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Abstract 
This paper will have a close look at the costs of HSR infrastructure and the reasons why 
they vary so much according to different countries. Not only infrastructural costs will be 
analysed but also operation, social and environmental costs. Comparison between 
different European countries will be shown in order to see what are the costs in each one. 
The comparison will be done amongst the four European countries with more operative 
HSR lines: Germany, France, Italy and Spain. The benefits derived from HSR will also be 
shown and discussed. 
 
 Although according to European legislation, separation in different institutions (whether 
public or private) of infrastructure and operation is compulsory; the application of this 
Directive is being done differently, leading to different financial results. Also, decision-
making methods in each of the chosen countries will be analysed and discussed, to see 
the criteria on which the countries rely on. When exposing the project appraisal methods 
used, it will be discussed what method is best under each circumstance. Another 
interesting point is to see what are the most favourable conditions in which to construct 
HSR, in terms of demand, population density and distance between cities. A close look at 
how the HSR lines have been financed in each of the study countries will be done, paying 
special attention to where the funds come from. In addition, social profitability of the 
infrastructures once they are operative will be analysed in an ex-post evaluation using 
cost-benefit analysis.  
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Task 
High-Speed Rail Projects: Economic Evaluation, Decision-making and 
Financing 
 
Construction and operation of high-speed railway lines always goes along with high costs. 
Implementation or increasing the offered HSR-traffic has to base upon solid decisions. At 
this, rentability and assuring the financing of that traffic offer are of high relevance. In this 
master thesis the whole topic has to be described broadly.  
 
Cost components and financing 
To do economic valuations, all the different cost components appearing at high-speed rail 
projects have to be comprised. Examples are: erecting of infrastructure and purchasing 
train sets, railway operation, maintenance, operational difficulties etc. The author has to 
itemise these costs, show the context of them and point out their position in the lifecycle of 
a railway line. The financial responsibility of the different costs has to be allocated to the 
acting institutions. In addition, the ways of financing the single costs are to point out (e.g. 
construction of transportation infrastructure). 
Based upon this, financing of long-haul passenger transport by rail in different countries 
has to be analysed. To select the countries, the tutor has to be consulted. European and 
additional countries with high-speed rail are to comprise. As mentioned above in general, 
the financial responsibilities of the different institutions for all single cost components in 
every country have to be pointed out. In addition it is to display, how the railway 
companies are organised and how there are integrated in governmental structures (incl. 
discussing the effects of dividing infrastructure operators and train operators according to 
EU-regulations). 
 
Economic valuation and decision-making 
Due to the often extended importance of transportation projects, the decision-making (pro 
or contra specific projects, consideration of alternatives) has to be broad and 
comprehensible. 
First, the basic alternatives of economic valuation of high speed rail projects are to 
describe. It is to get clear, what data input is needed for significant valuations and how 
quality and quantity of the input data influence the results. 
Economy is not the only deciding criterion, especially in infrastructure projects, so it is to 
display, which other criteria are used to evaluate projects. First, the basic methods of 
decision-making (as a part of economic sciences) have to be described. Based upon this, 
decision-making methods for investment in transportation infrastructures in the different 
countries have to be itemised. In Germany, for example, the chosen projects belong to 
Bundesverkehrswegeplan (BVWP). The choice method for BVWP contains amongst 
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others the determination of a macroeconomic benefit-to-cost-relation and analysis of 
spatial effectiveness. 
So there are two questions to answer for each country: 
1. Does an instrument exist for (coordinated) planning of infrastructure investments 
in the country and what is its design? 
2. Which methods are used for project choice? 
It is also to discuss, whether and how operation of infrastructure is included in the 
decision. 
Ex-post-analysis 
An ex-post-analysis is used to determine economic contexts after realising a project, e.g. 
after start of train operation on a HSR. First the author has to introduce the method of ex-
post-analyses in general. Then an exemplifical analysis is to carry out for some selected 
high speed railway lines. For selection, the tutor has to be consulted again. It is to attend, 
that railway lines often are part of a network. An improper separation from the network 
could lead to false results. 
 
 
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Wolfgang Fengler 
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Aims 
• Investigate the effects of infrastructure management and operation management 
separation in independent companies. 
 
• Analyse the liberalization of the railway market processes in some European 
countries. 
 
• Describe the fundamental reasons of the increasing trend in HSR infrastructure 
construction in Europe. 
 
• Show the different costs of HSR in different countries. 
 
• Show the beneficial impacts of HSR in different countries. 
 
• Clarify the most suitable conditions for HSR investment. 
 
• Define the guidelines for a proper appraisal of Railway projects. 
 
• Identify the different decision making processes and criteria in the study countries 
for HSR construction and compare the differences. 
 
• Investigate the financing sources for HSR. 
 
• Investigate the socioeconomic profitability of an already existing HSR line in 
Europe (Ex-post analysis). 
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Conclusion summary 
Title: High-Speed Rail projects: Economic Evaluation, Decision-making and 
Financing. 
• The rail liberalization has been scarce in all the studied countries as the majority 
of the railway undertakings belong to State owned companies. This means that 
very little competition has taken place in the rail market. 
 
• The main reasons for HSR construction vary among the different countries. The 
main reasons are capacity relief in the saturated railway corridors and political 
reasons, where no evidence of transport efficiency criteria has been used to 
justify the investments. 
 
• The average cost per kilometre of HSR infrastructure in the studied countries is 
17M !, being the highest costs in Germany and Italy and the lowest costs in 
Spain. 
 
• Benefits of HSR occur mainly in terms of time savings and not in terms of 
environmental conservation and development of deprived economic areas.  
 
• The most efficient HSR investments takes place under certain circumstances: 
when demand is enough to cover operation expenses, when times of travel are 
competitive with the plane and when distribution of population is congregated in 
few high density nodes. 
 
• In the four studied countries, three existing appraisal techniques are used: cost-
benefit analysis, multi-criteria analysis and the financial analysis. In spite of this, 
there are differences in how the techniques are used, being Germany the country 
that takes most care of environmental issues and being France and Spain the 
countries that give more importance to the impacts on economy when 
constructing HSR. 
 
• Traditionally, the HSR lines have been financed using Public Budgets and loans, 
which the governments ask for to banks or other lending institutions such as the 
European Investment Bank. The new trend is arranging Public Private 
Partnerships so that efficiency in the construction, operation and maintenance of 
the HSR increases and also not to stress Public Budgets so much. 
 
• The ex-post evaluation of the Madrid-Seville line clearly shows how this line is 
non-profitable from the social point of view, being the costs much higher than the 
quantified benefits. The main problem is lack of passenger demand, which is the 
main factor to achieve positive social returns from the investment. 
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1  Introduction!
In the past 25 years, railway infrastructure has been constructed at a high rate in Europe 
following the new European Commission Directives issued in 1990, which aimed to 
reduce road traffic and air traffic in favour of railway traffic. During the second half of the 
20th Century, both passenger traffic and freight traffic in railway had decreased 
substantially due the rapid expansion of the automotive industry leading to the problems 
of road traffic congestion, pollution and excessive costs in time delays. In terms of HSR, 
the European Directives want to achieve high rates of passenger traffic, warranting their 
security and also achieve high levels of trans-European interoperability; reducing 
technical boundaries for operation and describing technical standards for the construction 
of the railways, for example, international track gauges. 
 
HSR has several different definitions, but the most accepted one is the one provided by 
the International Union of Railways (UIC), which includes the following three: [1] 
• Lines that are explicitly built to run trains capable of speeds 250 km/h or over. 
 
• Conventional railway lines that have been upgraded to run trains capable of 
speeds of 200km/h; 
 
• Conventional railway lines that have been upgraded but because of special 
topographical circumstances or due to the proximity with urban areas, the speeds 
must be reduced to certain maximum. 
 
These definitions are wide enough to include the totality of the HSR infrastructure. 
However speed is not the only factor which has to be taken into account since there are 
other which can cause trains equipped with high speed technology to slow down, as 
stated on the third definition above. 
 
The first European HSR line to be operative was the French connection between Paris 
and Lyon in 1981. Congestion problems in the existing railway line made the authorities 
start the feasibility studies for constructing a new one instead of upgrading the existing 
conventional line. Both cities, which are 483km apart, were connected in 2h 20 min. Soon, 
this line became successful in terms of demand as it carried more than 12 million 
passengers (Vickerman 2007) during the first year of operation and so the French TGV 
started expanding rapidly. In 1991, ran the first HSR line in Germany between Hannover 
and Würzburg, connecting both cities short after German reunification in about 2h. Short 
after, in 1992, the first Spanish HSR line was opened between Madrid and Seville, 
covering the 530 km in 2h 55min. Since 1992 onwards, HSR construction has been at a 
growing trend, and still today there are new projects being studied.  
 
In early 2008 there were in operation around 10.000 km of new HSR lines throughout 
the world, and globally, including conventional lines also used by the high-speed 
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trains, more than 17.000 kilometres of the railway world were used to provide high speed 
services to a growing number of travellers willing to pay for lower travel times and higher 
quality rail transport. In Europe, the average annual traffic is located at 50 
million passengers, but has grown steadily since 1981 at an annual rate of 2.6%. The total 
number of HSR km in operation on Europe is about 6.700. [2] 
 
It is has been discussed whether the construction of HSR lines is always profitable for 
society and for the managing companies. Due to its high implementation costs, new 
construction of lines is not always justified in terms of benefits. Solid decisions have to be 
made in order to approve new construction of HSR, such as sufficient passenger demand, 
operation costs, and time savings. Furthermore, financial profitability of all stakeholders 
must be analysed in order to ensure success. Private investors will most likely be 
reluctant to take excessive risks when investing in such high costly operations, therefore, 
government decision making will have to consider all the stakeholders involved. Although 
investigators agree on the need to compare social benefits and costs of transport 
infrastructure before committing excessive resources to this purpose, the truth is that ex 
ante appraisals are often not being done and therefore questionable returns appear from 
these once they start their life cycle. HSR infrastructure involves high investment costs, 
often irreversible, subject to strong indivisibilities and high risk due to uncertainty of 
demand. These features show the high cost of taking wrong decisions. Therefore it is 
important to appraise projects correctly considering all stakeholders during the whole life 
cycle of the infrastructure. This type of analysis is what is known as the financial 
profitability analysis. 
 
On the other hand, cost benefit analysis is used to show the economic impact of a project 
in the whole of “society’s” welfare and does not consider financial profitability for 
stakeholders. It measures benefits and costs of the project for society in terms of 
resources, which, for many items, the market will be able to provide. Others, such as time 
of travel, are non directly tradable. Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a useful technique, 
which will be described later in this investigation. It is a fact that this technique is used 
worldwide, but it has been proved that it is most useful when the CBA links with the 
incentive system of financing mechanisms. Other appraisal methods used are multi 
criteria method and the economic impact method. Depending on the country, different 
methods are used.  
 
Components of HSR infrastructure are by far, more expensive than conventional railway. 
This is due to the higher quality of the materials used and of course, due to the modern 
technology implemented. Satellite navigation systems and safety measures take up a 
considerable amount of the budget in this type of infrastructure. Rolling stock is also an 
important part of the total costs as well as the operation costs. 
 
On the other hand, benefits of HSR are also taken into account. HSR is known because it 
reduces travel times and access passenger times. Historically, HSR have been put 
through in order to reduce congestion in some corridors, either road corridors or 
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conventional railway corridors. Also, reduction in fossil fuel consumption is a HSR 
characteristic compared to the air transport sector; therefore it is considered an important 
benefit in terms of socioeconomic profitability. 
 
These extremely high costs of HSR have to be financed one way or the other, and this is 
the reason why further on in this document, a deeper investigation is carried out. It is 
interesting to see how, at a slow pace, governments expect to have private financial 
support so that public budgets are not so much affected by HSR investments. Private 
participation in projects via concession contracts is believed to increase the projects 
overall performance, in terms of management and operations. 
 
2  Railway Legal Framework in Europe 
2.1  91/440 Directive 
This European directive issued in 1991, applies to the management of rail infrastructure 
and rail transport in all the Member States of the Union. It does not refer only to HSR but 
to all railway activities taking place. It only applies to railway companies, which provide 
railway services throughout a country and therefore, are excluded, railway undertakings 
whose activities take place only at an urban, suburban or regional level. This European 
directive states three basic points that will have to be complied with: 
 
• Management independence 
Governments of the Member States will make sure to take the appropriate measures to 
warrantee the separation of management, administration and administration accounting. 
This means, the States will have nothing to do with the assets, accounts and budgets of 
the railway companies. 
 
The States will make sure that railway companies will adapt their activities to the market 
and to be properly managed by their own directive bodies. Also, Governments should 
control their activities so that they provide the most efficient and cheapest services to 
users. 
 
• Separation between transport operations 
Member States should ensure the separation of infrastructure management and transport 
operations, maintaining income accounts and balance sheets apart. The accounts of the 
operator and the infrastructure manager will be published separately and there will be no 
fund transfer between them. Public budgets should also reflect this account separation. 
Furthermore, each State will be responsible for the correct development of the railway 
system (i.e. planning, decision making and finance) always taking to consideration the 
general needs. 
 
• Access to railway infrastructure 
All railway operators affected by this directive will have access to all EU countries 
infrastructure, not only to provide freight transport but also to provide passenger transport. 
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The European Transport Commission will monitor the technical conditions for the 
development of the railway market and will work with each countries EU representatives 
so that this Directive is complied with. [3] 
 
 2.2  95/18 Directive 
This Directive sets the criteria for the granting licenses of railway companies of the EU 
with good reputation, sound financial situations, acknowledged skills of their workers and 
those in possession of a liability insurance. 
This Directive covers the following aspects: 
• Each country shall appoint a licensing authority in order to grant the licenses to 
the targeting companies. 
 
• Railway companies established in the EU will have the right to apply for a license 
in their own country. The license will be valid throughout the whole EU. 
 
• The license for itself does not give full right to access the infrastructure because 
several requirements have to be achieved. These requirements are: a security 
certificate issued by a competent authority in the State to which the infrastructure 
belongs to, the allocation of the tracks on which the company will be able to 
operate and the realization of the necessary business arrangements with the 
infrastructure manager.  
 
2.3  95/19 Directive  
The rules for the capacity allocation the railway infrastructure are contained in this 
Directive. It determines the conditions of utilisation of the infrastructure in terms of: 
• The provision in the allocation of the infrastructure 
 
• The collection of royalties from the operator to be able to operate in the 
infrastructure. 
 
• The obligation of the infrastructure managers to publish a network statement (this 
is the document that sets out the characteristics of the infrastructure available to 
the railway companies, and contains information on the conditions of access to 
it. It details the general rules, deadlines, procedures and criteria concerning the 
charging and capacity allocation, and any other necessary information to enable 
application of the operator to use the infrastructure) 
 
• Creating a regulatory organism in every country, which may supervise the 
development of the operator’s activities and will act as a referee in case of 
conflicts, especially in the use and royalties for utilization. 
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These Directives have been applied in all EU countries but with a different degree of 
compliance and therefore they have been modified and adapted due to the failure in the 
complete application of its contents (fully achieve the process of liberalisation and free 
competition). [4] 
 
 2.4 First Railway Package 
In order to achieve the revitalization of the use of railway in Europe, and to in order to get 
a transfer of an important proportion of road traffic, to the European Commission issued a 
series of new Directives which were known under “ First Railway Package” on February 
2001. These Directives amended the previous ones, taking into account the resolutions 
written in the White Paper that stated the importance of a full liberalization in the railway 
sector. The new European Directives were the 2001/12, 2001/13, 2001/14, which added 
new measures in terms of freedom of access to infrastructure and reduce constraints. A 
new Directive, 2001/16, later joined these, and addressed issues related with the 
interoperability of the system. These three directives emphasized the liberalization of 
services, greater separation of the infrastructure exploitation and the creation of a 
regulation entity of the railway business. 
A brief summary of each of these follows: 
• 2001/12 Directive: this goes on, on the 91/440 in the rules of separation between 
services and management. It defines the infrastructure manager as the one in 
charge of installation and maintenance as well as the responsible for security 
issues. It stated the willingness to open the railway service market in 2003 up to 
50.000km for the Trans-European Freight Railway Network. Nevertheless, in 
2008 the whole European network must be open. 
 
• 2001/13 Directive: it extends the provision of the 95/18, which introduced a 
licensing system only for international railway operators. Now, it is extended to 
national rail service providers, ensuring a fair non-discriminatory treatment for all 
of them. 
 
• 2001/14 Directive: emphasizes on the rules for awarding infrastructure capacity 
in terms of a more specific definition of railway companies’ rights. An 
independent organism, not related to any operator, will carry out the capacity 
award. Regarding to the charges on the utilization of railway infrastructure, 
pricing is calculated on marginal costs i.e. costs related only to the operation of 
services. Also, charges will be set by independent organisms. 
 
• European Transport White Paper: it stated the prioritization of railway transport to 
the detriment of road and air transport in order to balance the modal distribution. 
Also, an important issue was to remove bottlenecks in the railway network and to 
achieve interoperability in passenger traffic and freight traffic. Security measures 
were also put forward in the White Paper.[4] 
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2.5 Second Railway Package 
On January 2002, the European Commission issued a series of new laws, which intended 
to create a common space for an integrated railway area. The main 5 actions describes in 
these new Directives are all following the guides of the 2001 White Paper and all have to 
do with upgrading the already stated measures in the past. Again the main objectives 
were, enhancing security, achieving interoperability, the market opening for freight 
transport and the creation of a European Railway Agency responsible for coordinating the 
technical work. A brief summary of each directive is as follows: 
• 2004/49 Directive: has to do with security matters in terms of creating a European 
common security space, describing thoroughly the security systems, which all 
railway operators should adopt. Its aim is to develop a common approach on 
safety and creating a common system to regulate the expedition, content and 
validity of safety certificates. An agency will be created in every Member State 
responsible of certifying the quality in the railway services and infrastructure. A 
very important point here is creating common procedures when investigating 
accidents driven by independent investigating agencies. 
 
• 2005/50 Directive: it modifies and completes with the previous Directives related 
to interoperability of conventional and high-speed railway systems. At this point, 
interoperability is defined as the capacity of circulating anywhere in the railway 
network. Therefore, this Directive is a further step in implementing the European 
technical railway systems, removing technical barriers that eventually would be 
against international traffic. It insists in improving the technical interoperability 
specifications that will be issued by the European Railway Agency and which also 
force countries to publish a rolling stock register every year. [4] 
 
2.6 Third Railway Package 
The third railway package consisted of new European directives orientated towards 
passenger rights and with the aim of revitalizing international passenger traffic. The 
railway sector must by 2010 be completely open to international competition in national 
and international journeys. The new legislation is composed of two Directives, one on the 
development of the Community's railway through a certification of train 
drivers and personnel involved in the driving, and a second one regulating on the 
rights and obligations of rail passengers.  
 
Concerning train driver certifications, it will be compulsory for these to be in possession of 
a license, which certifies their skills to drive specific trains and their language skills. 
 
Concerning passenger rights, the new Directives stated the conditions of compensations 
due to delays in the railway service. Alike with the air transportation sector, 
compensations will be applied in case of severe delays, link loss and cancellations. 
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Delays between 60 and 119 minutes will be compensated with 25% of the tickets price, 
and delays beyond 120 minutes will be compensated with 50% of the fare. 
Compensations will have to be paid within 1 month from passenger’s claim. 
Other elements in the new legislation include the obligation of railway operators to inform 
passenger about their rights and duties and not to discriminate the disabled.[4] 
 
2.7 HSR legislation 
HSR laws in the European Commission have to do with technical standardization of 
systems to be able to achieve interoperability within the whole European Union. The 
Directive underlines the essential requirements covering all of the conditions to be met in 
order to ensure the interoperability of the European high-speed train network. Member 
States are obliged to comply with these essential requirements to achieve the objectives 
of interoperability in Europe. The trans-European high-speed train network is divided into 
many sub-systems, which are subject to special rules. The European Union implements 
rules concerning the management of the sub-systems by the Member States. The 
Directive also defines the allocation of roles and prerogatives of the Member States, the 
procurement bodies, manufacturers and notified bodies. 
 
2.7.1 ERTMS  
Technical systems such as ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System) started 
being deployed in 2009 after a 7-year phase of research and development. ERTMS is a 
system, which enhances cross border interoperability and signalling procurement by 
creating a Europe wide standard for train control and command systems. The two main 
components of ERTMS are the European Train Control System (ETCS), which is an 
automatic train protection system, and GSM-R radio system that provides voice and data 
communication between track and train using GSM standard frequencies. ERTMS is 
being deployed because there are more than 20 train control systems in the EU, making it 
difficult for trains to cross borders in a safe way. Endowing trains with different signalling 
and communication systems to be able to operate across borders also means high costs. 
For example, Thalys trains covering the Paris-Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam line use up 
to 7 different train control systems. A standardization of these systems will make, not only 
passenger traffic, but also freight traffic, more efficient. According to the European Union, 
the ERTMS system will bring benefits in reducing maintenance, enhancing reliability, 
punctuality and traffic capacity. This will also mean great environmental benefits for the 
whole Community. [5] 
 
  2.7.1.1 ERTMS deployment in Italy and Spain 
In Spain, the railway infrastructure manager ADIF has deployed ERTMS in level 1 in the 
following operating lines: 
• Madrid-Barcelona HSR line (650km) (since October 2011, ERTMS level 2) 
• Córdoba-Málaga HSR line (155km) 
• Madrid-Valencia HSR line (500km) 
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• Madrid-Valladolid HSR line (197km) 
• Madrid-Toledo HSR line (80km) 
• Zaragoza-Huesca HSR line (80km) 
 
ERTMS will also be deployed in HSR lines that are at the moment under construction in 
northwest Spain (Galicia) and the international connection with France via Figueres in the 
northeast. 
Observed benefits since the ERTMS was fully operative in the stated lines above were the 
achieved punctuality rates above 98% on average in all lines using ERTMS. 
 
Italy has been an early investor of ERTMS, therefore it is nowadays deploying level 2 of 
ERTMS. ERTMS Level 2 does not need trackside light signals and allows for a significant 
increase in terms of traffic capacity. The following lines use such traffic management 
system: 
 
• Rome-Naples HSR line (245km) 
• Torino-Novara HSR line (80km) 
• Milan-Bologna HSR line (219km) 
• Bologna-Florence HSR line (78km) 
• Novara-Milan HSR line (40km) 
 
Benefits of such deployment include an increase in tunnel speed in the lines running 
through the Alps, resulting in a global increase of the share in railway passenger transport 
up to 48% in detriment of the air transport market share (39%). [6] 
 
3  Rail liberalisation levels across Europe 
According to the European directives above explained, European countries should tend to 
a higher degree of liberalisation in their rail markets, and at some point be similar to one 
another. Yet, this similarity has not yet been achieved because of the differences existing 
in the granting of these companies. Different States in the EU give different subsidies to 
railway companies and this influences the level of deregulation. Some authors state in 
their investigations that full deregulation and competition lead to higher productive 
efficiency, in the freight market and in the passenger market. Deregulation helped 
operators to improve their financial results reorganizing networks, cutting off unnecessary 
costs, reducing the staff and negotiating new contracts with shippers. 
 
In spite of these conclusions, many countries that have documented non-discriminatory 
access to railway companies into the system, do not allow this to happen due to high 
costs in licensing processes. Rolling stock approval represents one of the biggest barriers 
for companies to access the infrastructure. It is easy to find regulatory institutions to be 
dependant on each State’s Transport Ministry without the necessary resources; therefore, 
reality differs from what is stated in European legislation. 
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Nash (2008) studies show three models of deregulation:  
• Separation of operations and infrastructure management. 
• Separation of basic competences  
• Separation of the main holding rail company.  
 
He states that completely unbundled countries could face high transaction costs in the 
future due to the large amount of operators. Also, the task of governments is key to 
achieve full separation and full access. They must remove bureaucratic barriers and 
promote competition, leaving the task of decision making in operations to the private 
sector. Therefore, governments should only supervise the conditions of entering the 
market and protect the consumer but not interfere with operational decisions. 
 
3.1 Current monopoly conditions 
Germany and Italy are the two European countries that have a greater separation 
between operation and infrastructure management. In spite of this fact, the major 
contributor in the management of the network is still the State but in the case of Italy, 
under different departments: the Ministry of Economics and the Ministry of Transport. In 
France SNCF (operator) and RFF (infrastructure manager) are economically independent 
have separate account sheets but are in conflict in two aspects. The first one is in the 
charging of fees, where an agreement, which satisfies both parts, has not been yet 
completed and the second; the terms in the contract for which SNCF does the 
infrastructure maintenance. Quality achievement and finance of the infrastructure 
maintenance is a matter of conflict between them. In Spain, the owner of infrastructure is 
ADIF and the company responsible for the operations is RENFE, although they both 
belong to the same Transport Ministry (Ministerio de Fomento), they are under different 
secretariats and work under a Program Contract, in which states mutual obligations and 
benefits. Summarizing, in the four countries the owner of the companies is the State 
under different ministries, which highlights clearly the “dress up methods” used in order to 
give a separated appearance. 
 
Table 1 shows the ways in which funding of national railway companies occurs in the four 
countries stated. 
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Table 1 State and Regional finance in 4 cost types [7]  
 Investments Network maintenance Services Rolling stock 
Italy 
State ! RFI 
(Program 
contract) 
State ! RFI 
(Program 
contract) 
State ! 
Trenitalia 
(Long distance 
services) 
 
Regions ! 
Trenitalia 
(Regional 
services) 
 
No subsidies 
before 2009. 
 
Regional 
Governments !  
Trenitalia (from 
2010) 
France 
State ! RFF (for 
non financially 
profitable 
investments) 
State ! RFF 
(contract 
subsidies 
 
State ! SNCF 
(maintenance 
contracts) 
State and 
Regions ! 
SNCF (public 
service 
obligations) 
 
 
For regional 
services, rolling 
stock 
amortizations is 
part of the 
financial 
arrangement of 
contracts. 
Germany 
Federal State ! 
DBNetz (by law 
BSchWAG) 
 
Regions ! DB 
Netz 
Federal State ! 
DBNetz 
Regions ! DB 
(for regional 
services only) 
Not subsidized 
Spain State! ADIF State! ADIF 
State! RENFE 
(public service 
obligations) 
 
Regions! 
RENFE (for 
regional services) 
State! RENFE 
(about 40% of 
investments in 
rolling stock) 
 
As seen on Table 1, in Spain is where most governmental intervention takes place as it 
finances at four levels, investments for infrastructure, operations, maintenance and 40% 
of the rolling stock. Little amounts of money come from regions, only to pay for the 
regional services. The Spanish State also covers operating losses accounting for 150M! 
per year between 2009 and 2010. The French case shows almost the same as in Spain, 
where State and Regions co-finance the railway companies to a large extent, except for 
rolling stock. RFF must, by law, keep SNCF as only client; a clear demonstration of State 
intervention in the railway sector. In Germany, it is seen that Regions finance the service 
operations and the State only funds investments in infrastructure maintenance. Italy has 
also a strong cash input from Sate and Regions but had no finance for the acquisition of 
rolling stock before 2009. However, after 2010, a 2.000M ! State investment was 
announced to purchase rolling stock. [7] 
 
To have an idea of the amount of money that States and regional governments transfer to 
their railway companies, table 2 summarizes such amounts in 2007. 
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Table 2 Public transfers in investment costs and total demand of railway network in 
2007. [7], [8] 
 Spain Italy Germany France 
Infrastructural 
investments 
(Million !) 
2125 3900 4270 2151 
Demand 
(Million 
passenger-
km in 2007) 
21.362 49.780 79.098 81.961 
Ratio 
(!/passenger-
km) 
0,09 0,07 0,05 0,02 
 
Table 2 shows public transfers in investment costs and passenger demand in the whole 
railway network in 2007. As seen, in absolute term, Germany is the country with higher 
transfers to railway managers and Spain is the country with the lowest transfers.  
Anyway, to be able to compare between countries, it is useful to pay attention to the ratio; 
investment in ! per passenger-km. Here is where Spain gets the highest transfers of 
public investment per passenger-km and France the lowest. An explanation to this fact is 
the high amount of public budget that Spain is transferring for its expansion of the HSR 
network, despite the low demand rates. Italy and Germany are the countries that have 
intermediate State transfers for new infrastructure with 0,07 and 0,05 !/passenger-km 
respectively. 
 
3.2 Evolution of the concessional model 
Traditionally, European countries have used concession agreements in order to provide 
the railway services. This model involved transfers to companies to be included in the 
annual budgets, often resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources, cost overruns due 
to additional payments and discrimination to competition due to subsidies. Therefore, this 
system has evolved towards a contractual model, where contracts of issue, are 
established between public institutions and railways. The contracts define the terms and 
conditions of the payments to railway undertakings and therefore use of resources is more 
efficient. Contracts also regulate the duration of the public funding. With these, Regions 
are able to have better programming in the acquisition of rolling stock and provide higher 
quality services. If terms in the contracts are not respected by either of the two signing 
parties, independent regulatory agencies can act and sanction the party committing the 
irregularities. Other functions of these agencies include tariff setting and ensuring 
competition between operators. From 2009 there is in France such an agency called 
Autorité de Régulation des Activités Ferroviaires (Railway-Activity Regulation Authority), 
which deals with infrastructure charges to operators, access and deals with conflicts when 
agreements between Public Sector and operators are not reached. In Germany, the 
regulatory organisms are the Eisenbahnbundesamt  and BNetzA; the first responsible for 
the timing of technical specifications and the second deals with track charging and sets 
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the non discriminatory rules. In Italy and Spain such agency does not exist as such and 
the Ministries assume these functions. [7] 
 
3.3 Conditions to access the market 
Theoretically as explained before, the market should allow free access to any company 
willing to provide rail services and that complies with the rules of access, according to 
European directives. Reality differs somehow on what stated in the Directives due to each 
country’s specific legislation. In Germany is where the hardest conditions to obtain an 
operating license take place, especially due to technical and trained personnel 
requirements, although it is the country with more railway operators (see Table 3). On the 
opposite side, Italy has the less strict conditions to enter the market, as only a declaration 
certifying that all requirements are met at the moment of starting operations, instead of an 
ex-ante certification. The monopoly conditions of Spain and France make it very difficult to 
access the rail markets for other undertakings that are not public like RENFE o SNCF. 
 
Regarding the access conditions in terms of accessing the use of fixed railway assets 
such as terminals, stations, depots and maintenance machinery; differences between the 
four countries are found. It is important to remember that operation means not only the 
right of using the tracks but also the rest of necessary infrastructure. Many times, this acts 
as a barrier for accessing the market because it is not easy to manage such high cost 
assets, and they are strictly necessary to carry out railway operations. The following table 
summarizes the conditions in every country to access the fixed assets operation. 
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Table 3 Access conditions to fixed railway assets [7] 
 
It is seen that France’s conditions for entering the operation in train depots and stations is 
not open to other competitors and therefore can only be operated by SNCF and RFF 
national companies. In Germany and Italy is where fewer restrictions to enter the fixed 
assets management occur as the four types have full open access to competition. In 
Spain, ADIF, infrastructure manager gives full access to competitors but RENFE operator 
does not give such in the maintenance machinery assets. With this table, the differences 
in the access conditions to fixed railway assets in the four countries are made clear, being 
Italy the less restrictive in this sense.  
 
No less important than the fixed assets is the issue of rolling stock purchasing. Rolling 
stock is one of the most expensive items in the railway companies costs. Not only the 
purchase of it, but also amortization and maintenance. Normally, state companies do not 
provide other tendered companies with their rolling stock, being the main reason why new 
companies will have to purchase it, leading to high costs that they cannot assume This is 
seen as an important barrier to access the market. This is not the case of Germany, 
where the Regions (Bundesländer) own the rolling stock and lease it to the tendered 
companies who have accessed the rail market. In Spain, RENFE State Company owns 
the rolling stock and does not give the chance to newcomers to lease it. Instead rolling 
stock must be purchased and maintained, incurring in high costs. Of course it is easier to 
 Italy France Germany Spain 
Stations RFI, open to new entrants 
Divided into 
"technical" part 
(owned by RFF 
and accessible) 
and 
"commercial" 
part (owned by 
SNCF) 
DB Station und 
Service, open to 
new entrants 
ADIF, open 
to new 
entrants 
Freight 
terminals 
RFI, open to 
new entrants 
 
Some of 
them are 
transferred to 
Trenitalia 
and access 
is subjected 
to its 
approval 
Owned by RFF 
and rented out 
to operators, 
other 
competitors 
must apply to 
use them 
The majority is 
owned by DB 
Netz and rented 
out to Railion 
(cargo carrier), 
few private 
owners, 
Container 
terminals are 
open to new 
entrants 
ADIF, open 
to new 
entrants 
Maintenance 
units 
RFI, open to 
new entrants 
Light 
maintenance 
units for rolling 
stocks are 
operated by 
SNCF but are 
considered as 
an essential 
facility and 
competitors 
have access to 
them. 
Open to DB 
Netz and private 
companies 
RENFE, not 
open 
Train depots RFI, open to new entrants 
Owned by 
SNCF, not open 
Open to 
operators and 
DB 
Dienstleistungen 
(Services) 
ADIF, open 
to new 
entrants 
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buy rolling stock if the company is granted with public funds, therefore new companies in 
Spain will have a clear disadvantage. In Italy, like in Spain, trains were financed by 
Trenitalia itself until 2009, when the Italian government started to grant the purchase of 
rolling stock. The case of France is somewhat like in Germany, where Regions contribute 
to the rolling stock amortizations according to the contracts existing with the main 
operator, SNCF.  
3.4 Licensed operators and market shares 
Market liberalization has led to a growing number of railway undertakings in European 
countries, although it is not a clear indicator of the level of market opening because many 
times, the market is not profitable enough for new competitors to enter. Table 4, shows 
the number of actual companies operating in the four countries being studied.  
 
Table 4 Number of operators and their market shares. [3], [7] 
 
Licensed 
operators 
2008 
Operating Passenger market share 
Freight market 
share 
Italy 
49 (many of 
them of mixed 
traffic) 
16 Less than 1% (2009) 13% (2008) 
Germany 350 330 
Regional: 
15,2% 
 
Long distance: 
< 1% (2006) 
19%(2007) 
 
22%(2009) 
France 
8 (mainly 
freight 
operators) 
- 0% (2008) 
10% (2008) 
 
15% (2009) 
Spain 
8 (mainly 
freight 
operators) 
(14 by 2011) 
- 0% (2008) 5% (2008) 
 
As seen on Table 4, most companies are operating in Germany, as it is easier to enter the 
market than in the other countries. 330 companies operate regularly and take up 
approximately 15% of the market share in regional services of passenger travel and up to 
22% of freight transport in 2008. Passenger market share for Spain and France is very 
low compared to the other two countries. Only after 2010 there was an opening to other 
companies only in the international passenger transport. The great majority of operators in 
these countries (Spain and France) are freight carriers. The number companies operating 
in Italy is not negligible although not near to Germany’s status. As seen, they take up a 
relatively high portion of the whole countries freight traffic (13%). 
 
4  Exploitation models of HSR lines. 
 Although the high-speed rail shares the same engineering principles of transport 
as conventional rail (both are based on the idea that the circulation on iron rails anchored 
to the floor allows the circulation of higher weight vehicles by reducing friction and energy 
expenditure to a minimum),there are also notable differences between the techniques. For 
example, from an operational point of view, signalling and guidance systems used 
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by each are completely different: while conventional rail traffic is controlled through 
external electric signals, along with automatic signalling and control placed along the track 
sides, communication between a high-speed train and the different stages of the path, 
is performed internally, using an integrated equipment in the driving cab. 
 
Similarly, the electrification is completely different: while most of the new railway  high-
speed lines require at least 25,000 Volts, conventional rail operates at a lower 
voltage. There are also other significant differences in relation to rolling 
stock and commercial exploitation of services. However, mixed exploitation systems 
between high speed and conventional rail exist. Four exploitation models are identified: 
 
Figure 1 Railway exploitation models [9] 
• Exclusive exploitation model: takes place when each type of train (conventional 
and high speed) travels on specific built infrastructure. Therefore there are no 
mixed services and this brings a clear advantage: the commercial and 
administrative organization of services may be independent. 
 
• Mixed high-speed model: in this model high-speed trains travel on exclusive 
tracks and also in upgraded conventional infrastructure. A clear example of this 
models’ utilization is in France, where since 1981 the new TGV’s, were not only 
running in new built exclusive infrastructure but also in upgraded conventional 
tracks. The main renewal was the electrification of lines up to 25KV in order to 
allow high speed trains to travel on the tracks. The main advantage is the 
considerable reduction of construction costs. 
 
• Mixed conventional model: this takes place when conventional trains and high 
speed trains are used over new built infrastructure specially built for the second 
type. This happens in countries such as Spain where a different gauge has 
traditionally been used in conventional tracks. New built tracks are built in the 
international gauge (1435mm) so to be able to operate trains in both of them, new 
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technologies in train’s bogies had to be implemented. This technology allows 
bogies to vary their width in order to adapt to both gauges and is mainly used in 
Talgo trains for long distance journeys. This interoperability achievement in trains 
reduced the cost of rolling stock acquisition as well as maintenance costs, and 
allowed to offer express, intermediate services in certain routes. 
 
• Completely mixed model: this model is used when high-speed trains may use 
conventional tracks or when conventional trains may be used on new built tracks. 
This fact means more flexibility in operations, as no track constraints appear to 
run trains. Of course, each type of train will travel at its correspondent speed. This 
happens in some Intercity services (ICE) in Germany and in the Rome-Florence 
line, where at some moments high speed trains use conventional infrastructure 
and vice versa; especially conventional freight trains may use new built 
infrastructure for high-speed services during the night, when these services are 
much less frequent. This intensive use of tracks end up in higher track 
maintenance costs due to the erosion caused by heavy freight trains. When 
adopting a mixed high-speed model or an exclusive exploitation model, running of 
trains is subject to little conditions and may be more intensive utilization. Instead, 
when using the other two models, the fact that slower trains need bigger time 
slots to complete the same distance as faster trains travelling on the same tracks, 
means that planning of services needs to be very accurate. This may be avoided 
only in sections where duplicated tracks for overtaking exist. Due to the major 
capacity problems this may cause, the normal operations scheme is: high-speed 
passenger services occur during the daytime and freight traffic during the night 
time. Occasionally, high-speed night trains may use conventional tracks. 
 
The decision whether to use one exploitation model or another depends, amongst other 
factors, in an economic factor. This means that costs of using one or other have to be 
compared and analysed. These costs comprise, as always, construction and maintenance 
costs. Other decision factors apart from economic criteria, are listed ahead: 
• Characteristics of the rolling stock: when constructing a high-speed line it has to 
be taken into account that special rolling stock must be purchased. This must 
adapt to the high-speed specifications and requirements in order to achieve 
desired speeds and comply with security and technical standards. This type of 
rolling stock is much more expensive than conventional trains and usually 
amortization takes place during more than 20 years.  
 
• Public support: it is to be noticed, as explained in previous paragraphs, that HSR 
lines are being largely granted by governments, which have committed large 
amounts of public budget for their construction. The reason for this is European 
Commission’s commitment to favour railway transport instead of road transport 
due to the less consumption of fossil fuels, reduced levels of congestion and 
higher security. This massive support to HSR may bias decision of external 
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railway operators in favour of offering high-speed services instead of conventional 
ones. It may also influence decision on which exploitation model to use. 
 
• Growing demand of HSR services: it is a fact that passenger demand on this type 
of services has grown considerably over the past decade, especially in Europe. 
Society demands higher quality services in terms of time savings and passenger 
comfort for mid range hauls. Especially the number of business trips is growing in 
this type of transport, where one-day trips to cities within a 600-800 km range 
may be done. The added value HSR offers in terms of comfort, ticket sales, 
frequencies, time savings etc., is often positively valued by customers. This 
growing demand together with public grants is a perfect chance for external 
railway operators to make business and expand their companies, of course when 
competition is allowed in highly liberalised markets. [9] 
 
5  Costs of HSR lines 
Costs of HSR lines may be separated in three main types of costs: Infrastructure costs, 
infrastructure maintenance costs and operation costs. Also a fourth type of costs appears 
when the line is operative, like in all transport projects, external costs.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Types of HSR costs (source: author) 
5.1  Infrastructure costs  
The following table summarizes the infrastructure costs. 
 
Table 5 Types of infrastructure costs 
Planning and land costs 
Infrastructure costs 
Construction costs 
 
The larger costs are always related to infrastructure costs but these not only refer to the 
costs of materials and labour, but also to the costs of feasibility studies and land 
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expropriation. These are the previous stage before the start of construction itself and are 
known under the name of planning and land costs. The magnitude of a HSR project 
makes it compulsory for public administrations to task for these kinds of previous studies, 
which include not only technical studies but also economic studies. These try to make 
accurate estimates the final construction costs, which will be very important for the 
investor’s prediction of their financial profitability. Moreover, land acquisition has to be well 
taken into account, although land is many times purchased at expropriation cost instead 
of market value. This means, land results somewhat cheaper than if bought at market 
price. However, the high length of this type of infrastructure makes these costs arise 
substantially. The portion land acquisition and feasibility studies represent usually 
between 5-10% of the investment costs. 
 
Purely construction costs are the costs of infrastructure and superstructure. Construction 
of infrastructure involves terrain preparation, platform building, tunnelling and viaducts. 
These costs may vary between 10 to 25% of total investment costs when the 
topographical conditions are favourable. On the contrary, when topography is harsh i.e., 
when tunnels and viaducts need to be built, this percentage may duplicate up to 40 to 
50% of total investment. On the other hand, superstructure costs involve all elements on 
top of the platform: tracks, catenaries, signalling elements, electrification, safety 
installations and communication systems. Also included in this part are stations and train 
depots used for maintenance of rolling stock, which are considered basic facilities for a 
HSR line. However, special station architectural designs may increase substantially the 
cost of superstructural elements, well beyond the minimum for operating purposes. With 
no special architecture on stations this part of the budget represents between 5 to 10% of 
investment costs.  
 
The percentages given are general figures but these may vary according to each specific 
project, subject to terrain characteristics and the pre-existence of conventional 
infrastructure. If previous infrastructure was present, upgrading of this incurs in less costs 
than the construction of a completely new line. Attending to this criterion, five type of 
projects may be distinguished: 
• Large isolated corridors, which are constructed away from other HSR lines and 
for specific purposes. A clear example was the Madrid-Seville line, which was 
built in 1992 because of the celebration of the International Exposition in Seville. 
At present, this line is being integrated in Spain’s south HSR network with 
connections to Málaga and Córdoba. 
 
• Network integrated corridors, which connect to other existing HSR lines, allowing 
connections to other cities. This is the case of the Paris-Lille line, which was the 
north extension of the Paris-Lyon line. 
 
• Smaller extension of major existing lines, like for example Madrid-Toledo or Lyon-
Valence lines, built to provide service to medium size cities in the middle of big 
corridors. 
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• Large singular projects such as the Eurotunnel, connecting Calais (France) and 
Dover (UK). 
 
• Smaller projects that act as complements for the conventional network, which 
include high-speed connections to airports and upgrade of conventional railways 
for high speed services such as in Germany an Italy. 
 
The following table shows the range of infrastructure costs and average costs per km in 
the four countries being studied in this paper. These costs do not include feasibility 
studies or terrain preparation. 
 
Table 6 Average cost per km for HSR lines in service (s) and under construction (c) in 
million !. [10] 
 Cost Range/km Average cost/km 
 S C S C 
Spain 7,8 - 20 8,9 - 17,5 13,9 13,2 
Italy 18 - 25,5 14,0 - 65,8 21,75 39,9 
Germany 15 - 28,8 21,0 - 33,0 21,9 27 
France 4,7 - 18,8 10,0 - 23,0 11,75 16,5 
 
It can be observed that Spain and France have the lower infrastructure costs per km of 
new line (between 13 and 16,5 M ! on average) because their topography is not as harsh 
as in the other two countries, therefore less tunnelling and viaducts have had to be 
constructed. Also, the fact that less concentration of population outside main conurbation 
exists and so reduces land expropriation costs. On the opposite side, Italy and Germany 
have considerably higher costs due to construction procedures and due to Italy’s 
mountainous terrain in the north, especially on the Torino-Milan line. In France, 
construction procedures avoid tunnelling in favour of steeper grades up to 3,5% instead of 
the standard limit of 1 – 1,5%. This reduces the amount of tunnel and viaduct construction 
therefore reducing the construction costs. [10] 
 
Further explanations to the cost differences may be: 
• Land acquisition costs: in Spain, government land is often free of charge for 
transport infrastructure projects although these only represent 5% of total cost. In 
other countries land costs are higher, for example Germany, due to high-density 
populated areas. 
 
• The differences between the countries’ labour costs. 
 
• Environmental regulations: it is known that environmental regulations are more 
onerous Spain than in Germany for example, where these are stricter. This often 
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causes the increase in track length or tunnel length, raising the final cost of the 
project.  
 
• Pace of the approval for projects: normally, the longer it takes for the decision 
makers to process and accept the project proposals the more cost overruns there 
will be. 
 
• Changes in project specifications after the works have begun. 
 
 Figure 3 shows the maximum construction costs per km of infrastructure for the 
compared countries in already in service and under construction. Note how the costs of 
the under construction lines are much higher than the existing ones. Anyway, the total 
average construction costs for these four European countries is 17,3M! per kilometre of 
HSR infrastructure. 
 
 
Figure 3 HSR maximum construction costs per km (source: own elaboration from 
Table 6). 
5.2  Infrastructure maintenance costs 
Infrastructure maintenance cost are the ones incurred in labour to maintain stations and 
depots, maintenance operation activities such as energy consumed by specific machinery 
running along guideways; signalling systems; safety systems and traffic management. 
These costs are normally fixed cost, which means these operations occur systematically 
throughout the week according to the company’s safety and maintenance standards. 
Although, track and catenaries maintenance costs are directly proportional to the amount 
of trains running per day. This means that more train operations involve a higher wearing 
rate of both infrastructural elements and therefore higher costs. Knowing this, companies 
have to estimate maintenance costs depending on the number of daily operations that 
take place. On the other hand, companies’ benefits are expected to increase the more 
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railway services they provide, leading to a trade off relation where more running trains 
provide more revenues but also produce higher infrastructure maintenance costs.  
 
According to UIC (International Union of Railways) the proportions of labour costs 
compared to the total costs are: 55% for electricity facilities maintenance (catenaries and 
power stations) and 45% for equipment maintenance (signalling and management 
systems). The following table summarizes the annual cost per km of single track in some 
European countries: 
 
Table 7 Cost in ! (2002) of infrastructure maintenance per km of single track and year 
[10] 
 
As seen on Table 7, highest cost in infrastructure maintenance is the tracks that take on 
average 40% of the total maintenance cost. In France, this figure is higher, reaching 67% 
due to intensive track utilization with more train services that in Spain and Italy, especially 
in the Paris-Lyon line. It has to be considered that Spain most demanded line (Madrid-
Zaragoza-Barcelona) is relatively as it opened in 2009 new therefore demand ramp-up 
has not yet finished and therefore expected level of demand has not yet been achieved. 
Although Table 7 summarizes infrastructure costs in the whole of the network, not in 
specific lines. However Spain is the country that incurs in higher costs and Italy the one 
with fewer costs in this matter. Anyway, the average cost in these three countries is 
25.000 ! per km of single line, which means that to maintain a 600km line with double 
tracks, 30M ! need to be spent each year. 
5.3  Operation costs and rolling stock 
Inside this category, rolling stock acquisition, maintenance and utilization are found. The 
first one is mainly carried out at the beginning of operations when new rolling stock is 
purchased, but can also be done for renewal when the amortization period is over. 
Normally, rolling stock with high-speed characteristics is renewed every 20 to 25 years. 
Therefore railway undertakings must take into account in their cash flows the investments 
in new rolling stock during the period they are going to operate. The price of rolling stock 
depends on the contract agreements between operator and manufacturer companies an 
also in the train capacity. It stands to reason that greater train capacity means higher 
purchase price. Also technical specifications can affect final price. Operation costs involve 
personnel training and labour, passenger insurance and energy consumption. All of these 
will depend on the number of daily trains operating in a line, which at the same time, will 
 Spain Italy France 
km of single 
track 950,0 492,0 2638,0 
Track 
maintenance 13.531,0 40,4% 5.941,0 46,0% 19.140,0 67,3% 
Electrification 2.986,0 8,9% 2.455,0 19,0% 4.210,0 14,8% 
Signalling 8.654,0 25,9% 4.522,0 35,0% 5.070,0 17,8% 
Telecommunication
s 5.637,0 16,8% - - - - 
Other costs 2.650,0 7,9% - - - - 
Total 33.458,0 99,9% 12.918,0 100,0% 28.420,0 99,9% 
 36 
depend on the passenger demand. In regard to energy consumption, speed of travel is a 
factor that determines it. Daily services and operations will be adjusted to demand rates 
every year, so that tariff revenue covers operations costs. Otherwise, low demand rates 
and many operations cause operation costs to increase considerably. These costs are 
usually calculated in !/seat-km, units that relate train capacity and train distance. On the 
other hand, train maintenance costs which include again, labour and material reposition, 
are determined by demand, which at the same time determines train distance travelled 
each year. 
 
The following table summarizes the types of train used in European high-speed services 
and some of their characteristics: 
 
Table 8 Types of high-speed trains and their capacities. [9]. 
Country Type of train Capacity (seats) Capacity (seats-km per year) 
Max. Speed 
(km/h) 
TGV Resseau 377 186.615 320 
TGV Dupplex 510 267.750 320 France 
THALYS 377 167.765 320 
ICE-1 627 313.500 280 
ICE-2 368 147.200 280 
ICE-3 415 174.300 330 
Germany 
ICE/T 357 128.520 230 
ETR-500 590 212.400 300 Italy 
ETR-480 480 138.240 250 
AVE 329 154.630 300 
AVE S-112 365 175.680 330 Spain 
AVE S-103 404 140.970 330 
 
Higher train capacities may be observed in France’s TGV Dupplex by Alstom and 
Germany’s ICE-1 by Siemens, operating since 1995 and 1991 respectively. The faster 
between both are those in France capable of 320 km/h. Slightly lower capacities can be 
observed in Spanish trains, Siemens 112 and 103 models covering the Madrid-Seville and 
Madrid-Barcelona lines. Due to lower passenger demand rates, smaller convoy 
configurations are adopted, although S-103 may carry 141.000 seat-km every year. 
Convoys with different capacities are used in different lines depending on the times and 
demand rates. 
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Table 9 Train operation costs [9]. 
 
Country Type of train Euros/seat Euros/seat-km per year 
TGV Resseau 45 90 
TGV Dupplex 40 75 France 
THALYS 65 147 
ICE-1 60 124 
ICE-2 35 100 
ICE-3 56 120 
Germany 
ICE/T 42 120 
ETR-500 58 155 
Italy 
ETR-480 42 152 
AVE 65 154 
AVE S-112 55 125 Spain 
AVE S-103 46 95 
 
In the table above, train operation costs are compared using Euros/seat and Euros/seat-
km. The last one includes the cost of the train operations (mainly labour costs). On 
average, the cost of operating trains in these countries is 51!/ seat, being relatively higher 
in Spain’s AVE, as it has the same costs as the German ICE-1 but with almost half its 
capacity. When comparing figures with annual Euros/seat-km, it can be seen that on 
average, France’s technology reduces costs between 11 and 25% the costs of operation. 
Higher costs are observed in Italy’s ETR-500 despite its relatively high passenger 
capacity. 
 
Also energy consumption is taken into account in the operation costs, which depends on 
each countries specific trainset. Energy consumption varies with speed and number of 
passengers carried in each haul. At speeds over 300km/h energy consumption increases 
exponentially but the amount paid for it depends on electricity’s price in each country at 
each moment. In France and Germany, energy is somehow cheaper (between 5 and 
10%) not only because they have increased nuclear energy production but also because it 
is acquired directly by the operator rather than paying canon for infrastructure utilization. 
This happens mainly in Italy and Spain, where operator is charged by the infrastructure 
manager for each train that travels on the managers owned infrastructure. 
The following table shows train maintenance costs per 1000 km of train operation in each 
of the countries being studied 
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Table 10 High-speed train maintenance costs [9] 
Country Type of train Euros per 1000km 
TGV 
Resseau 1,6 
TGV Dupplex 1,6 France 
THALYS 1,8 
ICE-1 3,1 
ICE-2 1,6 
ICE-3 1,7 
Germany 
ICE/T 1,7 
ETR-500 4 Italy 
ETR-480 3,2 
AVE 2,9 
AVE S-112 3,1 Spain 
AVE S-103 3,3 
   
 
High-speed trains maintenance costs, just as the high-speed infrastructure maintenance 
costs are not low due to intensive usage and expensive material components (advanced 
technology). In the comparison above, recently acquired Spanish AVE Siemens 103 
model used in the Madrid-Barcelona line, shows higher maintenance costs that the rest of 
competitors in the four countries being studied (3,3!/1000km of train operation). Similar 
costs, and even higher, are seen in Italy’s ETR-500, just as its operation costs. On the 
other hand, France and Germany’s train maintenance costs are relatively lower with 
averages of 1,9!/1000 km of train operation. These differences may be explained by 
different maintenance plans, externalization costs and periodicity of new rolling stock 
acquisition. 
 
Taking the average distance travelled by a single convoy each year as 500.000 km, the 
annual maintenance costs per unit rises up to 1M !, which yields to 2!/km. 
 
5.4  External costs 
External costs (or externalities) are the those which the transport systems generates on 
the rest of society, or in other words, the costs which lapse on those who have nothing to 
do with the transport system. This means that all transportation activities, including the 
railway, will have negative effects on others.  
 
According to INFRAS/IWW studies on transport external costs, in the year 2000, the total 
external costs in the 17 EU members at that time was (excluding costs of congestion) 650 
billion Euros, representing about 7,3% of the EU’s GDP. Climate change contribution is 
the most important cost with almost 30%. Air pollution and accidents account for 27% and 
24% respectively, whereas noise represents 7% and landscape effects (barrier effects 
and visual impact) and other urban effects only represent 5% of total costs. The most 
striking sector is the road transport sector with more than 87% of all externalities, followed 
by the air transport (11%) and finally, the railway sector (1,5%) and the maritime transport 
(0,4%). These figures reflect how railway transport is one of the least contributors to 
external costs on society. [11] 
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Figure 4 Contribution to external costs by transport mode in the EU (2000). (Source: 
own elaboration from [11]) 
First, there are the environmental negative effects such as air pollution, land consumption, 
barrier effects, visual intrusion and contribution to global warming. In second place there 
are other negative effects, which the transportation systems may cause on external users 
such as accidents, congestion (and therefore time loss) and noise. All of these negative 
effects may be monetized and compared with the benefits an infrastructure can provide to 
conclude whether its construction is beneficial or rather harmful for society.  
 
5.4.1  Environmental effects 
The negative environmental effects of the construction of a new HSR have to be 
compared with the reduction of the externalities in road and air transport when 
passengers shift to HSR. The final balance depends on several factors but basically the 
net effect depends on the magnitude of the negative externalities in HSR compared with 
the substituted mode, on the volume of traffic diverted and whether, and in what degree, 
the external cost is internalised (users are charged according to the amount of negative 
impact they produce with their transportation activity). 
 
 The environmental effects of HSR are the same no matter where the line runs through 
due to electrical energy being consumed by running trains. This kind of energy is mainly 
produced by petrol, coal and gas combustion; therefore releasing air pollutants and 
contributing to global warming and upper climate change. However, due to a big diversity 
in each countries energy primary sources, it is difficult to compare HSR amount of air 
pollution but the following figures are generally accepted. The volume of petrol consumed 
by HSR for 100 passenger-km was 2,5 litres (6 litres for car and 7 for aircraft) whereas the 
amount of carbon dioxide emissions per 100 passenger-km was 4 tonnes, compared with 
14 Tn for car and 17 Tn for aircraft. [11]. This can be seen in Table 11: 
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Table 11 Carbon dioxide emission and petrol consumption in three transport modes 
per 100 passenger-km [11] 
 
However, the big environmental impact produced by HSR is during the infrastructure 
construction, where big quantity of carbon dioxide is released. It has to be accounted for 
the production and distribution of materials, such as concrete and steel, as well as all the 
operation of the machinery involved for construction: tunnel boring machines, bulldozers, 
and trucks. To compensate for this impact, decades of train operation may be needed, 
once again depending on the demand rate, on the diversion from other transport modes 
and on the new traffic generation. Therefore it has to be assessed in an ex post analysis 
after some years or operation, whether the amount of carbon dioxide emissions produced 
during the construction compensate for the ones saved in the future. Other factors 
influencing this evaluation are the number of people affected by the works and the 
environmental value of the areas affected. This has to be appraised in particular corridors 
and cannot be evaluated in a whole network. Other factors, which help to understand the 
little external benefit of HSR in carbon dioxide emissions, are:  
 
• The difficulty in evaluating the environmental costs produced during the 
operations of the HSR line, subject to variations due to load factors in trains and 
volume and composition of traffic. 
 
• Other effects such as barrier effects, landscape visual impacts and biodiversity 
effects might be higher in comparison with the positive effects on global warming, 
but the social debate nowadays is the one on carbon dioxide emissions. 
 
• If charges for infrastructure use in road and plane do not cover the marginal social 
costs of this traffic, the diversion to HSR will be beneficial. For the estimation of 
these benefits, all the externalities, which have been referred to previously (land 
occupation, noise, global warming etc.) must be valuated in terms of their 
marginal costs and compared to the taxes that are paid for them. 
 
• A clear and simple example may help to understand the non-efficiency of HSR in 
order to reduce the global warming effects. The following figures will be assumed 
in a 500 km HSR line in terms of passenger-trips deviation from other transport 
modes: 
o Aviation: 20% 
o Cars: 20% 
Mode of Transport CO2 emissions 
Volume of petrol 
consumed 
Road 14 tonnes 6 litres 
HSR 4 tonnes 2,5 litres 
Plane 17 tonnes 7 litres 
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o Conventional rail: 30% 
o Bus (long distance): 5% 
o Generated traffic: 25% 
With these figures and assuming a demand on the first year of 10 million passengers 
(more or less the minimum for a positive Net Present Value), a reduction of 90.000 tonnes 
of carbon dioxide would be achieved. Accepting the cost of 30!/tonne of CO2 (Catalonia’s 
College of Civil Engineering), the amount saved would be 2,7 million !. Compared to the 
construction costs of this type of transport infrastructure, the saving seems rather low. [12] 
 
5.4.2  Noise 
Regarding the noise a HSR line causes, it is difficult to compare and analyse. Of course 
noise only affects when running through populated areas, therefore in some villages 
acoustic protection along the tracks have been constructed to lessen this impact. 
Basically the noise of a train comes from the steel contact between track and wheels, the 
pantograph and aerodynamic noise and all are proportional to the speed of travel. 
According to Levinson et al. (1997), a 150m corridor is needed to maintain a tolerable 
55dB noise of a high speed train travelling at 280km/h. Usually values lie between 80 and 
90dB, which are non acceptable noise levels. [14] 
5.4.3  Land Consumption 
Also land consumption must be analysed when constructing a HSR line and sometimes 
must be compared with that of a motorway. On average a motorway consumes 75m of 
width whereas a HSR line may consume up to 25m. From a capacity point of view, on 
average a motorway may carry 7650 people per hour and directions of travel (assuming 
1,7 passengers per vehicle) and a HSR line may carry 5760 on an 80% load factor 
assumption. Looking at the total capacity of each infrastructure it seems that a motorway 
construction is not worthy for a 2000 passenger capacity increase per hour, taking into 
account that a motorway takes up three times more space. [13]  
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Table 12 Comparison in land consumption between HSR line and a motorway.[13] 
 HSR line Motorway 
Type Double track 2 X 2 lanes 
Width 25 metres 75 metres 
Infrastructure 
capacity 
12 trains/ hour and 
direction 
4500 cars/ hour 
and direction 
Vehicle capacity 600 passengers 5 passengers 
Total capacity 
5760 passengers/hour and 
direction (assuming 80% 
load factor) 
7650 
passengers/hour 
and direction 
(assuming 1,7 
passengers per 
car) 
 
External costs on safety are the ones derived from the price of injuries and death of a 
person. These vary across countries depending on economic indicators. As far as HSR is 
concerned, safety standards when constructing this type of infrastructure reduce chance 
of train collision to a minimum, as very few high-speed train accidents have occurred. 
Therefore, in the safety aspects, HSR is considered to be positive as it reduces accidents. 
Nevertheless, safety systems account on a big proportion of the budget for HSR lines. 
[13] 
 
5.4.4  Effects on Regional inequalities 
Government policies in Europe have wanted to minimize territorial economic inequalities 
between regions. This is the wish of making grow less developed and less industrialized 
areas, not only the big industrial poles in a country. One of the main pretexts for building 
HSR is, in fact, this reduction of economical inequality. However, it is not clear yet the 
impacts in this matter of constructing a new infrastructure.  
 
It has to be taken into account the fact that HSR does not transport freight and therefore 
this may reduce the potential benefits that HSR could bring to the industrial sector. 
Normally, the improvement of a transport infrastructure reduces costs of transport and 
increases the quality of it, therefore inducing new economic activity. Efficient 
communication between industrial nodes and supply poles (cities) normally lowers these 
costs but in the case of HSR, which only transports passengers, this does not help this 
situation to happen. Therefore it is discussed whether European policies of building HSR 
for lessening regional inequalities is really an effective measure. On the other hand, what 
HSR has done is to shift service companies’ headquarters from the less dense populated 
areas to the big conurbations. This results in higher costs in the highly populated centres 
but more advantages in terms of scale economies. Thus, resulting the opposite desired 
effect. 
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Figure 5 Daily accessibility by rail (Source: Vickerman, Spiekermann, and Wegener 
(1999) 
 
The figure on the left corresponds with 1993 daily access by rail and the one on the right 
shows the same but in 2010. The height of the surface at each point is proportional to the 
population that can be reached from that particular point by a return rail trip made during a 
working day with some minimum stay in the destination. These are normally business 
trips for which HSR is indeed broadly used. The conclusions at the look of Figure 5 results 
in larger concentration in hubs. It can be seen that access condition to European cores 
may be twice as much as that of in peripheral areas. When major cities are connected 
with HSR they get better access to the rest of the territory, whereas in peripheral zones, 
connections are improved with nearby locations. Another conclusion is that HSR only 
favours in terms of accessibility the cities that are within the high-speed network (normally 
at a 3-5 hour travelling distance). On the contrary, cities, which do not belong to the 
network, will reduce their accessibility and therefore may be concluded that HSR 
construction will only benefit the highly concentrated activity nodes on the network, and is 
unlikely to develop economic activity in the less developed areas. [15]  
 
 5.4.5  Barrier effects 
Finally, the called barrier effect occurs when trains run on urban areas. The main problem 
is that the railway lines divide land in two sections, creating problems in mobility and 
communication between both sides. It also conditions the future growth of the city by 
influencing land use in its edges. This does not only happen with HSR lines but also with 
conventional rail lines, although in the last case the impact has been minimized by 
constructing crossings at different levels for pedestrians and for road traffic. In contrast, 
for HSR, due to the restrictive constraints for its construction, high viaducts or large 
tunnelling has to be made, increasing the cost of the works. 
 
To summarize, the total external costs between 3 transport modes in two corridors, the 
following figure is shown: 
 
Source: Vickerman, Spiekermann, and Wegener (1999)
Figure 10. Daily accessibility by rail, 1993 and 2010
In a related study, Vickerman et al. (1999) analyse how the ten-t for high-speed rail will change
the relative locational advantage of different parts of the European continent. The two maps in
Figure 10 (from Vickerman et al., 1999) plot daily accessibility surfaces, drawn so that the height
of the surface at a particular point of the map is proportional to the population that can be
reached from that particular point by a return rail trip made during a working day with some
minimum stay in the destination (essentially population within five hours of train travel). This
seems a particularly appropriate accessibility indicator for high-speed rail travel, since this mode
of transport is specially relevant for the business service sector. The map on the left-hand side is
drawn for the existing European rail network in 1993, and the map on the right-hand side for the
European rail network planned for 2010. Two main conclusions emerge from Figure 10.
First, we can see once again the hub effect at work. The growth in accessibility of cities in
the European core is several times larger than that of cities at the European periphery. Naturally,
when major cities get connected through high-speed rail lines, cities located more centrally get
better access to nearly everywhere whereas in more peripheral locations the improvement is felt
mostly in the access to nearby locations. This has led the European Commission to acknowledge
that ‘[i]n transport policy, cohesion countries stand to gain in absolute terms from trans-European
networks but not necessarily in relative terms’ (Commission of the European Communities, 1996).
Second, the introduction of new high-speed lines leads to strongly non-monotonic changes
in accessibility, and creates large differences in accessibility within small distances. While the
population that can be reached within five hours by train greatly increases, differences on this
respect between the core and the periphery as well as between the main cities and smaller cities or
rural areas increase. Only cities that are nodes of the high-speed rail network gain accessibility,
while the areas in between nodes and those not on the network or at its edges do not. This
highlights an important difference between investments in high-speed rail and roads.
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Figure 6 Total external costs (!) per 1000 passenger-km [9] 
 
 
 
The costs include global warming, accidents, noise, environmental pollution and urban 
effects but do not include congestion costs. As seen on Figure 6, for the Paris – Brussels 
corridor (320 km) the HSR external costs are 25% of those of plane and car due to its 
high occupation factor, mainly because of business trips between the two capital cities. 
On the other corridor, conventional railway is responsible for 50% less external costs 
compared to plane and 75% less than those related to road traffic. The relative advantage 
of rail transport over plane is reduced as distance increases because big part of external 
costs caused by the latter is during take-off and landing. This also explains the difference 
in costs between both corridors in the air transport. 
 
6  Benefits of HSR 
Of course, once the investment in HSR has taken place, benefits are expected to come in 
one form o the other. Some European governments justify enormous economic 
expenditure with the only pretext of environmental sustainability, but it is not the only 
benefit of HSR. As seen before, in fact, it is the least important of the benefits provided by 
HSR. The main benefits than can be observed in this kind of transport are: 
• Time savings. 
• Generated traffic. 
• Higher capacity. 
• Reduction of externalities in comparison with other transport means. 
• Other economic impacts, such as economic stimulus. 
• Increased passenger comfort 
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When referring to time savings, usually HSR is compared with conventional rail and with 
other means of transport within similar distance journeys. It is logical that if a train travels 
at 160km/h or at 300km/h, for the same haul, the time spent by the fast train will be almost 
half of that needed by the slower one. Also for distances between a certain distance 
range, high-speed trains are more competitive in door to door journeys than other 
transport modes, due to lower access and waiting times. Normally high-speed services 
connect city centres, which means faster access to business facilities than having to travel 
from an airport for example. As users value access time higher than actual travel time, the 
perceived cost of travel is reduced for these types of journey.  
 
Another concept of travel costs must appear at this point, it is the value of time. Value of 
time is quantifying each user’s trip hour in monetary terms. For each country, these values 
vary according to the transport mode chosen and according to the purpose of travel 
(business, leisure etc). Differences between countries values of time are established 
based on economic parameters such as GDP and income. Users mostly value HSR 
business journeys because, on the train, people are able to perform job related tasks or 
activities unlike plane or car, making the HSR option more attractive and therefore making 
their time more valuable. [9], [16], [17] 
 
Latter studies (British Institute for Transport Studies, 2003) on value of time state that this 
magnitude based on salary rates should vary proportionally to each countries GDP, 
therefore accounting on the variations of the value of time with the passing of years. With 
this information, the generalized cost of travel may be easily calculated as the cost of the 
ticket (out of pocket cost) plus the value of time multiplied by the door-to-door travel time. 
This generalized cost of travel is responsible for the modal split (choice of transport mode) 
and may be determining in the demand rates. 
 
When compared to conventional rail travelling at an average of 130km/h, HSR reduces 
the door-to-door time, on average, between 45 and 50 minutes in a 350 to 400 km 
journey. However, when the conventional rail is travelling at 160 km/h, HSR saves only 30 
minutes time on average due to smaller differences in in-vehicle time, as waiting and 
access time are the same for these modes.  
 
For car users, the access and waiting time are almost zero but as distance rises, benefits 
of HSR are evident because it travels, on average, twice as fast. As distances get shorter, 
HSR advantages over road users diminish due to the proportional reduction in in-vehicle 
time on the train with respect to waiting and access time. 
 
Comparing with air transport, which is its main competitor, HSR has higher in-vehicle 
times but may compensate this lack with considerably lowering access and waiting times. 
As explained before, access and waiting times are valued by users between 1,5 to 2 times 
as much as in-vehicle time, therefore this may influence the modal choice of users 
towards rail. Of course, this will depend on the purpose and final destination of the 
traveller: if the final destination is not in the city centre but in a peripheral area (i.e. not a 
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business journey), plane may be preferable. Also it has to be taken into account at this 
point, airport security controls and check-in procedures, which may reduce the comfort of 
the passenger, affecting his final decision towards the train. Another factor, which may 
influence this final decision of users, may be the comfort of travelling by HSR. Passengers 
may seat in wide seats, they can work throughout the journey and there are no such 
security controls as in airports. 
 
Regarding generated traffic, the construction of new HSR lines normally diverts traffic 
mainly from road transport and air transport. If the charging for infrastructure use on these 
modes is lower than the marginal cost of the traffic, benefits will be observed. Also, if 
enough diverted traffic is achieved in the railway line to reduce car and air transport 
externalities, benefits will occur. Moreover, if diverted traffic is high enough, other 
transport mode operation costs will be reduced, as the passenger demand will fall. When 
fewer drivers are travelling in the same corridor in which the HSR line has been built, car 
maintenance cost and vehicle amortization will be lower, generating a social benefit for 
those who choose not to use it. [18] 
 
Increasing the capacity of the corridor by building a new line (in this case, a HSR line) will 
only produce benefits when the corridor has reached it’s saturation point, or in other 
words, maximum capacity has been achieved. If this is the case, the new line will offer 
more capacity and therefore congestion will reduce in road traffic, air traffic and in the 
conventional railway services, if these are to exist. The benefit when this occurs is 
quantified by the net benefit of users plus the net benefit produced due to reduction of 
externalities on the other modes (accidents, pollution, time savings…). Not only will the 
expanded capacity benefit the cities that are connected by the new line but also will 
increase capacities in other connected transport networks, such as the freight traffic. [19] 
 
Also it has to be observed that operating a new HSR line can produce economical benefit 
to society by providing new jobs and promote economic activity. The operation of the 
services will need labour force, and so will need all the administrative necessary works to 
manage the railway undertaking. An example of economic stimulus produced by the HSR 
line is tourism to a city due to generated trips. The comfort the new line provides as well 
as the time savings mentioned above, may induce new leisure passenger traffic, 
promoting tourism in any connected city. However, in the cost benefit analysis, it will have 
to be made clear whether it is a pure stimulus of economic activity or if it is a simple 
relocation of labour and economic activity. Similarly to what has been argued in Effects in 
regional inequalities, if the primary objective is to give stimulus to central cities, there is 
proof that HSR connections produce this effect. Therefore, depending on the policy 
adopted, this is a beneficial impact on big cities, where the main business activities take 
place. 
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7  Development of HSR in the study countries. 
During the last decades, the main European countries are constructing HSR (> 250km/h) 
at a high rate. The following table shows the extension of this kind of infrastructure at the 
beginning of 2010: 
Table 13 HSR in service at the beginning of 2010 [20] 
 
As seen on Table 13, France was the country with more operative HSR lines out the four 
compared countries, but in fact, Spain is the country which will have the larger HSR 
network when under project and under construction lines are finished. Italy shows the 
lowest figure on operative HSR lines. 
 
If we have a look at Figure 7 we can see that the ratio of km of HSR in service per million 
inhabitants, Spain has the highest figure with 42, more than triple than that of Germany 
and four times that of Italy. France remains at second position in this ranking. 
 
Figure 7 km of HSR per million inhabitants [21] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1  France 
In France the first HSR line was finished in 1981 between Paris and Lyon with a length of 
419 km. The main motivation to carry out this line was the big levels of congestion in road 
and rail between both cities. Between 1981 and 1992 the demand of this line almost 
doubled, reaching 19 million passengers. Due to these successful demand levels, the 
TGV investment plan expanded with new lines between Paris and Le Mans, Tours and 
Calais. The extension carried on to the Rhone-Alps corridor in 1994 and in the 
Mediterranean. 
Country First year of service 
Km in 
service 
(1) 
Km under 
construction 
(2) 
Km under 
project (3) 
Total 
(1)+(2)+(3) 
Germany 1988 1032 316 599 1947 
Spain 1992 1515 2219 1072 4806 
France 1981 1872 299 2616 4787 
Italy 1992 760 55 395 1210 
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The network is a centralized structure, which centre is Paris. The conventional rail has 
been preserved in order to feed the major HSR lines between cities with lower demands 
since the expropriation and construction costs for high-speed infrastructure would have 
been exorbitant. However, TGV transports every year an average of 100 million 
passengers, being the European country with highest HSR demand. 
 
The economic benefits of TGV have mainly been in Paris, whose trips have risen 144% 
when it was the final destination. Therefore, Paris has absorbed activity from other minor 
cities. Nonetheless, Lyon and Lille have also received some positive impacts in their 
mobility rates via rail. However, the effects on industrial activities and decision on 
business location have been almost negligible. Finally, after the opening of the Paris –
Lyon line, in business trips, the number of people who decided to stay at least one night at 
destination reduced from 74% to 46%. [22] 
 
 
Figure 8 TGV France [23] 
7.2  Germany 
The beginning of commercial high-speed operation is Germany took place in 1988 after 
some political and topographical problems. The new Inter City Express lines were used to 
change the networks characteristics, since the German network had been traditionally 
mainly used in the west-east lines before World War II. After WW II, industrial traffic had 
started to rise quickly in the north-south corridors of the country, mainly because of freight 
transport from ports in the north to industrial areas in the south. Hence, the first two 
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“Neubaustrecken” to be constructed were the Hannover-Würzburg completed in 1994 and 
Mannheim-Stuttgart in 1991. The main objective was to improve freight traffic from north 
to south and to solve congestion problems that had been happening during some years. 
After the countries’ political reunification in 1989, east-west corridors were also a priority; 
hence Hannover-Berlin and Nüremberg-Leipzig were constructed shortly after. [24] 
 
It is important to say that not all railway lines in Germany have been newly built and 
turned into HSR, but in contrast to other countries, Germany has upgraded many 
conventional lines to be able to operate at 200-230km/h. These lines correspond to 
Hamburg-Berlin, Bremen-Münster, Hannover-Dortmund, Berlin-Leipzig, Frankfurt-
Mannheim and part of the Nürnberg-Munich line. In addition, in Germany high-speed 
tracks are compatible with the freight transport (except Frankfurt-Cologne line). Thus, the 
network is shared between high-speed trains, passenger fast trains and freight trains. The 
only lines, which are able to achieve 320km/h, are Frankfurt-Cologne and Nuremberg-
Ingolstadt 
 
The German multi-purpose HSR system was designed to expand benefits rather than to 
concentrate them in the networks major nodes (as it is the case for Spain and France). 
The freight transport was considered more important as it contributed more to productivity 
and income than the passenger transport. The average increase of the market share 
introduced by the HSR was 11% and the average revenue for every train-km of the ICE 
was 1,7 times higher than the average for the other long distance services. [25]. However, 
Germany’s abrupt topography and construction delays ended in high cost overruns as 
well as operating deficits. Some of these cost overruns were due to the need to satisfy a 
wide range of policy participants. Therefore, German lines have been more expensive 
than the French lines. Together with the fact that the average number of users is 67 
million a year (much lower than in France), the continuity of HSR investment is being 
questioned. 
 
The following figures shows Germany’s HSR. Red lines are over 300km/h, orange 230-
280km/h and blue 200-230km/h (upgraded lines) 
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Figure 9 Germany's ICE lines [26]  
7.3  Italy 
High-speed in Italy started with the Rome-Florence line with a length of 240 km that was 
known as La Diretissima and completed in 1992. It allowed speeds up to 250 km/h, but its 
technical specifications are not formerly those of HSR. The initial plan in Italy was to build 
a HSR network that was completely independent from the conventional rail services, just 
as in Spain and France. However, in 1996 a more integral network conception was 
thought of, therefore Alta Veloccità Plans were replaced by the AV/AC plans. These 
consisted of sharing tracks between HSR and conventional rail, expanding capacity and 
avoiding conventional rail’s degradation. Due to private stakeholders’ reluctance to pay for 
the new line construction, the State railway manager Ferrovie dello Stato purchased 60% 
of the shared investment between the established Public Private Partnership (PPP), 
Società TAV. 
 
The first operating proper high-speed lines were Rome-Naples line in 2005 and the 
Torino-Novara and Módena-Lavino lines in 2006. Nowadays, the AV/AC (Alta 
Veloccità/Alta Capaccità) gives service to the Torino-Milano-Bolonia-Forence corridors 
and the Rome-Naples-Salerno corridor.[27] 
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Just like in Germany, the deployment of HSR in Italy was conceived to spread benefits 
rather than to concentrate them by linking with the conventional lines. However, these 
plans caused the costs of construction to shift about 33% of total initially expected costs 
due to delays and inefficient management of works and contracts. As seen in the costs of 
HSR section, in Italy is where higher construction costs have occurred, due to the reasons 
exposed in this paragraph, due to its harsh mountainous terrain, high dense populated 
metropolitan areas and high seismic risk.  
 
 
Figure 10 Italy's HSR lines [28] 
 
 7.4  Spain 
Spain’s first high-speed trains operated between Madrid and Seville in the inauguration 
year of Seville’s Universal Exposition. The line covered the journey in 2 hours and 20 
minutes and was surprisingly not the corridor with the heaviest traffic in the country. 
Instead, that was the Madrid-Barcelona corridor, linking the two biggest metropolitan 
areas in Spain. The Spanish Transport Ministry decided to build the AVE (Alta Velocidad 
Española) in international gauge instead of the iberic gauge (1.666mm), which was the 
traditional gauge used in Spain. In addition, Spain bought the in rail technology from other 
countries rather than building its own, fact which differs from the other countries 
mentioned. Regardless of that, the aim of the Spanish government with HSR was 
territorial cohesion and to favour the economy of the less developed regions of the 
country. Therefore, in this case, a technical reason responding to transport efficiency 
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criteria (such as reducing congestion) does not exist. Instead it only responds to a political 
issue.  
 
Although during its first years of operation, the market share for plane between both cities 
fell considerably, is has been clear that the whole Spanish HSR network is unable to meet 
demand rates in France or Germany. Even with the Madrid-Zaragoza-Lleida-Barcelona 
line opened fully in 2008, the total demand rates are lower than expected. In 2007, the 
first services between Madrid and Valladolid started to operate and also the branch to 
Málaga. The latest inauguration was in December 2010, the Madrid-Valencia line. 
 
The network configuration is radial, where all lines have origin or destination Madrid. So, 
in order to travel from north to south (for example, Barcelona to Seville o Málaga), trains 
used to pass through Madrid’s city centre, heavily penalizing travel times. Since 2009, a 
by-pass was constructed, which reduces travel time in 50 minutes, making the whole 
journey (Barcelona-Seville) 5 hours and 20 minutes. The journey is completed by plane in 
1 hour and 35 minutes and door-to-door time is two times as much in HSR. This together 
with lower air transport fares makes it unattractive to travel from north to south by high-
speed train. [29]  
 
Spain has made of HSR a main priority in infrastructure policy, as stated in the Ministry’s 
Plan for 2020, about 82 billion ! will be spent on it. It will convert Spain in the second 
country in the world with more km of high-speed lines just after China. Therefore, if budget 
restrictions are not too heavy until 2020, Spain will carry out its HSR construction policy, 
based on criteria, which do not respond to technical problems.  
 
In 2009, reported passengers that travelled in HSR in the global Spanish network were 16 
million. This figure is 15% of that of France and 25% of that in Germany, where the 
network is smaller. France and Germany have more population density and a more 
adequate urban structure for HSR passenger transport.[30] 
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Figure 11 Spanish AVE network in 2011. [31] 
 
8  The Market for HSR 
In this section the best conditions for constructing a new HSR line will be discussed. It is 
important to know when HSR will be the best option amongst all the feasible transport 
possibilities. The main factors affecting the optimal conditions for the construction of a 
HSR line will be analysed deeply. These are: 
• Journey times and distance 
• Competitiveness with other modes of transport 
• Demand and capacity 
• Distribution of population 
• Journey times and distance 
 
Typically, HSR is more advantageous in middle distance journeys than in long journeys or 
too short journeys due to three reasons: the first one is that for long journeys, the plane is 
faster, although access and waiting times are larger; the second reason is that for short 
journeys, conventional train services may reduce time because, many times, HSR will 
have to serve stations in outside locations, which will make the overall door to door time 
increase; the third reason is that, also for short journeys, the need of the high speed trains 
to accelerate to maximum speed will not be comparatively advantageous with respect to 
conventional rail. Also, energy consumption issues may be observed at this points, where 
it is arguable that having to spend the energy required for the train to speed up to 
300km/h is reasonable for short distances. 
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Although conventional rail speeds vary widely depending on the country, the typical 
threshold distance below which HSR is less competitive than this type of rail is 150 km. 
For journeys between 150-500km, HSR will be more competitive than any other mode. 
This is because door-to door time travels are considered, where air transport has a clear 
disadvantage compared to rail. However, when the journey is between above 550 km, 
normally air transport offers the best conditions for reducing the total time of travel. In 
spite of this, nowadays there are many airlines competing with HSR in this medium 
distance ranges. This comparative advantage of HSR in medium-haul market can be seen 
in the following figure 
 
 
Figure 12 Modal competitive advantage of HSR [9] 
 
A strong correlation between countries that have most of their mainly populated areas 
within a 400 – 600 km range and the length of their HSR network is observed: 
 
• In France, all major cities except Nice are within 400 – 800 km from Paris; 
• In Spain, all major cities are no more than 600km from Madrid. 
 
Apart from this geographic fact, the cases of Spain and France respond to central State 
communication model, in which the majority of investments in transport infrastructure are 
made to communicate the capital cities with rest of the country. 
 
On the other hand, Italy and Germany have sufficient cities on the range where HSR is 
competitive but also, have many others out of this range, which means that the extension 
of their HSR network are not as vast as in the other two countries. Although having a non-
2 We do not include here the (much faster) magnetic lev-
itation technology (maglev), since its commercial use is
still very limited.
3 For private car, graph 4.1 was drawn assuming an aver-
age speed of 110 km per hour on an intercity highway
plus 30 minutes (2x15) of urban traffic congestion. For 
rail (both conventional and high speed), it assumes to-
tal scheduled time plus 30 minutes of access time. In
the case of air transport, total travel time was consid-
ered as 3 hours regardless of distance since flying
time variations for short distances are minimal.
4.2.1 THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
OF HSR: THE EFFECT OF TRAVEL TIME
All these characteristics are particularly relevant
for analyzing the intermodal effects of high speed
rail services, where most existing comparisons
just relate market share to speed and distance.
SDG (2004) states for example that «(...) for
journeys of less than about 150 km, high speed
rail offers little advantage over conventional rail
and may, depending on the location of stations,
be less convenient for most passengers; for jour-
neys of approximately 150-400 km, rail is faster
than air travel even if there is no high speed line,
and HSR will instead serve to make that advan-
tage more robust; for journeys of more than 400
km, high speed is necessary for rail to become
the fastest mode and thereby make significant
mode switches realistic; and for journeys of more
than about 800 km, even with dedicat d high
speed infrastructure available for the entire
route, air travel is f ster.»
However, as reckoned in several case studies (for
example, Yao and Morikawa 2003), these dis-
tances are not absolute and may vary slightly
across corridors and along time. In 1964, the
Tokaido Express Rail (Shinkansen) was operated
as the first high speed train in Japan. In its ear-
ly stages, the Shinkansen system’s main line was
capable of speeds of up to 220 km per hour and
did not offer much advantage over air transport.
But in its latest specifications, the Shinkansen
was the first high speed train to reach the speed
of 591 km per hour,2 and thus become a very at-
tractive alternative even for shorter routes. For
example, in the Tokyo-Nagoya corridor (366 km),
air services have been highly reduced, as total
travel time, including airport dwelling time,
might be approximately 2h 30min by air, and
slightly more than 1 hour by train.
In general, as represented in graph 4.1, the
time-distance relationship just reflects the rela-
tive speed of each mode and the range of dis-
tan s over which each one implies a lower gen-
ralized cost for the passenger. Only when the
comparison refers to a standardized intercity
door-to-door journey,3 and total travel time is
considered (including access and waiting time),
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negligible length of HSR lines, they have decided that the best option is to upgrade 
conventional railway lines to offer reasonable speeds at a much lower cost. It has to be 
noted that Italy and Germany do not have such centralized States as Spain or France, 
which means investment will spread out more evenly throughout the whole country’s 
transport infrastructure rather than focusing in the capital cities. 
 
8.1  Competition with other transport modes 
8.1.1  Conventional rail. 
 
When comparing HSR with conventional rail, the difference in speed between countries 
has to be observed. Also, speed varies in different lines in the same country. The most 
representative speeds are: 
 
160km/h: fastest conventional rail speed, widely used in some British lines. The average 
time saving of the HSR in this case is 35 minutes for distances between 400-450 km. 
130km/h: this is the typical speed for main conventional rail lines across Europe and the 
time saving produced by HSR is between 45-50 minutes in journeys within 350-400 km. 
100km/h: this is speed is most common in Italy and Spain for conventional rail. The time 
savings could be more than an hour for journeys up to 300 km. 
 
Countries with good conventional rail infrastructure will have fewer costs in constructing 
HSR lines. The main reasons are that stations to access city centres will already exist and 
therefore only some upgrading will be needed and therefore many tunnelling works may 
be avoided. In France, Germany and Italy, this has been achieved as the conventional rail 
infrastructure allowed the capacity to run the high-speed trains into the cities. In Spain, the 
poor existing conventional rail access infrastructure has prompted the construction of long 
urban tunnels, with the high cost of doing so. The best example of this is the 5km tunnel 
being constructed under Barcelona (Spain) to link the AVE services with the two main 
urban stations (Sants and Sagrera), which will be the final linkage of the Madrid-
Zaragoza-Barcelona-French Border line. [32] 
 
With respect to conventional rail market shares, the effect of introducing HSR is less clear 
due to the lack of information provided by the operating companies. As the following table 
shows, the effect on the conventional rail market shares was reducing dramatically its 
figures to almost less than 4%. The reasons are that many of them were suppressed as 
HSR overlapped in the same corridors and also because of the clear reduction of 
demand. 
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Table 14 Conventional rail market shares after HSR  
Paris-Lyon Before HSR (1980) After HSR (1997) 
Conv. rail 40% 3% 
HSR 0% 70% 
Madrid-Seville Before HSR (1991) After HSR (2002) 
Conv. rail 16% 1% 
HSR 0% 61% 
Hamburg-Frankfurt Before HSR (1985) After HSR (2000) 
Conv. rail 23% 3% 
HSR 0% 48% 
 
8.1.2  Air 
Over long distances the main competitor of HSR is air, even more with the creation of the 
low cost airlines. These have challenged HSR operators to lower their operation and 
maintenance costs because otherwise, rail market share will decrease rapidly. In France, 
where typically airlines have issued high fares, HSR demand had increased notably, 
especially in the Paris-Lyon line (450km), where rail market share rose from 40 to 72% 
and air market share decreased dramatically from 31 to 7% after the constructions of the 
HSR line. Of course, this increase in more than 30% is not all direct transfer from plane, 
but also generated traffic and diverted traffic from road users [18]. In longer lines such as 
the Paris-Marseille line (700km), the air market share also dropped by an average of 15% 
by 1997.  
 
Regarding the Spanish line between Madrid and Seville, the air market share after 6 
months of construction dropped more than 20% and the weekly flights in one direction did 
so from 71 to 40%. By 1997 (5 years after finishing construction), the rail market share 
increased from 16 to 51%, again not being all a consequence of direct transfer from plane 
but also accounting on diverted traffic from road and generated traffic. [33] 
 
Something similar has happened with the Madrid-Barcelona line (620km), where 2 years 
after the completion of the line (2010), the air market share was between 14 to 17% lower 
than that of 2007 (before HSR). The number of passenger flying between both cities 
lowered 23% in 2010. [34] This data can be clearly seen in Table 15: 
 
Table 15 HSR and air market shares before and after the HSR [33] [35] 
Paris-Lyon Before HSR (1980) After HSR (1997) 
Air 31% 6% 
HSR 0% 70% 
Madrid-Seville Before HSR (1991) After HSR (2002) 
Air 40% 8% 
HSR 0% 61% 
Hamburg-Frankfurt Before HSR (1985) After HSR (2000) 
Air 10% 4% 
HSR 0% 48% 
Madrid-Barcelona Before HSR (2007) After HSR (2010) 
Air 56% 40% 
HSR 0% 35% 
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Indeed it is the travel time the key factor to decide between plane and HSR by the look of 
the following table. It is interesting to note that when the HSR journeys are 3 hours or 
less, the rail market share was usually above 60% of the combined market for air and rail 
in 2006. 
 
Table 16 Corridors with the duration of travel and rail share [33] 
Corridor (km) Year Travel time HSR share1 
Paris-London (257) 2005 2h40min 66% 
Paris-Amsterdam 
(514) 2004 4h10min 45% 
London-Brussels 
(204) 2005 2h20min 60% 
Paris-Geneva (339) 2003 3h30min 35% 
Paris-Brussels (183) 2006 1h25min 100% 
 
It is remarkable the fact that in the Paris-Brussels corridor the HSR market share is 100% 
for the HSR, with very little airport activity between these two cities. It is observed that as 
the journey takes more than 3 hours, the market share for HSR reduces significantly as 
seen on the Paris-Amsterdam and Paris-Geneva corridors. Although the airlines will not 
exit the market, the only possibility for the air transport is to introduce low cost airline 
services between these medium haul corridors in order to boost their market share.  
 
In the interaction between low cost airline and HSR, two analysis can be made, national 
and international journeys. In fact, in the national journeys, Germany is where HSR 
services have been most affected by the low cost airline competition, due to 
Germanwings competition with the main HSR corridors Hannover –Stuttgart and 
Hamburg-Frankfurt. In the international journeys, most competition takes place in the 
Paris-Geneva and in the Paris-Amsterdam as well as in the Cologne-Paris corridors.  
 
Table 17 Air and HSR evolution of the market share in the Paris-London corridor 
Company Market share 
 2002 2003 2004 
EUROSTAR 58% 58% 66% 
British Airways 15% 16% 12% 
Air France 13% 12% 10% 
Easyjet (low cost) 5% 5% 5% 
British Midland 5% 4% 4% 
Buzz (low cost) 2% 2% - 
Others 0% 1% 1% 
 
Looking at the figures on the table above it can be said that the operations of low cost 
airlines did not reduce the demand in the HSR services but, did so, from other traditional 
airlines that were operating before, such as Air France and British Airways. Not only did 
the demand for EUROSTAR services not decrease but it increased to 66% of the market 
share by 2004. However, the introduction of the low cost airlines has made the rail sector 
adapt its ticket fares by lowering prices to be able to compete with those of the low cost 
                                                      
1 With respect to air 
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companies. For example, in the Paris-Marseille corridor, SNCF has only allowed 
customers to buy low cost tickets online, being more competitive than before. [36] 
8.1.3  Road 
In any corridor still the road traffic is the one the takes the major part of the market shares. 
So it is interesting to see how the introduction of HSR has affected its demand. The 
following table shows how road market share has evolved after the first HSR services 
took place in each corridor. 
 
Table 18 Evolution of road markets shares after HSR [36] 
 
Corridor Road market share2 
 Before HSR After HSR Reduction 
Hamburg-Frankfurt 57% 46% 11% 
Madrid-Seville 84% 55% 29% 
Paris-Lille 50% 50% 0% 
 
As seen on the table above, in the French corridor of Paris-Lille is where HSR made no 
difference in the road demand, whereas in the Madrid-Seville corridor, the road market 
share dropped dramatically from 84 to 55%. In Germany, in the Hamburg-Frankfurt 
corridor, the share for road users reduced 11% after the HSR operations. Therefore, in 
this section it may be concluded that the road traffic is somehow reduced by HSR but not 
as much as the air traffic, which is its main competitor, and, at most, the HSR market 
share with respect to road will be 55% (Madrid-Seville case). [36] 
 
8.2  Demand and capacity 
As explained before, HSR infrastructure hives a relief in capacity to all the other transport 
networks, as it is a high capacity transport system. Actual navigation systems allow the 
headways in the HSR trains to be approximately 5 to 6 minutes per direction of travel. 
Considering an average train of 500 seats operating 12 hours a day (120 trains per day 
and direction), an extra capacity of 120.000 passengers per day (including both 
directions) can be achieved with HSR. Of course is this would be maximum capacity of 
the infrastructure, at which the operator would never aim at due to incredible operating 
and maintenance costs. But it shows how a HSR increases capacity at a very high 
degree. In fact in Japan, there are HSR trans that have up to 1.600 seats, therefore 
capacity being tripled than that calculated in the simple example above. With this figures, 
it is obvious that demand has to exist, and it has to be very high in order to justify 
investments for HSR.  
 
Capacity has been the main justification for many countries to construct many kilometres 
of HSR networks rather than speed. A clear example could be Japan where demands are 
highest, and where HSR has relieved capacity from the existing railway networks. In Italy, 
the Rome-Naples line will also increase capacity rather than speed. Not only HSR 
construction provides extra capacity for intercity journeys but also for conventional long 
distance and regional rail and also freight routes. On he other hand, rather than capacity, 
                                                      
2 With respect to rail 
 59 
Spain’s justification was speed, as the central government’s aim in the year 2000 was to 
connect Madrid with all province capital cities within 4 hours of travel in HSR. Only the 
Madrid-Seville corridor had congestion in both conventional rail and motorways, before 
HSR. 
 
The full theoretical capacity above explained (120 -160 trains per day and direction) is 
only used in the most demanded HSR lines during peak periods. However, demand will 
be the key factor to operate services at a reasonable proportion of the maximum capacity. 
The following figure represents the amount of trains per day in different European HSR 
routes. 
 
Figure 13 Trains operating per day and direction in different European HSR corridors 
[37] 
 
It can be observed how at least, there are 30 trains operating per day and direction of 
travel in the less demanded lines and maximum, there are about 100 trains per day and 
direction in the TGV north and south east corridors. Therefore is it is clear that France 
operates the most HSR services due to the high demand rates. The previous figure may 
be contrasted with the number of passenger per km of line travelling in different European 
lines in 2010: 
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Figure 14 Passenger/km-year in major European HSR lines in 2010 [38] 
 
The Paris-Lyon line, with almost 60.000 passengers per km, and the Cologne-Frankfurt 
line, are the most demanded lines in Europe, boosting their social returns over profitability 
thresholds. The Spanish lines and the Rome-Naples line, are the ones that transported 
less passengers in 2010 with demand rates that lied between 9.000 and 14.000 
passenger per km. In the section Minimum demand thresholds for HSR positive social 
returns further on, the minimum demand for a 500 km HSR line to have a positive net 
present value is discussed in depth (page 67). 
8.3  Distribution of population 
Another key factor affecting the rail market share is the distribution of population. It is 
known that rail services will have a greater demand when connecting with high-density 
population nodes, as it is a high capacity transport mode. HSR can better serve markets 
such as the ones in France where the majority of population concentrates in the big cities. 
The Paris-Lyon corridor experiences very high demands and enables to serve nearby 
population nodes in the middle by having branches off to them. Also, conventional rail 
helps to feed the main line between smaller cities within the main corridor. In countries 
such as Germany, where population is spread out more evenly throughout the country 
than in France, fewer long sections of HSR lines will have very high traffic, therefore the 
maximum profit of HSR investments cannot be achieved. The case of Spain is similar to 
the French one but the difference is that the intermediate cities between the main HSR 
corridors have very low population compared to the main nodes, therefore demand on the 
main line will be somewhat lower. Italy’s case, because of its long and thin geographical 
nature not only enables high traffic between Rome and Florence but also serves many 
close medium sized cities, which are not far from the main corridor. The following figures 
show the countries population density and the 5 larger cities population density. [39] 
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Figure 15 Population density 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16 Population density of the 5 larger cities 
 
9  Appraisal of HSR projects  
Before starting the construction of HSR line it is very important to proceed to a detailed 
economic evaluation of the project. Due to the enormous costs, which this transport 
projects imply, careful studies have to be done in order to see if the resources spent on it 
have a positive economic return. As it has been discussed in this paper, HSR has a series 
of beneficial impacts on society but it has to be seen whether these are greater than the 
cost of the infrastructure and operation during a certain period of time. Investing in HSR 
has a big opportunity cost for society. This means that the money invested in it cannot be 
spent in other areas, therefore investments should respond to criteria that make the 
transport system more efficient, which, at the same time means maximizing the social 
benefits. 
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Not only is it important to do an appraisal before the construction of the line but also after 
a few years of operation. The ex-ante (previous) evaluation responds to decision-making 
criteria, i.e. is it worth spending big amounts of money in a certain infrastructure? Will the 
investment have good social and economic returns? Once the infrastructure has been 
built and has been operating for a few years (2-3 years) the ex-post evaluation determines 
whether initial objectives have been met during this period and also whether the expected 
beneficial impacts have taken place. Therefore, ex-ante appraisal is a tool to justify 
investments and feasibility of the project and ex-post is used to see if it has been actually 
worthwhile. 
 
The following table shows the differences between the ex-ante estimations and the ex-
post evaluations of the high-speed network in France. It is seen how some differences 
appear in some of the lines, especially in terms of demand and costs. Normally, in both 
cases, demand is overestimated and costs are underestimated. Although differences 
between the estimated and the real figures are quite significant, the social and financial 
returns do not differ to that much. Only in the case of the TGV-Nord, where demand was 
50% underestimated, big differences appear between the expected and the real returns. 
Of course, the magnitude of the error in demand estimating is proportional to the 
difference between expected and real returns. 
 
Table 19 Ex-ante and ex-post results of French TGV lines [18] 
 
Traditionally, decision-making in railway projects has been carried out by the Public 
Administration, particularly by Ministries of Transport that usually have a close relation 
with the monopolistic railway national companies. This has been the main reason why the 
allocation of financial resources has often not been the most efficient. Another reason for 
this misallocation of economic resources is not considering the effects of HSR on other 
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As commented above, France is one of the countries with the most experience of HSR, and 
it is also a country which is systematic in conducting cost benefit analyses of all transport 
projects. More recently, an ex post evaluation of French HSR projects has been undertaken 
and compared with the ex ante appraisals (Table 7). It will be seen that all the lines 
considered were expected to have acceptable financial and social rates of r turn, and to 
carry at least 15m passengers per annum. In practice, the out turn rates of return are 
generally lower, mainly because of higher infrastructure costs and lower traffic levels than 
f recast in so e cases. Howev r, the only line for which the soc al case turned out to be 
marginal was the TGV Nord, where the major shortfall in traffic was mainly due to extreme 
over estimation of Eurostar traffic through the Channel Tunnel. 
 
 
Table 7     Ex post appraisal of French high speed line construction 
 
  Sud 
Est 
Atlantique Nord Inter 
Connection 
Rhone 
Alpes 
Mediter-
ranean 
Length (km)  419 291 346 104 259 
Infrastructure 
cost 
Ex 
ante 
1662* 2118 2666 1204 1037 4334 
(m euros 
2003) 
Ex 
post 
1676 2630 3334 1397 1261 4272 
 % 
change 
+1 +24 +25 +16 +22 -1 
        
Traffic (m 
pass) 
Ex 
ante 
14.7 30.3 38.7 25.3 19.3 21.7 
 Ex 
post 
15.8 26.7 19.2 16.6 18.6 19.2 
 % 
change 
+7.5 -12 -50 -34 -4 -11.5 
        
Financial 
return (%) 
Ex 
ante 
15 12 12.9 10.8 10.4 8 
 Ex 
post 
15 7 2,9 6.5 n.a. n.a 
        
Social return 
(%) 
Ex 
ante 
28 23.6 20.3 18.5 15.4 12.2 
 Ex 
post 
30 12 5 13.8 n.a. n.a. 
 
 
Source:  Conseil Général des Pont et Chaussées (2006), Annex 1. 
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transport modes such as air, road and conventional rail. The transport system has to be 
seen in an integral way, without excluding other transport modes when appraising HSR 
projects for example. This is because the effects of building a new infrastructure will be 
noticed in the other transport modes and vice-versa. The close relation between Ministries 
and railway national companies has also been the reason for biases in the ex-ante 
appraisals, where figures have been exaggerated to justify the benefits. These 
exaggerations are usually in terms of demand forecasting which are usually too optimistic, 
leading to inefficiency of the system, under exploitation of the infrastructure’s capacity and 
thus, big cost overruns. The new appraisal techniques should substitute the old ones, 
where independent consultants should evaluate the projects, ensuring the transparency of 
the figures shown so that the most beneficial decisions for every stakeholder (especially 
society) are taken. 
 
There are two kinds of economic appraisal in transport projects: financial and 
socioeconomic. Financial analysis is the one where all stakeholders are accounted for 
and where cash flows are included. Socioeconomic evaluation is the one that takes into 
account the benefits that may be monetised for the whole of society and the costs, which 
the project implies, not including the financial cash flows. Here is where external costs are 
accounted for. 
  
9.1  Stakeholders in the appraisal procedure. 
For the financial evaluation it is important to indentify the different stakeholders involved. 
Each one will have its own cash flows and its own benefit expectation.  
 
• Public Administrations: these are State Companies that normally own the 
infrastructure. Although nowadays it is common to have public-private 
partnerships (PPP’s) in the form of concessions for some parts of the railway 
network. In a PPP, assets are partly private and partly public. Concessions are 
contracts between a private partner and the public sector for the exploitation and 
conservation of an infrastructure, where the private pays the public administration 
for the right of exploitation during a definite amount of time. The concessionaire 
(private partner) has the right to charge users (rail operators, drivers etc) for the 
use of the infrastructure, by which revenues are generated. However, Public 
Administrations always reserve the right of property over the infrastructures and 
almost always participate to a great extent in the financing of the projects. 
 
• Infrastructure managers: in some cases these are the owners of the 
infrastructure, but it may be the case that they are not. When they are different, 
they should be treated differently in the appraisal procedure since they will have 
different sources of income (tolls, track charges, taxes etc). 
 
• Service operators: recent European legislation states that the market for the 
operators must be an open one, ensuring competition between them. During 
project appraisals it is necessary to take them into account, especially in the 
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financial evaluations, as they will have costs and revenues during the process of 
operation. Tariffs and traffic forecasts are important in this sense for the operators 
to estimate their financial benefits. 
 
• Users: users are a very important part of the socioeconomic evaluation, as they 
will benefit from the project (time savings and comfort). Also, users are the ones 
who pay for the service, being directly responsible for the revenues of the 
operating companies and infrastructure managers. Sadly, railway users have very 
little influence in the decision-making process. 
 
• Non-users: this group is the rest of society, who is always a potential user, but is 
affected directly by the project’s externalities. This group should make clear what 
external costs they expect from the project and should intervene in the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Therefore, impacts on non-users should 
be monetised and quantified as much as possible to be able to elaborate the 
socioeconomic analysis. 
 
• Other stakeholders: other stakeholders in the process are: banks (giving loans), 
construction companies, material suppliers and landowners. Although these 
stakeholders have normally little influence on the decision-making process, they 
will absorb a substantial part of the cash flows; therefore they need to be taken 
into account in the financial analysis.  
 
9.2  The role of evaluation in the decision-making process.  
Authorities are to make the best use of scarce public resources. They must bear in mind 
the fact that technical committees will audit the public accounts during parliament 
sessions so they must be able to justify investments and demonstrate positive results. 
Pre-investment assessment will allow clear justification for future investments based on 
accepted evaluation criteria. After investment evaluation provides feedback on the 
project’s success or failure and is a lesson for politicians on how to invest in future 
schemes. 
 
Publishing evaluation results make processes clear, transparent and comprehensible. 
This will make transport projects more irrefutable for fast changing political attitudes, 
which are not based on technical criteria, for implementing high cost programmes. The 
fact is that politicians are not very keen on evaluation processes due to the “fear” of failure 
of their decisions and exposure to public criticism. Laws should include project evaluation 
as compulsory in order to make sure that public resources are efficiently invested. The 
failure in doing so may lead to project appraisals not being trustworthy and manipulated to 
meet the short-term demands of the authorities in charge. This process is dishonest and 
often too common, where biased evaluations are used to justify pre-established 
conclusions. [42] 
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9.3  General guidelines for transport project appraisal. 
It is important to carry out a general screening of the project considered to see how much 
effort, in time and resources, should be put in the appraisal. The following graph shows, in 
general terms, the costs of the appraisal process depending on the total cost of the 
project. 
 
 
Figure 17 Approximate costs of evaluation in transport projects [42] 
As seen on Figure 17, the cost of the evaluation in % is inversely proportional to the total 
cost of the transport project. For projects with costs above 5M!, the evaluation costs 
should be around 1-3% of the total cost. In our case, in which we consider HSR, the costs 
of projects are way above this amount; therefore the cost of the appraisal will always be 
between these percentages. For project costs under 1M!, costs of evaluation may reach 
12% of the total. Furthermore, Figure 17 shows how, in projects where new technology is 
being implemented, evaluation costs are between 2-6% higher than projects using well-
established and proven technology. Figure 17 is only a guideline and only refers to capital 
costs. However, appraisal costs also depend on the following factors: 
 
• Anticipated benefits of the project and number of set objectives. 
• Scale and nature of the project or expected deployments of the application. 
• Complexity of the project. 
• Level of certainty of expected results. 
• Data availability and difficulty at obtaining it. 
 
By looking at the rest of the factors it is obvious that evaluation costs will increase with the 
number of set objectives, with the complexity of the project and with the non-availability of 
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estimated impacts. Projects using totally untested and unproven technologies will likewise require 
more detailed and therefore costlier evaluation than those using proven technologies where benefits 
have been shown pr viously for similar schemes. 
Figure 2.2 gives an illustrati n of the approximate percentages of t tal project cost  that s ould be set 
aside for different sizes and types of projects to enable thorough and suitable evaluation to take place. 
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Figure 2.2 Approximate Costs of Evaluation 
 
The graph above is only a guide and it is important to note that capital cost is only one factor. Other 
factors that should be considered affecting the cost of evaluation include: 
? anticipated benefits of the scheme and importance of the scheme and evaluation objectives; 
? scale and nature of the scheme or expected deployments of the application; 
? complexity of the scheme; 
? degree of work already undertaken;  
? level of certainty of outcomes;  
? transferability of findings to other schemes; and  
? data availability and difficulty of obtaining. 
 
???? ??????? ????? ??? ??????????? ???????? ????? ?????? ??????????? ???????? ??? ???? ????? ??? ???????? ??? ???
application as ex-post evaluation is most often the largest source of cost. In the case of a first national 
demonstration project, it may be worth spending considerable resources on ex-post evaluation of 
various impacts from surveys of user reaction and acceptance to studies of impacts. Such detailed 
studies will allow more precise future ex-ante evaluation and allow a strong decision at the programme 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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information about the project during the evaluation. Thus, the importance for companies 
and administrations to publish clear information in order to cheapen the process. 
 
9.3.1  The screening process 
In first place, in order to simplify the selection process of possible projects, it is important 
to do a quick screening of all the alternatives. This is done before feasibility and pre-
feasibility studies are carried out. It is useful to follow the following five steps: 
 
• Be sure that all the projects are clearly indentified in terms of objectives and 
alternatives. 
 
• Rank the projects in order of priority or most advantageous with simple key 
indicators so that most unfeasible projects can be easily rejected at the beginning. 
An example in the railway sector could be “investment/time saved”. 
 
• Make sure, for demand-driven projects that the effects that users perceive directly 
are beyond perception thresholds. This means making time savings and comfort 
(what users perceive in a more intense way) to stand out from other impacts of 
the project. If users do not have a clear perception of these, it is likely that a low 
economic profit will occur. 
 
• Make sure that benefits in one projected are not linked with the benefits in 
another complementary project, for example, a project in the same corridor. It has 
to be distinguished, what benefits belong to which project. 
 
• Evaluate if there are barriers to the implementation of the project, such as political 
ones, ecological ones or physical ones. [43] 
 
9.3.2  Traffic forecasting 
All transport feasibility studies need a demand forecast. Demand is the key indicator to 
success or failure of the project. The demand analysis will not only have to forecast the 
traffic in the lifecycle of the project, but also the origin of it. Therefore it is necessary to 
make clear what proportion of each kind of traffic there will be: generated or induced 
traffic and diverted traffic from the other transport modes. Demand models should be 
adapted to each type of project and be able to predict demand accurately throughout the 
evaluation period (normally 30 years).  
 
9.3.3  Alternatives 
Transport projects are developed to provide solutions to specific problems. These can be 
congestion produced by bottlenecks or may also respond to environmental problems. In 
all transport projects there exist different solutions to solve each problem. Each of these 
are known as alternatives and should all be properly defined and evaluated. For each 
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project there is a wide range of alternatives, but they should all provide similar solutions 
(time- savings, comfort, reliability, security etc) to be able to compare them in a 
reasonable way.  
 
To start with, all projects should have a “do-minimum” alternative, which means 
guaranteeing the level of service without its excessive deterioration by doing minimum 
investments. This does not mean “do-nothing”. Instead, in the railway sector, the “do-
minimum” alternative implies the renewal of the rolling stock every certain amount of time 
(normally 30 years) and also the maintenance of tracks, signalling systems and 
electrification. As its own name indicates, the “do-nothing” alternative does not even 
contemplate the fact of minimum infrastructure maintenance, therefore it should not be 
considered as a base case reference scenario. The base case should be clearly defined, 
as it is the scenario to compare with the new project and from which benefits, such as 
time saving can be measured. For example, the base case could be an already existing 
conventional railway line with trains travelling at 160 km/h, in which normal maintenance 
and renewal of rolling stock investments are carried out during its life. 
 
When a project is interlinked with other performances, for example, in the same corridor, 
the network effects of the railway mode will cause the interaction of both to distort the final 
economic appraisal. A way to avoid this is to carry out the global evaluation of the global 
project and also of each of its individual components to reach optimal project selection. 
Moreover, it is very important not to double count benefits produced by similar parts of the 
project. This can be achieved by accurate technical studies that can distinguish between 
traffics in different branches of the railway project and their net effect on the overall 
benefits. [44] 
 
9.3.4  Environmental and social aspects 
The EU’s transport policy has tended clearly towards higher investments in HSR than in 
other transport mode’s infrastructure. This is justified by the argument that rail transport 
has less environmental impact than air and road. This has been discussed in some 
paragraphs above. Anyway, all environmental impacts during construction and operation 
period of the line must be included in the appraisal. There are guidelines to assess each 
impact from a monetary point of view and should be included in the Environmental Impact 
Assessment. This document is compulsory for al EU railway transport projects and should 
include the mitigation measures in order to relieve impacts with the real cost of each one. 
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) also includes different relieving alternatives 
to lessen the impacts produced, the cost of which will be included in the cost of the 
project. The appraisal will only consider the costs of the impacts produced after the 
deployment of the mitigation measures considered in the EIA. 
 
On the other hand there is social externalities, which are even more difficult to measure. 
The benefits produced by the construction of a HSR line have to be measured carefully 
since the economic effect is not the same between regions. The major effects are noticed 
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around stations, where land values increase substantially. Also, job generation and 
economic stimulus are to be observed carefully since a mere redistribution of these may 
occur instead of net creation of jobs and economic activity. Again, it is important to avoid 
double counting of these two last factors. 
 
9.4  The financial analysis (microeconomic point of view) 
The financial analysis is carried out by each stakeholder’s point view in terms of cash- 
flows of the project and does not take into account the costs or benefits derived by others 
in the wider community [45]. Each stakeholder should make its own financial analysis to 
ensure that the project, in which he is investing, has acceptable rates of return. This step 
of the appraisal is important to ensure the financial sustainability of the project. Financial 
sustainability is ensuring that each organisation has positive results in cash flows during 
the whole life of the project or in other words, the organisation has to cover every year at 
least, the operational and maintenance costs of the project. This means that the 
organisation must have the ability to obtain funds (grants, revenues etc) in order to ensure 
the continuity of their activities. [46] 
 
The financial analysis includes: 
•  Investment costs (infrastructure costs), including expenditure in renewal of 
infrastructure and rolling stock. 
•  Infrastructure maintenance and operating costs. 
• Vehicle operating costs (operators). 
• Revenues for infrastructure managers and operators. 
 
Taxes such as Value Added Tax (VAT) should be ideally included in the financial 
appraisal because railway projects will produce demand that will pay VAT when 
purchasing tickets. If demands rates are very high, tax flows may produce an impact in 
the financial balance of administrators. 
 
In regard to operating costs, the items that are not a proper economic expenditure should 
be not included in the financial appraisal. These are: 
 
• Depreciation and amortisation of assets. 
• Reserves for future replacement costs. 
 
Revenues should be taken into account with traffic forecasts and tariffs. Although the 
pricing policy may vary during the period of evaluation, a clear estimate should be done to 
show its impact on the stakeholder’s revenues. In regard to subsidies, they should be 
accounted for in the appraisal but properly separated from operation revenues. Many 
times, operators and infrastructure managers receive grants and subsidies from state 
funds so that their revenues are guaranteed because the extremely high maintenance and 
operating costs may not be recovered only by user payments. It is also important to take 
into account residual value, (if there is) of the assets at the end of the evaluation period. 
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This is the value at which the assets (rolling stock and infrastructure) could be sold at the 
end of the projects life. [47] 
 
Figure 18 Structure of financial analysis [48] 
 
Normally, the financial analysis is carried out by the operating companies and by the 
infrastructure managers, since they are the stakeholders, which will have the operating 
and maintenance costs. It is therefore vital to assess whether they will be able to generate 
profits to maintain the utility of the infrastructure. When all the costs and revenues are 
properly analysed per year, the economic profitability indicators of the investment are 
calculated: Net Present Value (NPV) and the Internal Rate of Return (IRR). The NPV is 
the net balance between cash inputs and outputs during the evaluation period with a 
given discount rate. The IRR is the rate, which makes the NPV zero; therefore it is the 
profitability of the investment during the evaluation period. Therefore, the NPV formula 
may be written as: 
 
NPV = CFn /(1+i)n  
 
Where; 
CFn is the net cash flow at year n. 
i is the discount rate or the opportunity cost of capital. 
n is the time of the cash flow. 
 
In the comparison of two projects, the one with higher NPV and higher IRR would be the 
one to be chosen. When evaluating single projects, when the IRR is higher than the 
discount rate used, the project is economically worthwhile. [49] 
 
For greater detail see the financial analysis for French operator (SNCF) and infrastructure 
manager (RFF) for the TGV-Est high-speed line is shown in the appendix. In this financial 
analysis, the IRR and NPV for each of these stakeholders are calculated, showing 
financial profitability for each of them. At the end, a simple exercise of how much money 
would be needed to be borrowed from different lending institutions is made: loans from 
the European Investment Bank (EIB), short term and long term loans from private banks 
with higher interest rates. The last graph shows the evolution of cash flows (blue) during 
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2.4  Financial Analysis
The financial analysis should finally result
in two tables summarising the cash flows:
1. one for investment returns (capacity of
operating net revenues to sustain the
investment costs, Tab. 2.5) regardless of
the way in which they are financed;
2. the other for the calculation of the
returns on equity capital where in the
outflows there are the own equity of the
private investor (when it is paid up), the
national contribution at three levels
(local, regional and central), the finan-
cial loans at the time they are paid back,
in addition to operating costs and rela-
ted interest, and revenues for the
inflows. It does not consider the EU
grant. It gives the rate of return of the
project considering its financial burden,
regardless its investment costs (Tab. 2.6).
In order to correctly draw up the tables
above, careful attention must be paid to the
following elements:
• time horizon;
• the determination of total costs (total
investments costs, row 1.21, and total
operating costs, row 2.9);
• revenues generated by the project (sales,
row 2.13);
• the residual value of the investment
(row 1.19);
• adjustment for inflation;
• verification of financial sustainability
(Tab. 2.4);
• selection of the appropriate discount rate;
• determination of the main performance
indicators (Tables 2.5 and 2.6, FRR and
FNPV of the investment and capital, row
5.4, 5.5, 6.4, 6.5);
• determination of the co-financing rate.
2.4.1  The time horizon
By time horizon, we mean the maximum
number of years for which forecasts are
provided. Forecasts regarding the future
20
2.4  Financial Analysis
Checklist for feasibility study and option 
analysis:
Has the application dossier given sufficient evidence of the projec-
t’s feasibility (from an engineering, marketing, management, imple-
mentation, environmental…points of view)?
Has the applicant demonstrated that alternative options have been
adequately considered (at least in terms of do nothing or do-mini-
mum alternatives?).
Fig. 2.2 Structure 
of financial analysis
1. Total investment
3. Sources of finance 6. Calculation of FRR/K
5. Calculation of FRR/C
4. Financial sustainability2. Total operating costs and revenues
Tab. 2.1  Total Investments - Thousands of Euro
Years
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1.1  Land 400
1.2  Buildings 700 600 150
1.3  New equipment 155 74 80 91
1.4  Used equipment 283 281
1.5  Extraordinary Maintenance 200
1.6  Fixed assets 1100 1038 505 80 200 0 91 0 0 0
1.7  Licences 500
1.8  Patents 500
1.9  Other pre-production expenses 60
1.10  Pre-production expenses 0 60 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.11  Investment costs (A) 1100 1098 1505 80 200 0 91 0 0 0
1.12  Cash 26 129 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148
1.13  Clients 67 802 827 827 827 827 827 827 827 827
1.14  Stock 501 878 880 880 880 880 880 880 880 880
1.15  Current Liabilities 508 1733 1694 1694 1694 1694 1694 1694 1694 1694
1.16  Net working capital (=1.12+1.13+1.14-1.15) 86 76 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 161
1.17  Variations in working capital (B) 86 -10 85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.18  Replacement of short life equipment 200
1.19  Residual value -1500
1.20  Other investment items (C) 0 0 0 0 200 0 0 0 0 -1500
1.21  Total investment costs (A)+(B)+(C) 1186 1088 1590 80 400 0 91 0 0 -1500
Tab. 2.2  Operating Revenues and Costs - Thousands of Euro 
Years
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2.1  Raw materials 1564 5212 5212 5212 5212 5212 5212 5212 0
2.2  Labour 132 421 421 421 421 421 421 421 0
2.3  Electric power 15 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 0
2.4  Combustible 5 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 0
2.5  Maintenance 20 65 70 70 70 70 70 70 0
2.6  General industrial costs 18 75 80 80 80 80 80 80 0
2.7  Administrative costs 48 210 224 224 224 224 224 224 0
2.8  Sales expenditures 220 1200 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 0
2.9  Total operating costs 2022 7252 7476 7476 7476 7476 7476 7476 0
2.10  Product A 400 1958 2458 2458 2458 2458 2458 2458 0
2.11  Product B 197 840 1140 1140 1640 1640 1640 1640 0
2.12  Product C 904 2903 3903 3903 4403 4403 4403 4403 0
2.13  Sales 1501 5701 7501 7501 8501 8501 8501 8501 0
2.14  Net operating revenue -521 -1551 25 25 1025 1025 1025 1025 0
Row numbers identify
items. They should be used
to fill in the next tables.
Residual value should always be included at end year (see
also below). It is an inflow. It is considered with a ‘minus’ in
this table because all the other items are outflows.
During the first year no operating revenues and
costs occurs, but only investment costs (see tab.1).
BOX 2.2  Time Horizon
CF Guidelines: “The lifetime varies according to
the nature of the investments: it is longer for civil
engineering works (30-40 years) than for technical
installations (10-15 years). In the case of a mixed
investment comprising civil e gineering works
and installations, the lifetime of the investment
may be fixed on the basis of the lifetime of the
principal infrastructure (in this case investment in
the renewal of infrastructure with a shorter lifeti-
me must be included in the analysis). The lifetime
may also be determined by considerations of a
legal or administrative nature: for example the
duration of the concession where a c ncession
has been granted”.
ISPA Guidelines: “infrastructure projects are gene-
rally appraised over a period of 20-30 years, which
represents a rough estimate of their economic life
span. Although the physical assets may last signifi-
cantly longer than this – e.g. a bridge may last for
100 years - it is not generally worthwhile trying to
forecast over longer periods. In the case of assets
with a very long life, a residual value may be added
at the end of the appraisal period to reflect their
potential resale value or continuing use value”.
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the appraisal period and the loans, which would have to be asked for to the different credit 
institutions. Different demand studies from SNCF were consulted and different 
assumptions in the price of rolling stock and periods of renewal were made. Infrastructure 
maintenance costs were also estimated for the 30-year period of the appraisal. 
 
9.5  Cost-benefit analysis (macroeconomic point of view) 
Cost-benefit analyses (CBA) are appraisals that show the total costs and benefits of a 
project to the community or society. In this case, financial cash flows between the various 
stakeholders in the process are not considered. The concept of “society” or “community” 
linked to a specific administrative area is subject to discussion because EU regulations do 
not allow differentiating between EU citizens of different nationalities. This is the reason 
why socio-economic benefits in the project should not make distinction among users, 
based on their particular nationality. 
 
The socioeconomic analysis is based on resource costs. Normally these costs can be 
monetised and the market will provide a value for them. However, others such as time of 
travel cannot have a value directly assigned to them. Others that cannot be monetised are 
estimated on the base of willingness to pay from users. Anyway, the objective of the CBA 
is to the see the project’s impacts on society individuals by summing up costs and 
benefits provided by the project, and finally assess if the project will be overall worthwhile. 
In this case, taxes and subsidies will not be taken into account, as they are just resource 
transfers. 
 
The following table summarizes the costs and benefits that the CBA should include in 
general terms: 
 
Table 20 Costs and benefits that should be included in the CBA (source: own 
elaboration). 
Costs Benefits 
Investment costs Reduction of travel times 
Variable operating costs Reduction in accidents (safety aspects) 
Maintenance costs of infrastructure Environmental issues 
Externalities Safety 
- Accessibility 
- Integration 
 
Of course, costs and benefits have to be itemized and further disaggregated: 
 
• Travel times for generated traffic: travel times have to be measured for the users, 
which will use the new infrastructure and compared with the times of travelling in 
other transport modes before the operation of the line (base case). 
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• Travel times, safety and comfort of existing traffic: the operation of new HSR line 
may reduce congestion on the roads, therefore reducing car travelling times; may 
reduce accidents (due to less number of travelling cars) and thus, increase user 
comfort on roads. For this, accident reduction rates have to be estimated and 
multiplied by unit values per accident and casualty. 
 
• Reduction in operation costs for private car owners: If sufficient diverted traffic is 
achieved, old car travellers will reduce their car’s operation and maintenance 
costs. 
 
• Reduction in CO2 car and plane emissions and noise. 
 
• Measure and estimate each of the external costs produced by the construction 
and operation of the new line: CO2 emissions, noise, land consumption etc. As 
said before, environmental impact mitigation measures described in the EIA, 
should be included as part of the investment costs. [50] 
 
As seen in the disaggregation of costs and benefits produced, for the CBA to success, it is 
very important to have accurate demand estimations not only of generated passengers, 
but also from diverted traffic to be able to evaluate accurately the benefits produced. 
Thus, it is important to have accurate demand studies. Also, as discussed before, the 
choice of the base-case scenario in order to estimate a benefit is very important (for 
example, the benefits produced by time-savings). 
 
To measure the economic performance of the CBA, or in other words, the output of it, the 
two indicators explained before (IRR and NPV) are used, as well as the Cost-Benefit 
Ratio (CBR). The CBR is easily obtained by dividing the sum of benefits and costs during 
all the evaluation period. If the figure that results is above 1, the project is said to be 
beneficial as measured benefits are greater than measured costs. Just as in the case of 
the financial analysis, IRR and NPV are calculated for the whole appraisal period (the time 
between the first year of construction until the last year of operation) and give the results 
of whether the project is socially profitable or not using the same criteria. To sum up, 
Table 21 shows the final criteria on which to decide if a project is socially (and financially) 
profitable. 
 
Table 21 CBA result indicators (source: own elaboration) 
< Discount rate Project is not profitable 
IRR 
> Discount rate Project is profitable 
< 0 Project is not profitable 
NPV 
> 0 Project is profitable 
< 1 Project is not profitable 
CBR (only in CBA) 
> 1 Project is profitable 
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Mathematically, the following equation must be satisfied in order to have positive social 
profitability: 
 
where; 
B(H) is annual social benefits of the project 
Cf is annual fixed operating and maintenance costs 
Cq(Q) is annual operating and maintenance costs depending on Q 
Q is passenger trips 
I is investment costs 
T is project life 
r is the social discount rate 
g is annual growth of costs and benefits that depends on the level of real wages and Q 
[51] 
 
It is easily identified in the equation that for social profitability to be positive, benefits (term 
on the left side of the equation) of the project have to be bigger than costs (term on the 
right side of the equation). 
 
9.5.1  The social discount rate 
Choosing the social discount rate is important in this process as it an attempt to reflect 
how future social costs and benefits should be valued against present ones. The discount 
rate is the rate used to discount future cash flows to the present value and is a key 
variable of this process. There is no one single social discount rate set internationally, as 
it depends, amongst many other factors on capital taxes, capital market imperfections and 
uncertainties. For the EU is set at 5% since this figure best reflects how investments in the 
future loose value compared to investments today. [48] 
 
The social discount rate extends the efficiency criterion to the case where costs and 
benefits occur over time. If the social discount rate is used to calculate the net present 
value of a project’s social costs and benefits over time, a positive net present value 
indicates the project increases efficiency or raises wealth: it produces enough benefits to 
fully compensate individuals for the forgone benefits of the resources it displaces from 
alternative uses. [52] 
 
The following table shows real social discount rates in different countries specified by 
different financial agencies. Notice that, normally the discount rate is higher in developing 
countries: 
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We follow here a resource cost approach and ignore the distribution of benefits and costs (see 
section 5.3.2 for a brief discussion on equity) and concentrate on the change in net benefits and costs 
ignoring transfers. 
 The social profitability of the investment in HSR requires the fulfilment of the following 
condition: 
 ( ) ( )
0 0 0
( ) ( )
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? ? ? ? ?? ? ?? ? ? , (1) 
where: 
'.(/: annual social benefits of the project. 
,%: annual fixed maintenance and operating cost. 
,&(-): annual mainte ance and operating cost depending on -01
-:1 passenger-trips.
+: investment costs. 
!: project life. 
": social discount rate. 
#: annual growth of benefits and costs which depends on the level of real wages and -. 
1
1 '.(/ is the annual gross social benefit of introducing the high speed rail in the corridor 
subject to evaluation, where a `conventional transport mode´ operates. The main components of '.(/ 
are: time savings from deviated traffic, increase in quality, generated trips, the reduction of 
externalities and, in general, any relevant indirect effect in secondary markets including, particularly, 
the effects on other transp rt modes (th  conventional transport m de). Other benefits related to the 
relocation of econom c activity and regional inequalities are not inclu ed in '.(/1 and have been 
discussed in section 2.4. The net pr se t value of the be efit  i cluded in equation (1) can be 
expressed as: 
 0 1 0
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0 0 0
1
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2
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where: 
4:1average value of time (including differences in service quality). 
0? :  average user time per trip 52$678$ the project.11
1? :  average user time per trip 52$6 the project.1 
-9: first year diverted dema d to HSR. 
,,: annual variable cost of the conventional mode.  
? : proportion of generated passengers 52$6 the project with respect to -9. 
2? : distorsion in market 201
0
2
& : equilibrium demand in market 2 52$678$ the project. 
1
2
& : equilibrium demand in market 2 52$6 the project. 
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Table 22 Social discount rates in different countries [52] 
 
Country Agency Discount Rate (%) 
India World Bank 12 
Pakistan World Bank 15 
EU 
European 
Commission 
5-6 
France 
Commissariat 
General du Plan 
4-8 
Germany 
Federal Finance 
Ministry 
3-4 
Italy 
Central Guidance to 
Regional Authorities 
5 
Spain - 6 
 
 
9.6  CBA summary: steps that should be followed  
  
To make the procedure clearer, the CBA has been summarized here in 7 steps. 
A. Specify the alternative projects. 
B. Decide whose costs and benefits account. 
C. Catalogue the impacts and select measurement indicators. 
D. Monetize all impacts. 
E. Account for uncertainty and choose the social discount rate. 
F. Perform sensitivity analysis. 
G. Rank and select the projects. 
 
A. Specify the alternative projects. 
Choose all the possible alternatives for the project being considered and compare them 
with the base case scenario. Make clear whether an ex-ante or an ex-post evaluation is 
being done. 
 
B. Decide whose costs and benefits account. 
In this step, the scope of the project has to be set. It has to be decided to whom is the 
project going to benefit or disserve. Depending on the scope of the project, it has to be 
decided up to which level the appraisal reaches: local, regional or national.  
  
C. Catalogue the impacts and select measurement indicators. 
List all the possible impacts (beneficial and non-beneficial) caused by the project. Some 
are obvious; others may have to be consulted in bibliography. Then decide what the 
measurement units of each impact will be such as; tonnes of CO2 / passenger-km, lives 
saved per year or passenger hours saved per year. 
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D. Monetize all impacts 
Once the list of impacts has been done, they should now be quantified and valued in 
economical terms. There are tangible impacts such as tonnes of CO2 or capital and land 
costs. These have a market value and can be more or less easily obtained. However, 
when the market prices are not available shadow prices may be used by converting the 
original into the shadow price, using a conversion factor. Shadow prices are assumed to 
be the marginal cost of a perceived benefit i.e. how much is a consumer willing to pay for 
an increase in one unit of a particular benefit [78]. Intangible impacts are for example, 
values of life, value of time and noise. These may be consulted in specific bibliography for 
each country. 
 
E. Account for uncertainty and choose the social discount rate. 
As explained before, the social discount rate is used to value present benefits of future 
investments, since future payments a worth less than present ones. It has to be chosen 
depending on the country on which the project will take place (see Table 22). At this point, 
also time horizon for the project’s evaluation must be allocated. At this point, CBA 
indicators NPV, IRR and CBR have to be calculated to obtain the results of such analysis. 
 
F. Perform sensitivity analysis. 
The last step of the CBA is studying how the decision variables (NPV and IRR) vary with 
the most important variables being considered, for instance, time savings and investment 
costs. In decision-making it is important to see how robust the analysis has been because 
robust results mean less uncertainty in the output. If a model is robust means that the 
analysed variable (IRR for instance) does not vary to a great extent (<10%) with respect 
to small variations of the other variable being considered. [53] 
 
The following figure is a sensitivity analysis of how IRR varies with investment costs in a 
CBA of a tram project in Palma de Mallorca carried out by the author. It has nothing to do 
with HSR but the intention is to exemplify the sensitivity analysis of an outcome from a 
CBA 
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Figure 19 Sensitivity of IRR to investment costs on CBA of tramline in Palma de 
Mallorca (source: own elaboration) 
 
As the graph shows, the model is quite robust as a 10% variation of the investment cost 
only implies a variation of about 0,8% in the IRR value. 
 
G. Rank and select the projects 
With all the output information of the CBA, it is time to decide which projects are going to 
be actually constructed from society’s welfare’s point of view. NPV’s, IRR’s and CBR’s of 
each project have to be compared and after that decide which project gives the best 
results. The criteria for this are shown in Table 21. 
 
9.7  Multi-criteria Analysis 
Multi-criteria analysis (MCA) is a useful way of obtaining an evaluation of non-monetazible 
effects caused by the project. Also it is useful when data availability is not much, since for 
CBA data has to be in abundance and great accuracy. Another case when this type of 
appraisal is used is when it is desired to compare results between similar project 
alternatives in a simple way. Normally, the outcome results of multi-criteria analysis are 
slightly more favourable than the CBA. 
 
 Some of the effects that could be considered in a multi-criteria analysis could be: social 
equity, environmental issues, equal opportunities, territorial cohesion, effects on other 
transport modes etc. Multi-criteria analysis gives a more general assessment than CBA, 
as it does not quantify each of the issues considered. Instead, each of the effects 
accounted for are given specific weights depending on the influence they have on the 
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global project’s effect. At the same time, a score system has to be set up, establishing a 
scale of impacts. This can be better explained with a simple example: 
 
Lets imagine that we want to assess the following impacts of the HSR project: 
• Territorial cohesion. 
• Affection to other transport modes. 
• Environmental effects. 
• Barrier effects. 
 
The next step is to set up the score system. A simple and useful one could be: 
 
Assessment Score 
Critical -4 
High -3 
Moderate -2 
Weak -1 
Null 0 
Positive 1 
Beneficial 2 
Highly 
beneficial 
3 
 
Then the specific weight of the selected criteria should be allocated. The weights are 
allocated in a subjective, but at the same time, rational way, which the examiner has to 
decide according to the relative importance of each of the single criteria. In the case that 
only the effects of the four given criteria should be assessed, the weighing could be: 
 
Territorial 
cohesion. 
 
0,20 
Affection to 
other 
transport 
modes. 
 
0,25 
Environmental 
effects. 
 
0,35 
Barrier 
effects. 
 
0,20 
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The final score would be calculated by the sum of each weighted effect score, obtaining a 
final figure, which would be the final assessment grade. If this is done in the do-something 
and the do-minimum (base case) situations, both projects can be easily compared. The 
main differences with CBA are that it does not require the use of prices and that the 
election of criteria is unlimited as it allows to “quantify” intangible elements. [54]  
 
10  Minimum demand thresholds for HSR positive social returns 
As it has been discussed before, HSR projects mean extremely high investment and 
operation costs, hence resulting in high opportunity costs for society. It has been said 
before that passenger demand in some lines in Europe have not been enough to boost 
the social profit of the investment, especially in Spain, Italy and in some German lines. 
Therefore, in order to execute ex-ante appraisals of HSR project it is very interesting to 
see above which minimum demand threshold will the infrastructure be socially profitable 
in terms of Net Present Value (NPV). Some studies have been made (de Rus and Nash 
2009), which show what the minimum demand for a 500 km HSR line should be for a NPV 
of 0. This means assuming conservative conditions, as NPV = 0 is the value from which 
the project is considered to be beneficial. Thus, it does not calculate demand thresholds 
for high project’s NPV’s, which would be a very optimistic case. 
 
10.1 The model 
The model will simplify itself by assuming that benefit generated by the new HSR line only 
come from time-savings and generated traffic. Relief of capacity, reduction of congestion, 
environmental benefits and reduction of accidents from roads will not be accounted for in 
this model, since these factors are very dependant on the condition of the corridor. 
Therefore the model assumes: 
• Fixed costs for construction of tracks, stations and superstructure; signalling 
systems, and technical equipment for traffic control (I). The range is between 
12M! and 40M!. 
 
• Maintenance and operation costs of the fixed assets that will be considered fixed 
(Ct) 
 
• Variable operation costs: energy, rolling stock and labour costs. These will 
depend on the level of demand (Cq). 
 
• Variable annual costs of conventional rail (Cc).  
 
• The average time saving per passenger considered by taking the base case of an 
existing conventional railway line of 400km travelling at 160km/h, is 35 minutes. If 
the base case were the same but reduced speed to 100 km/h, the average time 
saving would be 45 to 50 minutes. Time savings from car users would be even 
greater, but that from air traffic would be smaller. To summarize, time savings 
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have been considered to be between 30 minutes and 1hour and 30 minutes, 
including the whole range of possibilities (!t). 
 
• Values of time will be considered between 15 and 30!/hour. This range includes 
the different possibilities for reasons of travelling and possible initial combinations 
of transport modes ("). 
 
• The avoidable costs from the base case (conventional rail) are assumed to be 
half of the total costs of the new HSR line (Ct+Cq). 
 
• The social discount rate is assumed 5% as stated by the European Commission 
(r). 
The next table shows the average values assumed in this exercise: 
 
Table 23 Assumed costs for the exercise. 
 Cost per unit (thousand !) Units Total cost (M!) 
    
Capital costs    
Infrastructure construction (km) 12.000 - 40.000 500 6.000-20.000 
Rolling stock (units) 15.000 40 600 
    
Operating costs (per year)    
Infrastructure maintenance (km) 65 500 32,5 
Rolling stock maintenance 900 40 36 
Energy (trains) 892 40 35,7 
Labour costs (workers) 36 550 19,8 
 
The general formula used for the iterations is the one that follows after simplifications: 
 
where; 
# is the proportion of generated demand; 
$ is the annual average growth of net benefits; 
T is the time period of evaluation; 
%t is the average time that each passenger saves compared to the conventional mode. 
 
10.2  Results 
Under the assumptions of Table 23, the following figure shows the minimum passenger 
demand per year for a positive NPV. The table shows different results depending on 
different values of the following parameters: infrastructure costs (including rolling stock), 
time savings (expressed in monetary terms ".%t), the proportion of generated traffic and 
the rate at which benefits grow per year. 
Como suponemos que el modo convencional no tiene ni ganancias ni
pérdidas, y los costes son evitables cuando el tráfico se desvía a la alta veloci-
dad, entonces Cc = p0 q0 y p1 Q0 = Cc + ⁄ Dp ⁄ Q0, y por tanto (4.8) es equiva-
lente a:
Simplificando y re resen ando a la ratio :
Considerando que nDt es siempre mayor que Dp (de otro modo el nú-
mero de pasajeros n  se incrementaría), la ecuación (4.10) puede ser final-
mente apr ximada por:
[nDt Q0 + Cc] (1 + a) – Cq, (4.11)
donde,
n: valor medio d l tiempo.
Dt : ahorro medio de tiempo.
Q0: demanda desviada en el primer año a la línea de alta velocidad.
Cc: coste variable anual del modo convencional. 
a: propor ió  de los pasajeros generados con el proyecto con respecto
a Q0.
Para que (4.11) sea equivalente a (4.10), se requiere que nDt = ⁄ Dp ⁄
y, por tanto, (4.11) sobreestime los beneficios del tráfico generado por la di-
ferencia nDt – ⁄ Dp ⁄, lo que beneficia a la evaluación del proyecto.
Sustituyendo (4.11) en (4.5) y reordenando, es inmediato calcular el
valor mínimo de Q0 que sería necesario para el VAN social positivo:
ginés de rus mendoza y chris nash
30
nDt Q0 + Cc + ( 1 nDt Q0 + Cc + 1 Dp Q0 + ⁄ Dp ⁄ Q0 ) DQ – Cq. (4.9)2 2 Q0
nDt Q0 + Cc + ( 1 nDt Q0 + Cc + 1 ⁄ Dp ⁄ Q0 ) a – Cq. (4.10)2 2
DQ
Q0
Q0 >
1 [ r – ? I + Cq + Ct r – ? 1 – e–rT – Cc (1 + a)]. (4.12)nDt (1 + a) 1 – e– (r – ?) T r 1 – e– (r – ?) T
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Figure 20 Minimum demands, in millions, for a positive NPV under different scenarios 
[79] 
By looking at the figure extracted from [79], we can see that the most favourable case, 
where investment costs have been the lowest between the 3 possibilities (12M !/km), with 
50% of generated traffic, where the annual growth of benefits is 4% and with the average 
time saved per passenger is 45 minutes with respect to other modes of transport, the 
minimum demand for a positive NPV would be 4,4M passengers. However, this 
favourable case is not what we find in the studied European high-speed lines, where 
infrastructure costs have been proven to be much higher. A most realistic approach would 
be looking at the figure that appears in the results for I = 20M !, ".%t = 30 min (average 
scenario), annual benefit growth of 4% and 50% of generated traffic, where the minimum 
demand that appears is 10,6M passengers in the first year of operation. This shows that 
for an average European 500 km high-speed railway line, a minimum demand of 10,6M 
passengers would be needed in the first year of operation for the infrastructure to be 
socially profitable. As said before, the exercise has been done for a positive NPV, which is 
not a very satisfactory result, as NPV’s are expected to be much higher for better returns. 
This means the exercise has studied conservative scenarios, and that even the 10,6M 
¿en qué circunstancias está justificado invertir en líneas de alta velocidad ferroviaria?
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CUADRO 4.2a: Umbrales de la demanda del primer año correspondientes
a un VAN = 0 (r = 5%; T = 40; Ct = 32,5; Cq = 91,5; Cc = 62)
Qt
?
20% 30% 40% 50%
?
2% 3% 4% 2% 3% 4% 2% 3% 4% 2% 3% 4%
20 14,9 12,8 10,8 14,6 12,5 10,5 14,3 12,2 10,2 14,0 11,8 9,9
12 30 10,0 8,5 7,2 9,8 8,3 7,0 9,5 8,1 6,8 9,3 7,9 6,6
45 6,6 5,7 4,8 6,5 5,5 4,7 6,4 5,4 4,5 6,2 5,3 4,4
20 23,5 20,0 16,9 23,2 19,7 16,6 22,9 19,4 16,3 22,6 19,1 15,9
20 30 15,7 13,4 11,2 15,5 13,2 11,0 15,3 12,9 10,8 15,1 12,7 10,6
45 10,5 8,9 7,5 10,3 8,8 7,4 10,2 8,6 7,2 10,0 8,5 7,1
I
20 34,3 29,1 24,5 33,9 28,8 24,1 33,6 28,5 23,8 33,3 28,2 23,5
30 30 22,8 19,4 16,3 22,6 19,2 16,1 22,4 19,0 15,9 22,2 18,8 15,7
45 15,2 12,9 10,9 15,1 12,8 10,7 15,0 12,7 10,6 14,8 12,5 10,5
20 45,0 38,2 32,0 44,7 37,9 31,7 44,4 37,6 31,4 44,1 37,3 31,1
40 30 30,0 25,5 21,4 29,8 25,3 21,2 29,6 25,0 20,9 29,4 24,8 20,7
45 20,0 17,0 14,2 19,9 16,8 14,1 19,7 16,7 14,0 19,6 16,6 13,8
Qt: demanda total (millones de viajeros)
a: proporción de tráfico generado 
?: tasa de crecimiento anual de los beneficios netos
v: valor medio del tiempo (euros/hora)
Dt: tiempo medio de ahorro por pasajero (horas)
I: coste de inversión por kilómetro (construcción + VAN de material rodante, millones de euros)
r: tasa social de descuento
T: vida del proyecto (años)
Ct: costes fijos anuales de mantenimiento y operativos (millones de euros)
Cq: costes variables anuales de mantenimiento y operativos dependientes de Q (millones de euros)
Cc: costes variables anuales del modo convencional (millones de euros) Cc = 1/2 (Ct + Cq)
vDt
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passengers observed for an average European scenario could be too low for HSR with 
higher infrastructure costs (like some cases in Italy or Germany). 
 
If the study had considered the benefits of capacity relief and environmental benefits, the 
minimum passenger demand could be 10% lower than the 10,6M passengers/year, 
according to studies made in for the British HSR. 10% is not a significant figure; therefore 
we may assume that the study above is very accurate. 
 
11  Decision-making in HSR in the study countries 
In this section, the type of appraisal used in the four European countries being studied will 
be compared and discussed and also will the decision-making criteria in each case. 
Decisions should be made on a technical basis after having studied all possibilities and 
alternatives, but as results from this section, this is not always the case. 
 
11.1  France 
The legal process of HSR project appraisal in France is somewhat complicated. The main 
legislative framework is the Loi d’Organisation sur les Transports Intérieurs (LOTI) where 
all infrastructure planning is included and where it is stated that all major infrastructure 
projects should be appraised. RFF, the infrastructure owner, in collaboration with SNCF, 
define the guidelines to properly evaluate the projects. The process starts with a series of 
preliminary and pre project studies where different alternatives are considered, and the 
ones that get through are planned. After choosing the valid alternative, the project is 
subject to a survey of public utility. This is compulsory if the project is to be funded with 
public funds. At this point, the Ministry of Transport declares a statement of public utility 
for the project, which includes a socio-economic analysis of its impacts. Then, a detailed 
project is drafted and the ways of funding are decided. Finally, the Ministry takes the final 
decision and implementation can begin. 
 
Although the first HSR projects in France were not formerly appraised in economical 
terms, more recent projects have been subject to evaluation. The main lines in France 
that were constructed before the 2000’s  (Paris-Lyon-Marseille, Paris-Strasbourg, Paris-
Lille) were mainly appraised using economic studies concerning wider economic regional 
impacts. The further secondary lines, which are under planning or construction, have 
been mainly subject to multi-criteria analysis and cost-benefit analysis, as well as the 
economic impact studies that were carried out before. The criteria used in the past were 
general objectives such as national pride and leadership in HSR technology, since France 
produced its own rolling stock (Alstom). The majority of criteria used were only included in 
the multi-criteria analysis and not in the cost benefit analysis, therefore they did not reflect 
quantitative results. Therefore decision makers took into account mainly strategic 
objectives together with, but to a lesser extent, the financial appraisals and transport 
economic criteria. The most relevant issued in the French appraisals were: 
• Higher values of time than in countries such as Spain or Germany were used. 
 81 
• Tax revenues were counted as benefit. 
• The appraisal period is relatively short: 20 years. 
• The main indicator used is the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) rather than the NPV. 
• Wider economic impacts were also taken into account, such as job creation and 
regional effects. 
 
However, full cost-benefit analysis is required for HSR projects in France nowadays. The 
two documents specifying the appraisal criteria are Circualire Idrac (1995) and the Boiteux 
report (2001). The first one is more specific towards HSR projects; the second includes all 
types of transport infrastructure projects. The final assessment is based on the Internal 
Rate of Return (IRR) compared to the base case of doing nothing, i.e. the project is not 
constructed. Therefore, today’s French evaluations include: 
• Net financial profits of the project during its life (financial analysis), which basically 
means revenues minus costs. 
• Net gains in time for passengers. 
• Economic losses of other transport operators. 
• Impact on tax revenue. 
• External costs: noise, emissions, safety and congestion. 
 
Projects with less than 8% social return will not go ahead in France. Notice the fact that 
only social return is used as a key decision variable instead of considering the cost benefit 
ratio. 
 
In France, the government considers many other criteria to decide whether to construct 
the project or not, therefore, even though the project assessment gives high social return, 
it does not mean the project will be carried out. It is made clear in the Circualire d’Idrac 
the fact that assessment is only intended to inform decision-makers, and will not be the 
only decision variable for politicians. In French decision-making procedures, economic 
impact and regional development are very important. 
 
Table 24 Appraisal summary table for France [55] 
  
Appraisal summary Notes 
 
Financial 
analysis Yes 
Result of appraisal 
is a CBA including 
a financial analysis 
 
Cost benefit 
analysis Yes 
Main indicator used 
is IRR. "Appraisal type 
used 
Multi-criteria Yes 
Multi-criteria is not 
done explicitly but 
some 
factors are 
considered in the 
ultimate decision 
Discount 
rate 8% 
Also minimum IRR 
to accept project 
Evaluation 
period 20 years  
Key variables 
Value of 
time 
Road: 8,4-
13,2!/h  
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Rail 2nd 
class: 10,7 - 
12,3!/h 
 
 
Rail 1st 
class: 27,4 - 
32,3!/h 
 
 Air: 45,7!/h  
Value of life 
Private 
transport: 1 
M! 
 
 
Public 
transport: 
1,5 M! 
 
Value for 
serious 
injuries 
Private 
transport: 
150.000! 
 
 
Public 
transport: 
225.000! 
 
 
Value of 
CO2 100!/tonne  
    
 Effects CBA MCA 
Noise Yes - 
Air pollution Yes - 
Greenhouse 
effect Yes - 
Landscape Yes - 
Environmental 
issues 
Biodiversity Yes - 
Accidents Yes - 
Safety Personal 
security Yes - 
Journey time Yes - 
Rail costs 
and 
revenues 
Yes - 
Other mode 
costs Yes  
Other mode 
revenues Yes  
 
Performance No   
Road 
congestion Yes   
Facilities 
quality - Yes 
Not directly but 
stated in public 
documents 
Tax revenue Yes -  
Regional 
economic 
effects 
- Yes 
Not quantified in 
CBA but stated as 
political decision 
criteria 
National 
economic 
effects 
- Yes  
Economy 
Employment No -  
Accessibility Reduction of barriers No -  
Integration 
With other 
transport 
modes 
No -  
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 11.2  Germany 
 
In Germany the Bundesverkehrswegeplangesetz (BVWP), which in English means The 
Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan, is the basic framework where all the basic appraisal 
procedures are contained and it is written by the Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und  
Stadtentwicklung (Federal Ministry of Transportation). Also, the Bundesverkehrswegeplan 
2003: Die gesamtwirtschaftliche Bewertungsmethodik  is a document where specific 
methods of evaluation are explained, splitting by transport modes and paying special 
attention to HSR projects. 
 
In Germany all three analysis methods are used: CBA, MCA and financial analysis. The 
most important one for HSR projects is CBA. The Federal Government recommends this 
method for all long-distance transport projects and it separates the effects of modal shift 
and the calculation of costs and benefits. It compares the “with” scenario and the “without” 
scenario, therefore the base case is again the “do-nothing”. In general terms, the 
appraisal in Germany includes the following characteristics: 
• A formal score method in the multi-criteria evaluations. 
• A multiplier is applied to international rail projects. 
• Spatial impacts and employment creation. 
• The value of time is relatively high. 
 
The MCA is used for environmental assessment via the Environmental Risk Assessment 
(ERA) and the Spatial Impact Assessment (SIA), when non market prices are not 
available to be able to monetise the issues: landscape, water, soil, and human health. 
ERA is supposed to qualitatively take spatial environmental impacts into account, but it is 
neither combined with CBA nor SIA results. Results are considered separately in a matrix 
displaying the effects rated by impacts of the categories ?very low/ low, intermediate, 
high and very high. It is assigned to the decision-maker level in the federal transport 
infrastructure planning process. Explicit weights are given for the use of SIA in order to 
achieve a combined appraisal outcome. Thus, there are numerical values being done, 
using a scoring system. The outcome is a combined CBA - spatial impact valuation. This 
has the main advantage that decision-makers cannot neglect non-monetizable effects. 
However, the scoring method for MCA is believed to be somewhat subjective because no 
clear economic rationale is applied to the weightings used. This means that a scoring 
system may in occasions be created in order to favour some particular interest, mainly the 
promoter’s interest. Thus, benefits and costs should be monetised as far as possible in 
the cost benefit analysis. 
 
The final decision whether to construct or not is taken in by Deutsche Bahn (DB) and the 
final decision whether the project is given the money is taken by the Federal Government 
in response to DB’s decision. As said before, environmental issues have a lot of weight in 
this decision-making process. 
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In the summary table for Germany, it can be easily identified what is included in the CBA 
and MCA for appraisal. 
 
Table 25 Appraisal summary table for Germany [56] [57] 
Appraisal summary Notes 
 
Financial 
analysis Yes   
Cost benefit 
analysis Yes 
Combined results 
with the MCA. The 
output is a CBR 
"Appraisal type used 
Multi-criteria Yes SIA and ERA 
Discount 
rate 3%  
Evaluation 
period 
Depend on 
the lives of 
the 
components 
of project 
75 years for 
tunnels, roadbeds. 
25 years for 
superstructure and 
signalling. 
Value of 
time 
 
 
 
 
Non-
commercial 
travellers: 
5,47!/h 
 
Commercial 
travellers: 
19,94!/h 
The value for 
business travellers 
is about four times 
the value for non-
commercial 
travellers 
Value of life 1,176 M!   
 Value for 
serious 
injuries 
 
87.000!  
Key variables 
Value of 
CO2 205!/tonne  
    
 Effects CBA MCA 
 
 
 
Noise Yes - 
Determined by 
which the target 
level is exceeded. 
Air pollution Yes - 
Greenhouse 
effect Yes - 
Landscape - Yes 
Environmental 
issues 
Biodiversity - Yes 
Accidents Yes - 
Safety Personal 
security No No 
Journey time Yes - 
Rail costs 
and 
revenues 
Yes - 
Other mode 
costs Yes  
Other mode 
revenues Yes - 
 
Performance No   
Road 
congestion Yes   
Facilities 
quality - Yes  
Tax revenue No No  
Economy 
Regional Yes Yes Jobs created directly 
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economic 
effects 
National 
economic 
effects 
Yes Yes 
by construction and 
operations are 
included in the CBA. 
Regional effects are 
included in the MCA. 
 
Employment Yes Yes  
Accessibility Reduction of barriers Yes -  
Integration 
With other 
transport 
modes 
- Yes Included as objective in the SIA 
 
11.3  Spain 
A formal document stating that HSR projects have to be appraised written by the 
Transport Ministry (Ministerio de Fomento) does not exist in Spain. In spite of this, there 
are several appraisal guides written by Spanish authors that include the evaluating criteria 
in Spain and the figures that should be used. One example is the “Evaluation Guidelines 
for Transport Projects” written by the Catalan Civil Engineering College that is widely 
accepted not only in Cataluña but also in other regions of Spain. The second one is the 
one written by Florio et al. (2003),”Guide for Cost-benefit Analysis of Investment Projects”, 
in which, general appraisal criteria that should be used in transport projects, may be 
found. Despite the fact of having appraisal guides and set criteria, it is not compulsory to 
carry out the evaluations by Spanish law. However, the Ministry of Transportation 
(Ministerio de Fomento and) ADIF, the national infrastructure manager, are the institutions 
in charge of writing the infrastructure plan (PEIT) and to determine where the investments 
should be directed to in the railway transport as well as to all the other transport modes. 
Anyway, economic and social appraisal is carried out in Spain although it has not a 
relevant effect in the decision-making processes since the political decision was taken in 
the year 2000 during a parliamentary session: all province capitals should be within four 
hours of Madrid. The only way to achieve this goal is by HSR. [58] 
 
 Since many Spanish HSR projects have been partly funded by European Regional 
Development Funds (ERDF), CBA appraisals are compulsory following European 
Directives and are done by following the European Commission’s guidelines for cost- 
benefit analysis for investment projects. However, key variables for the evaluation process 
such as value of time are not specified in one unique value and therefore they are subject 
to a great variability depending on the project considered. In this paper, the 
recommendations of the Catalan Civil Engineering College have been considered. 
 
A distinctive fact in Spain is that increased comfort produced by the new line is explicitly 
taken into account. In other countries this would be part of specific appraisal (normally 
urban transportation) and only considered in the case that overcrowding is reduced. In 
addition, another distinctive Spanish figure is that 30% of all employment created in the 
construction process is supposed to be new. Also, the salaries of these new created jobs 
are considered benefits without using any conversion factor. This means using shadow 
prices in a large extent where market prices do not show the real opportunity cost and are 
converted to accounting prices. 
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To summarize, MCA and CBA are used in Spanish HSR evaluation. MCA is used for all 
the non-monetizable effects, for instance, some of the environmental impacts, whilst the 
financial analysis is included in the ex-ante CBA as a specific part. All costs and revenues 
are clearly written down in a 30-year evaluation period considering the “with” scenario and 
the “without” scenario. The following table summarizes what is accounted for in Spanish 
HSR appraisals. 
 
Table 26 Appraisal summary criteria for Spain [59] 
Appraisal summary Notes 
 
Financial 
analysis Yes 
Includes 
estimations on 
investment, 
operation and 
maintenance, 
sources of 
financing and 
returns on capital 
cost. 
 
Cost benefit 
analysis Yes 
Outcome is CBR 
and NPV "
Appraisal type 
used 
Multi-criteria Yes  
Discount 
rate 5% or 6% 
Recommended by 
the Civil 
Engineering 
College of Cataluña 
or Transport’s 
Ministry 
Evaluation 
period 30 years 
Recommended by 
the Civil 
Engineering 
College of Cataluña 
Value of 
time 
 
 
 
Depending 
on the 
purpose of 
travel on 
road and 
rail: 
 
Business: 
15,5!/h 
 
Work: 10!/h 
 
Others: 7!/h 
 
Air travellers: 
Business: 38!/h 
 
Leisure: 18,2!/h 
If the purpose of 
travel is unknown 
for road and rail 
travellers: 11!/h. 
 
Specified by Civil 
Engineering 
College of Cataluña 
not by the Ministry 
of Transportation 
Value of life 1,6M!   
Value for 
serious 
injuries 
 
217.000!  
Key variables 
Value of 
CO2 28!/tonne  
    
 Effects CBA MCA 
 
 
 
Noise Yes - . 
Air pollution Yes - 
Greenhouse 
effect Yes - 
Mode specific. 
Expressed in 
vehicle-km. 
Environmental 
issues 
Landscape No No 
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 Biodiversity No No 
Accidents Yes - 
Safety Personal 
security No No 
Journey time Yes - 
Rail costs 
and 
revenues 
Yes - 
Other mode 
costs Yes  
Other mode 
revenues Yes - 
 
Performance - Yes Emphasized as a key benefit 
Road 
congestion Yes No  
Facilities 
quality - Yes  
Tax revenue Yes Yes  
Regional 
economic 
effects 
Yes Yes 
Regions with HSR 
are believed to have 
increased economic 
effects 
National 
economic 
effects 
No No  
Economy 
Employment Yes Yes Included in CBA 
Accessibility Reduction of barriers - Yes 
Territorial barriers 
are studied in the 
MCA 
Integration 
With other 
transport 
modes 
No No 
Not quantified in the 
CBA but is likely to 
be assumed. 
 
As always, the main outcome of the CBA is a NPV and a CBR but the economic appraisal 
undertaken is mainly for prioritizing projects, rather than making decisions on which 
projects to really accomplish. HSR receives great financial support from the Ministry of 
Transport since accomplishing with the statements of Spanish National Infrastructure Plan 
(PEIT). 
 
 11.4  Italy 
 
The general transport plan in Italy is the Piano Generale dei Trasporti e della Logistica 
(PGT) written by the national government every 5 to 10 years. It shows out the main plans 
for transport infrastructure that are intended to be undertaken. However, not all projects 
included in the PGT are going to be constructed, but if they are not included, it is for sure 
that the project will not be carried out. The RFI, the national railway company, also edits 
the PPI (Priority Investment Plan), which includes all the investments in railway 
infrastructure and that is close linked to the PGT. The PPI states that each project should 
have an evaluation but it does not specifically refer to it as a detailed economic appraisal. 
This gives a glimpse that decision-making in Italy may not be much influenced by the 
results of the economic appraisal. 
 
The main lines of action that the PGT suggests are: 
• Projects have to be energy efficient and environmentally friendly. 
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• Projects have to be benefit the southern regions of the country as much as 
possible. 
• Reduction of congestion in the main corridors and increase efficiency and 
productivity. 
 
Apart from these general lines of action, RFI includes the criteria of financial viability and 
effects on the whole of the railway network for a project to be finally constructed. Anyway, 
the PPI is annually revised by the Interdepartmental Committee for Economic Planning 
(CIPE), which is made up by some representatives of regional governments, and has the 
authority to ask for economic appraisal of the infrastructure projects, if he thinks it is 
necessary. Many times, he thinks it is not; therefore the evaluation is not done, being 
clear that there is no formal obligation to do so in Italy. When a project is pulled out, after 
seeing the preliminary feasibility studies, the CIPE can also carry out its own evaluation. 
 
However, in the projects that are indeed assessed, CBA is the most common tool. Some 
MCA is included for minor aspects of the projects, but is not widely used for evaluation. It 
has been difficult to obtain clear information about HSR appraisal in Italy but some 
authors (Beria, 2007) point out some errors, which have been detected in the appraisal 
procedure: 
• The demand forecasts used do not come from a mathematical model, instead, 
“comes from a commercial analysis of the transport operator about the slots it 
would be interested to buy”. The model is never included and the demand 
estimates are based only in RFI passenger data. 
 
• Part of the surplus generated by new traffic in the line is not considered (time 
savings and money savings). 
 
• The necessity of constructing the project to obtain benefits is taken for granted in 
the hypothesis section, before even justifying it. 
 
• Benefits are calculated as the difference between the “do nothing” scenario at 
year 0 and the one with it at year n. The correct approach would be comparing 
benefits with the “do nothing” scenario and with the project at year n. 
 
• No relevant study of alternatives is included. 
 
• There are some calculation errors using the trains’ load factors that bias the 
estimation towards the beneficial side of the evaluation, therefore over estimating 
the benefits. 
 
• The discount rates used for the calculation in the NPV vary from 4% to 8%, 
showing clear inconsistency and non-uniformity of criteria. 
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• When CIPE has asked for external project appraisal, it has prioritized user 
benefits, environmental issues, economic impacts on regions and private 
investment returns. There is no mention of non-user benefits such as reduced 
road congestion. [60] [61] 
 
To sum up, the government together with RFI carries out the final decision-making with 
little attention to what CBA results state. Even so, if the CBA were taken into account, the 
criteria have not been well defined and the errors found in them would make the decision-
making not 100% reliable. Thus, criteria should be more transparent in order to make the 
appraisal procedure more realistic. 
 
 11.5  Comparison between the countries being studied 
This section will compare the appraisal procedures in HSR used in the four countries 
subject to analysis. The main objective is to point out the main differences and 
commonalities. However, for Italy not all the necessary information has been able to be 
collected, as sources consulted were unclear. 
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Table 27 Summary of appraisal methods used in the study countries (Source: own 
elaboration) 
Item France Germany Spain Italy 
CBA 
" (Only for the 
recent lines). 
" " 
(") (With 
detected errors 
and not always 
done). 
MCA " " " " 
Other methods 
Economic impact 
and regional 
development. 
Environmental 
Risk 
Assessment. 
Spatial Impact 
Assessment. 
 
Costs-
effectiveness. 
Economic impact 
and regional 
development. 
Financial 
analysis. 
Global effects 
on the rail 
network. 
Financial 
analysis. 
Impact of 
results on 
decision-
making 
Part of decision-
making. 
Economic 
impacts on 
regions are more 
important. 
Used for ranking 
and prioritization 
of projects. 
Used as basis for 
project inclusion 
in BVWP. 
Used for ranking 
and prioritization 
of projects. 
Results are 
important for EU 
project funding. 
Little impact. 
CIPE decides if 
appraisal is 
necessary or 
not. 
Appraisal 
horizon 
20 years 
Depend on live of 
components. 
 
30 years. - 
Economic life 
of railway 
infrastructure 
30 years for 
rolling stock. 
50 years for 
infrastructure 
5 years (tracks 
and tunnels) 
50 years 
(buildings and 
structures) 
20-25 years 
(superstructure 
and signalling). 
30 years for 
rolling stock. 
50 years for 
infrastructure 
- 
 
There are some main differences in the institutional set up of the appraisal between the 
countries but also some similarities in what refers to the methods used. However, slight 
differences occur in some criteria and in some evaluation parameters.  
 
A. CBA 
CBA is the most common appraisal tool used in the four countries although with 
differences on the way it is applied. In Spain and Italy, the degree of monetization is lower 
than in the other two countries. Although many of the major components are quantified 
(investment and operation costs and benefits), the main difference occurs in the 
environmental issues, where Germany includes the biodiversity and landscape effects 
and the other countries do not.  
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As regard for the economic impacts of the project, Germany and France monetize the 
aspects of regional development and wider economic benefits, such as job creation. In 
Spain, the wider economic impacts are carried out outside the CBA, therefore not being 
important for the CBA outcome.  
 
Also different indicators that result from the CBA are used in the different countries. Spain 
relies mainly in the cost to benefit ratio, as well as Germany, but in this case the final 
outcome is combined with the numerical results of the MCA. France uses the Internal 
Rate of Return as a result of the CBA, therefore focusing on the social economic return of 
the investment. In addition, a minimum IRR of 8% is set for the project’s success. 
 
B. MCA 
MCA is used formerly in Germany and Spain, although Germany is the only one that 
actually gives numerical scores to the issues considered which are then added to the CBA 
to give a combined result. In France the MCA is done but is only considered when it is 
difficult to compare between similar projects to finally influence the final decision. 
 
C: Impact on decision-making 
In all studied countries, the outcomes of all the appraisal procedures are not the key to 
proceed to its construction since all decision are taken at governmental level, representing 
only one input for overall investment decision. Although the results of the appraisals may 
influence in tight cases where little difference exists between two alternatives, all studies 
are mainly used for project ranking and prioritization in the national infrastructure plans. In 
fact, out of the study countries, we could affirm in Germany is where project’s appraisal 
outcomes is most considered at governmental level. 
 
D. Evaluation period. 
Different evaluation periods are considered in the study countries: 20 years in France, 30 
in Spain and variable in Germany. The period mainly depends on the lifetime of the 
infrastructure considered, which varies among countries due to different weather 
conditions, the degree of utilization and the quality of the materials used. Nevertheless, 
the longer the appraisal period, greater the value of the aggregate of the benefits will be, 
even though discounted. This has to be taken into account when comparing social 
benefits amongst countries, where different social discount rates and evaluation periods 
are used. 
 
12  Financing of HSR projects 
Financing of HSR projects is never an easy task since they are enormous projects, with 
very high costs and involving many stakeholders. Funding of the HSR lines in the 
countries of study has mainly been done through public budget, but a trend of mixed, 
public and private, funding is arising. Projects of such magnitude face a series of 
challenges to be able to get ahead and turn out to reality. The first challenge is political 
consensus within major political parties in parliament. Public budgets are approved not 
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only by governmental parties but also with the support of the rest of the chamber. Public 
budgets have a great part of them being sent to infrastructure funding and this is why 
decision makers need the outcomes of the appraisals discussed in the previous 
paragraphs. Another challenge they face is the uncertainties in traffic forecasting, on 
which highly depend the revenues of the operator and the social profits of the project. 
Being a stakeholder in this type of projects implies assuming different risk along the 
lifetime of it: demand risks, construction risk, finance risks or operation risks. Risk is 
inherent to this type of project as it is related to uncertainty. The long duration of the 
projects life and the complexity of the works make it easy for problems to come about, 
especially during construction. These include finishing the works on time without delays, 
which incur in high cost overruns or technical problems, such as ground subsidence. 
 
Another key issue for the realisation of the project is being able to assure financial 
sustainability as explained earlier in this document. Positive results in the financial 
analysis will be the key for private participation in the project’s funding. Many times, public 
funding is not enough and private partners will be needed in order to be able to raise 
funds and also to share the risks. Nowadays, no stakeholder in a HSR project is willing to 
bear all the risks; therefore Public Private Partnerships are established. However, The 
Public Sector will have to ensure good conditions for private participation by unbundling 
the HSR into key subcomponents, allocating the correct amount of risk by means of 
contractual condition and by having a strong project organisation, where it is clear what 
functions is each stakeholder assuming (operation, construction, funding, maintenance 
etc). 
 
This section will point out how the main lines the analysed countries have been financed. 
The intention is to have an overview of methods of financing and not a detailed study of 
each line since every project has used different ways of funding. Also, some key actions 
for project’s funding success will be described. 
 
12.1  Public Private Partnerships (PPP’s) 
A Public Private Partnership is a public service or private business venture, which is 
funded and operated through partnership collaboration between government and one or o 
more private companies. A PPP implies a contract between a public sector authority and 
a private partner in which the private provides a service and assumes part of the risks in 
the project. The cost of providing the service is assumed by the private partner by which it 
will become revenues via users or via government payments. There are two typical PPP 
structures: 
• Where the private sector is given a concession for the operation and maintenance 
of an infrastructure for which it is paid for by the public sector.  
 
• Where all types of outsourcing activities are carried out by the public sector to the 
private company, not only operation and maintenance of an infrastructure. [62] 
[63] 
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For the European Commission, a PPP shows the following characteristics: 
• The relatively long duration of the collaboration between the private partner and 
the public sector on different issues of a project. 
 
• The methods of financing the project come from complex arrangements between 
both partners. 
 
• The risk sharing between both partners is stated in the contract conditions. 
 
It is very typical that in a PPP created for the management of an infrastructure, the private 
partner receives subsidies in the form of a one-time grant in order to make it more 
attractive for the private investors. Also, governments may guarantee the private company 
the payment of annual revenues during a period of time. Normally the private partners 
form a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), which is a consortium of companies that will 
construct, operate, maintain and finance the infrastructure. The SPV signs the contracts 
with the public sector and is normally made up by a construction company, an operator 
and a bank (lender) which have to guarantee cash flows during the life time of the project. 
The SPV will only receive revenues after construction (during operation) and they will 
depend on the contractual conditions. However, revenues manly come from governmental 
subsidies or from user payment for the use of the infrastructure. As projects are so big 
and expensive, it is a risky enterprise and therefore the lending partners in the SPV 
(banks) will want to carry out an extensive due diligence of the projects viability before 
lending the funds and also a detailed review of risk allocation in the SPV. They will want to 
make sure that they are sufficiently protected against risk, therefore not assuming big 
losses if something goes wrong with the project. [64] 
 
The main motivations for arranging these types of contracts with the private sector are 
that the public sector does not always have the funds in order to finance (construction) 
such costly infrastructures and therefore means that public budgets are to some extent 
not much affected. The second motivation is taking advantage of the private sector’s 
expertise and efficiency in managing and operating a big infrastructure. Hence, the private 
companies intervening in the PPP must demonstrate a wide experience in the activities 
they have been assigned to carry out. This is the reason why the public sector arranges 
bidding processes to see which SPV offers the best conditions and reliability in order to 
assign them the contract. Some conditions, which the private partners are asked for in 
order to win the contracts, are: 
Financial, technical and managerial capacity to build, maintain or finance the 
project in question. 
 
• Understanding of the commercial issues. 
 
• High level of financial commitment. 
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• Proven experience in managing, constructing or operating the infrastructure in 
question. 
 
• Commercial and operation plans must be showed. 
 
• Evidence of adequate financial resources. [65] 
 
The private participation has become a popular action when transport infrastructure is 
involved. Sometimes, the project is not a greenfield project and therefore construction is 
not necessary, but management and operations will always be and both activities will be 
allocated to private companies. Therefore the outsourcing actions taking place in the 
project depend on the type of project and the contractual conditions. The next figure 
shows the number of PPP contracts in the EU (except UK) by sector. 
 
 
Figure 21 Number of projects (%) by sector involving PPP contracts in the EU [63] 
As seen in the above figure, the transport sector involved about 65% of all PPP contracts 
in the EU during the 2000-2004 period and 40% during the 2005-2009 period, and 
therefore being by far the sector in which this type of contracts are used the most. 
 
12.1.1  Advantages of PPP contracts. 
The main advantages for establishing PPP contracts for infrastructure construction, 
management and operation are: 
• Risk sharing: this means that the risks involved in any of the stages of the cycle of 
the project are shared between public and private stakeholders. This may occur in 
a variety of ways: 
o Construction risk is allocated to the private partner when assigned the 
construction tasks, at a particular schedule and price. 
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o In design-build-maintain type of contracts, the private partner not only 
bears the risk of the quality in the works but also has to be able to 
maintain the infrastructure for a given period of time. 
o In demand based concessions, the private bears the risk of traffic on the 
line and therefore, of revenues being lower than expected initially. 
 
• Advantages in cost, speed of delivery and quality: PPP’s are often set up 
expecting that the private partner’s activity during the concession makes the 
works end faster than if they were managed by the government. 
 
• Less expenditure from public budgets as private capital will be invested in the 
project. 
 
12.1.2  Disadvantages of PPP contracts. 
The main disadvantages of establishing PPP contracts can be summarized as follows: 
• Higher capital costs: normally, when a private company wants to have access to 
credit from lending entities, higher interest rates he will have to pay compared to 
the public sector. 
 
• Misallocation of risks. This may happen when the bidding process has finished 
and the private has been chosen by the public sector. At this moment, the private 
partner has more leverage to negotiate contract conditions towards his favour and 
therefore may not want to assume so much risk as the government had expected 
initially.  
 
• Higher transaction costs: these are the costs for all the legal work that has to be 
done in order to establish the contract. Lots of lawyers, financial analysts and 
infrastructure experts have to be paid not only to prepare the contract but also 
during the monitoring process undertaken by the government. 
 
• More difficulty in coordinating all the pieces and stakeholders taking part in the 
project. Lack of coordination between contract holders during construction and 
operation may also be the cause of higher costs or quality concerns. [66] 
 
12.2  Finance of the HSR in the study countries 
12.2.1  France  
French HSR network consists of six major divisions: the TGV-Est, TGV-Sud-Est, the TGV-
Rhine-Rhone, the TGV-Atlantique, the TGV Nord and the TGV-Mediterrané (see Figure 8 
TGV France). The extension plan for HSR 2010-2020 expects to invest in the new lines a 
total of 40 billion ! in spite of the restrictions in public budgets expenditure being carried in 
many European countries. The 2010-2020 plan is aiming at reaching 2000km of new 
infrastructure in the finalization of the TGV-Atlantique, TGV-Mediterrané and in the Loyre-
Bretagne Valley. 
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As explained in Liberalisation levels across Europe, RFF is the Sate railway manager and 
owner of the infrastructure, which is responsible for the provision of new rail infrastructure 
(including HSR) and also for the negotiation of contracts for the construction and 
operation of the lines. The new HSR lines are delivered by RFF to SNCF (national 
operator) where RFF acts as project manager, allocating the contracts section by section 
to different private bidders for the civil works. This is done in order to mitigate the risks 
involved in allocating the construction activity of the whole line to only one partner. 
Therefore, RFF started to enter PPP’s in order to have financial support in the 
construction of new HSR lines, especially from 2007 onwards, when the Rhone-Rhine and 
the Bordeaux-Tours lines bidding processes were initiated. Previous to these bidding 
processes, in 2006, the French law allowed PPP contracts for infrastructures. Before, 
2006, scarce participation of the private sector took place in HSR construction. These 
recent PPP contracts have allowed France to build HSR lines beyond State budget’s 
capacity. 
 
The two forms of involving the private sector in France are: 
• The concession model: where operators are allowed to use the infrastructure on 
payment of track charges to RFF in accordance to the amount of use. This way, 
the concessionaire assumes the demand risks.  
 
• PPP (Contrat de Partenariat): where RFF pays a fee depending on the 
performance of the private sector and throughout the duration of the contract. In 
this case, demand risk is taken by RFF. 
 
The PPP model has some main objectives: 
• Increase the national rail system in the budget constraint environment like the 
present one. 
• Optimise the public funds with the private finance on the projects. 
• Reduce cost and delay overruns by integrating project design, construction and 
management. 
• Transferring part of the risk to the private partners. 
• Introducing private expertise in the project’s development. 
 
The way RFF gets part of the funds sent to HSR are in the international markets in form of 
loans and the amount is subject to what RFF can repay back from the revenues of the 
access charges paid by SNCF. Therefore not all the funds that RFF contributes are equity 
but also loans from the international markets, which imply the payment of interest rates 
and therefore making the process even more expensive. These loans are guaranteed by 
the French State. Also, loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and European 
funds from the Trans European Network (TEN-T) have also been granted to RFF. 
 
Despite the fact of the growing trend of private participation in the provision of HSR, the 
part of public investment is not all paid by RFF or the Sate. Instead, local and regional 
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authorities also take part in the financing up to certain extents, depending on the length of 
the line section, which is built on each region. The average participation of these 
authorities has been between 25-30% of the total construction costs of the TGV up to 
present. This means that not all the funding effort lies on the State budget, again being a 
way of not stressing it too much. Another reason for local and regional participation is that, 
they benefit from the construction of the lines in their territories and the government feels 
that they should participate in the funding. The following table shows the amount in 
percentage, which each stakeholder has paid in three sections of the French TGV. 
 
 Table 28 funding by source (%) [67] 
 TGV-Est Rhine-Rhone Loyre-Bretagne 
State 39% 31% 32% 
RFF 24% 29% 35% 
Regional 22% 26% 33% 
SNCF 2% 4% n/a 
EU (TEN-T) 10% 8% n/a 
Luxemburg 3% n/a n/a 
Switzerland n/a 2% n/a 
 
The small contributions in the funding by SNCF correspond to the rolling stock purchase 
through lease commitments. 
 
Is noteworthy the case of the Tours-Bordeaux HSR contract recently signed between RFF 
and a private partner called LISEA, formed by a series of companies which can handle 
the funding, construction, maintenance and operation of the line. The part of LISEA in 
charge of operation will obtain revenues from charges from users and other operators 
willing to run trains on their tracks. The contract is a concession that will last 50 years and 
it was awarded for 7.800M!, the biggest PPP contract ever signed in Europe. The 
7.800M! will be obtained partly from the private partner and part from the public sector. 
The breakdown of the funding sources and quantities is as follows: 
 
LISEA is providing 3.800M!:  
• 772M! of equity provided by LISEA’S shareholders pre-financed by commercial 
banks and the EIB. 
• 1.060M! bank debt guaranteed by the French government. 
• 612M! of non-guaranteed bank debt. 
• 757M! provided by Fonds d’Espargne and managed by Caisse des Depots and 
guaranteed by RFF 
• 400M! from EIB credit guaranteed by the French government. 
• 200M! from non-guaranteed EIB credit. 
 
Public subsidies provided by French government, regional and local governments and EU 
funds sum up 3.000M! and RFF provides from its own equity the 1.000M! remaining. [68] 
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12.2.2  Germany 
By law, in Germany the State must provide and finance the necessary railway 
infrastructure that has been included in the transport infrastructure master plan (BVWP). 
The Federal government will finance investment, including construction, replacement and 
expansion of DB railway lines. DB is the State owned company that has four further 
subdivisions, which have the responsibility for maintaining and operating the lines. Hence, 
in Germany great part of the finance of railway lines comes from the central government, 
via subsidies or via loans that DB has raised. Also, but to a lesser extent, regional 
governments can contribute to the finance of HSR. [69] 
 
The main proper HSR lines existing in Germany are the Cologne-Frankfurt and the 
Nürnberg-Ingolstadt, Hannover-Würzburg, Berlin-Wolfsburg and Mannheim-Stuttgart. 
Therefore only the costs of these will be considered in this section. These sum up to 
21.000M!, of which:  
• 35% correspond to Federal government subsidies.  
• 32% correspond to interest-free loans. 
• 30% correspond to loans with different interest rates. 
• About 3% corresponds to EU granting. 
!
These acquired credit obligations by DB and the Federal government have been the usual 
financing methods. In this sense, very little or almost non-private partner collaboration has 
taken place to finance, operate and maintain the HSR lines. [70]  
 
On the other hand, EU funding has taken place in some priority projects (TEN-T) in the 
European network, for example in the Cologne-Frankfurt line that is integrated in the 
Trans-European railway axis of Paris-Brussels-Amsterdam-Cologne-London, with a 
150M! subsidy. Also in the Nürnberg-Ingolstadt line a EU subsidy of 190M! was received 
and in the TGV-Est extension on German territory between Saarbrücken and Mannheim, 
further 18,5M! were invested.[80] In regard to EIB loans, the only line that received 
financial support was the Cologne-Frankfurt, lending up to 800M!. [71] 
 
The following table summarizes the financing sources and amounts for German HSR 
lines. 
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Table 29 Sources of funding and amounts for German HSR (source: own elaboration 
after consulting sources described above) 
 Cologne-Frankfurt 
Nürnberg-
Ingolstadt 
Hannover-
Würzburg 
Berlin-
Wolfsburg 
Mannheim-
Stuttgart 
Total cost 
(M!) 6100 3500 7100 2100 
2200 
 
Federal 
subsidies 
(M!) 
1735 1225 2485 735 770 
Interest free 
loans (M!) 1552 1120 2272 672 704 
Loans with 
interest 
(including 
EIB) (M!) 
2630 1050 2130 630 660 
EU (TEN-T) 
(M!) 150 190 - - 18,5 
  
12.2.3  Spain 
As explained before, by 2010 Spain will be the country with the largest extension of HSR 
after China. Up to 2008, and excluding the Madrid-Seville line, the committed investment 
to this purpose is 24.000M!, being the highest amongst the compared countries in this 
study. By 2020, according to the PEIT, further 29.000M! will be invested to deliver a total 
of 10.000km. 
 
Spain’s HSR network has the peculiarity of having received many EU funds for its 
construction. The reasons for this is that many of the Spanish high-speed lines connect 
somewhat economically deprived areas within the country and also because of the 
Madrid-Barcelona-French border line, which will be integrated in the Trans-European 
Transport Network (TEN-T) since it is a cross-border line. The EU funds also come from 
the Euro Regional Development Funds (ERDF), which aim at stimulating poor regions in 
European countries and Cohesion Funds, which also aim at reducing economical 
differences between one country’s regions by investing in transport infrastructure. The 
following chart shows the percentage of EU funds that have been invested in different 
Spanish HSR lines: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 100 
 
Figure 22 % of EU funding in HSR in Spain [72] 
 
 
It is important to note that the Madrid-Lisbon line, which was agreed to construct in 2004 
by both countries governments, has been cancelled due to recent financial crisis and 
therefore the projected investment (2.700M! up to the border) will not take place. As seen 
on Figure 22, the Barcelona-Figures line that is a part of the Madrid-French Border line 
has received 28% of EU funding. The Antequera-Granada line has also received a big 
proportion of EU funds, specifically 44% of the total construction cost. These two regions 
belong to southern Spain’s economically deprived areas considered by the European 
Commission. The following table is a summary of Figure 22 and also showing the total 
investment costs for each line mentioned. 
 
Table 30 funding of Spanish main HSR lines [72] 
Line Total Cost (M!) % in EU funds EU funds (M!) 
Madrid-BCN-
France 
12.375 28 3459 
Madrid-Levante 12.400 10 1223 
Antequera-
Granada 
1355 44 600 
Almeria-Murcia 2519 14 348 
Leon-Asturias 2391 14 331 
 
Therefore, on average, EU funds have invested 22% of the total committed investment of 
Spanish HSR, excluding the Madrid-Seville line.  
 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
Other funds 
EU funds 
 101 
Other sources of HSR funding in Spain also include government’s equity (public budgets) 
and EIB loans for more than 2.000M!. The EIB loans have favourable conditions, which 
means the interest rates applied are lower than normal bank loans. [73] 
 
In Spain, PPP contracts only involve the construction of the line, as the State companies 
ADIF and RENFE carry out the operation and maintenance. In this sense, little private 
investment is being done, therefore increasing pressure on public national budget and 
increasing the countries’ debt. Furthermore, no regional or local contributions to HSR 
financing are made, which means these authorities have little to say in the planning of the 
lines, which is done exclusively by the Ministry of Transport (Ministerio de Fomento). 
 
The only exception to this non-utilisation of PPP’s in Spain is the Figueres-Perpignan line, 
which is the final connexion between Spain and France in HSR, and that has been put 
forward by a PPP contract between both countries governments and a private partner. 
This section is 44km long and includes heavy tunnelling across the Pyrenees. The 
concession contract includes construction maintenance and operation for a 53-year period 
that will be carried out by the private company for 1.183M!. 50% of these are coming from 
France and Spain’s government’s subsidies and the rest come from the private partners 
equity (10%) and non-recourse loans (40%), which will be provided by banks in different 
terms and conditions. [74] [75] 
 
12.2.4  Italy 
In Italy the HSR lines connect the northern cities of Milan, Turin and Bologna between 
them and also is the connection between these northern cities with Florence, Rome and 
Naples. Today there are more than 800 km of operating lines and about 400km of 
planned lines to provide connection between smaller southern cities. 
 
Italy’s Railway holding is 100% State owned but has had to differentiate between 
managing company and operations company in accordance with EU directives. The state 
created Ferrovia dello Stato (FS), the Italian railway holder, and divided into RFI, the 
infrastructure manager; and Trenitalia, the conventional and high-speed operator.  
 
In 1991, the Italian government conceded a 50-year concession to TAV, a partly private 
partner (40%) that was supposed to be responsible for the design, construction and 
finance of the entire HSR network. However, in 1997, the Italian government bought the 
40% of the private share of the company and turned it into a 100% nationalised company. 
When the projects are completed, the ownership goes back to RFI but still TAV, preserves 
the right of charging fees. RFI, in turn, charges Trenitalia when this company wants to use 
the high-speed infrastructure. Furthermore, Nouvo Transporti Viaggiatori (NTV) was 
awarded the licence to perform traveller services in the high-speed tracks during a 30-
year period and also the purchase and maintenance of the new rolling stock. 
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The financing of these companies in Italy is 100% public as the private withdrawal took 
place in 1997 due to, mainly TAV’s private partners inability to manage risk. Therefore 
TAV gets 60% of its funding from interest free loans and the other 40% are loans from the 
capital markets which have an associated interest rate, and that are guaranteed by the 
government. Total project cost estimates for HSR in Italy up to date sum up the amount of 
35.000M!, of which 19.000M! has already been financed. The breakdown of these 
19.000M! is as follows: 
 
Table 31 Funding by source of the Italian HSR network [76] 
Italian State equity 5.000M! 25,5% 
State guaranteed debt3 8.000M! 40,7% 
Loans 6.500M! 33,1% 
EU funding (TEN-T) 140M! 0,7% 
 
As seen, no other funding other than the one provided by the public sector exists in Italy, 
where scarce private participation is observed. Anyway the cash flows inputs of the 
project will be the track access charges, rental of commercial space for shops and 
restaurants in stations and State transfers to the companies responsible for all areas of 
the project. 
 
With regard to risk bearing in the Italian HSR network, it has been seen how it was a 
concerning issue for the private partners to leave the PPP in 1997. Nowadays, with no 
major private equity for the projects, the risk is distributed in the following way: 
• RFI assumes construction and demand risks 
• The service operators assume demand risk. 
• Italian government assumes credit risk in case of non-payment. 
 
13  Ex-Post evaluation of the Madrid-Seville HSR line [12] 
The ex-post evaluation presented in this section will be exemplifying, since no own 
calculations have been made. Instead, the results are from a study4 made by de Rus in 
2010 for the Swedish Finance Department, who wanted collaboration in order to evaluate 
some planned HSR lines between two major cities in that country. The chosen line has 
been the Madrid-Seville because it has been operating for 20 years now, since 1992. This 
20-year period provides more robust results than other lines that have been operating for 
much less time, for instance the Madrid-Barcelona line, opened in 2008. 
 
                                                      
3 Resorting to State debt is a common financing method used by many countries, where money is 
borrowed under certain repayment conditions. 
4 Kingstrom,B and de Rus,G. (2011).Economic Evaluation of the high Speed Rail. Report to the 
Expert Group for Environmental Studies. Swedish Finance Department) 
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As the authors of the study state, demand and cost data in Spain is not easy to obtain, 
therefore part of the data has had to be estimated. It is remarkable the fact that for 
Spanish government does not consider the investment as cost but as benefit, labour costs 
are considered output of the appraisal and relocation of the economic activity is not 
considered. The output of the CBA carried out is a NPV in 1987 ! and deflated by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) according to the National Statistics Institute. The other output 
is a density probability function of the same NPV. The density probability function is done 
by means of a risk analysis and it is very useful to see how near the project is of obtaining 
positive NPV, and therefore being socially profitable. The social discount rate used for this 
cost-benefit analysis is 5%. 
 
13.1  Costs 
• General characteristics and construction costs. 
General information about the line is that it is 471km long and works started in 1987 and 
finished in 1992, although the investment period lasted until 1993. The construction costs 
were 2.100M! of 1987 and were distributed evenly during the construction period. This 
cost does not account for the building costs of stations, planning costs and land 
expropriation costs. The life of the projected is 50 years although the evaluation period will 
be 30 years. There will be no residual value of the infrastructure at the end of its life. 
 
• Operating costs 
These will depend exclusively on the labour costs of running trains and will be estimated 
in accordance with the number of trains that are operated per day. The operating costs of 
trains are estimated to be between 90 and 120! per seat-km in 2002 Euros. To calculate 
the total operation costs we need the average number of seats per train (330) and the 
number of km per year that each train travels, which will be maximum 500.000km. 
  
• Rolling stock acquisition 
The cost of the purchase of rolling stock is estimated to be between 33.000 and 65.000! 
per seat in 2002. The average life of a train is 30 years. VAT is not deducted from the cost 
of rolling stock as it is all imported. 
 
• Maintenance costs 
These will include rolling stock and infrastructure maintenance. For this study, 
infrastructure maintenance costs were estimated to be 10.000!/km in 2009 and rolling 
stock maintenance will be assumed to 3,3!/1000km, since these are directly proportional 
to the number of km each train travels (up to a maximum of 500.000 per year). VAT for 
maintenance and operation costs will be: 
 
o 13% for 1987-1992. 
o 16%for 1992-2010. 
o 18% from 2010 onwards. 
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For maintenance and operation labour costs a factor of 0,9 will be taken into account for 
shadow pricing. Shadow pricing is allocating costs to any intangible asset, with no market 
value, in a production process. 
 
13.2  Demand 
Demand is assumed to be constant throughout the day, therefore not considering peak 
hours. Demand data has only been available for the 1992-2004 period. For the rest of the 
evaluation period, the demand-income elasticity is considered to be 1; therefore demand 
estimations will grow linearly with the countries population income evolution. According to 
IMF and the National Statistics Institute the growth for the period 2010-2015 will be 1% 
and for the rest of the evaluation period it will vary between 1-4%. The load factor in each 
train will be 0,7. In the first year of operation, 2,3 million passenger trips were made in the 
whole line.  
 
The estimation of diverted traffic comes from the total demand estimation per year and 
multiplied by the percentage of diverted traffic. According to COST 318 (review published 
by the EU Technical Committee on Transport), these percentages are: 
o 45% from air transport. 
o 2% from bus users. 
o 26% from conventional train users. 
o 12% from car users. 
o 15% of generated traffic. 
13.3  Travel times and value of time 
• In vehicle times are taken from RENFE’s webpage. 
• Values of waiting time are twice the values of in-vehicle time. 
• The values of time are gathered from de Rus and Roman 2006, an ex-post 
analysis of the Madrid-Barcelona line: 
• Access and egress times for HSR, bus and conventional rail are identical 
 
Table 32 Value of access and egress times in different transport modes. [77] 
 
 
13.4  Benefits 
13.4.1  Avoidable costs 
These refer to the costs that can be saved from the operation of buses, airplanes and 
conventional rail with the introduction of the new HSR line.  
• The price per km for IBERIA (the air company that used offer more services 
between Madrid and Seville) is 0,15! in 2009. 
• The bus fares are taken from the main bus operators between the two cities. 
 HSR (!) Plane (!) Bus (!) 
Egress cost 5,23 8,20 3,80 
Access cost 3,33 6,91 3,29 
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• The cost of using cars is taken from the petrol prices net of taxes and 
depreciation costs from the Spanish Road Association. 
 
13.4.2  Congestion 
Estimated hourly demand is taken from the Transports Ministry (2007) data, including 
average speed of vehicles in the corridor. With the car load-factor and the demand in 
each demand station, the number of passenger-km may be calculated and therefore the 
road demand can be distributed through the hours of operation of the HSR. Reduction of 
speed (without the diverted users) is transformed to time and then compared with the time 
using HSR. The resulting time is then multiplied by the value of time in the road transport 
to obtain the monetary benefits of reducing congestion. 
 
13.4.3  Accidents 
For the economic valuation of life saving, the statistical monetary value of a life and the 
number of lives saved due to diverted traffic are needed. The value of life is extracted 
from IMPACT (2008) including the values for injured (severe and lightly) and the number 
of casualties avoided per passenger-km is extracted from DGT (2006) (Spanish Road 
Traffic Authority). Knowing the demand in the corridor (vehicle-km) and the casualty rate, 
the cost avoidance in life and injuries may be measured. 
 
13.5  Analysis of time savings and generalised costs per transport mode 
In this section, a comparison will be made between door-to-door times and generalised 
cost on the different transport modes assuming the values stated above. The next figure 
compares door-to-door travel times (in hours) from Madrid to Seville in the different 
modes. 
 
 Figure 23 Door-to-door travel times in different transport modes [12] 
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As seen on Figure 23, travelling by air has a lower door-to-door time than HSR, but as 
regard to the total cost, the high access and egress time for the plane makes the 
generalized cost of travel in this mode higher than in HSR (remember that the value 
access times are twice of that of in-vehicle time). 
 
The next figure shows the time benefits in 2010 ! obtained from the deviated demand in 
each transport mode compared to HSR.
 
Figure 24 Time savings benefit per passenger-trip 5 [12] 
Figure 24 shows how the most benefit is obtained from the old conventional rail users that 
shift to HSR. Although the biggest door-to-door time difference is between bus and HSR, 
the insignificant 2% diverted demand makes the conventional rail users the most 
benefited. In addition, although 45% of plane users shift to HSR, the door-to-door time 
difference is so small that the benefits per passenger-trip of HSR are not that great 
between these two modes. 
 
The generalised cost of travel is the variable that users use to decide which mode to 
choose. The generalised cost of travel is the out-of-pocket cost (fares) plus the door-to-
door time multiplied by the value of time of travellers. The following figure shows the 
generalised cost of travel per passenger-trip for the users shifting from the different 
transport modes in 2010 !. 
                                                      
5 The graph should be read by pairs i.e. plane-HSR, Bus-HSR etc as it compares each transport 
modes benefit to HSR. 
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Figure 25 Generalised cost of travel for the users of each transport mode compared to 
HSR [12] 
 
There is strong modal competition between plane and HSR and Bus and HSR, although 
for this last one, the difference is in the total travel time. The price component for the air 
transport is what makes its generalised cost greater than that of HSR. However, price 
policies in the air sector are subject to external factors such as the cost of fuel or in the 
case of HSR, to governmental decisions.  
 
The following figure is extracted directly from the ex-post analysis made by de Rus (2012) 
and is where the balance between costs and benefits may be seen. The table 
summarizes for the 30-year evaluation period and discounts prices at a 5% discount rate 
until 1987. 
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13.6  Results of the ex-post appraisal 
 
Figure 26 Balance of costs and benefits in the CBA [12] 
 
At the top we can see costs, which have a negative sign and below we can se benefits. 
Some of them are broken down into constituent parts. Generated demand benefits are 
considered as the new users willingness to pay and are calculated as half of the 
difference in generalised costs of travel between the compared modes of transport. 
 
The red figure at the bottom left is the NPV for 1987, which was the first year of 
construction. It is clearly a negative figure (-2.265M!) expressed in 2010 !, and it is 55% 
of the construction costs (4.115M!). The reason for this negative NPV is the extremely 
low demand on the line, where in the first year of operation, only 2,3M passengers used 
the line and from these, only 1,2M travelled the whole haul from Madrid to Seville o vice 
versa. In addition, the time benefits (in Euros) generated by the new HSR line were not as 
great as expected, compared to plane, which still provides the lowest door-to-door time 
between both cities. Another explanation to the extremely low NPV for this infrastructure 
are the massive fixed costs (maintenance) and variable costs (operation and rolling stock 
maintenance), which sum up 35% of the total costs. The fact that maintenance and 
operation costs are higher than the benefits generated by time savings and generated 
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Table 5.1 Benefits of the HSR Madrid-Seville 
 Benefits 2010* % Discount rate 
(3%) 
25% increase 
in VOT 
Infrastructure Investment -4,115,670 60.6 -4,462,798 -4,115.670 
Infrastructure Maintenance -562,097 8.3 -882,418 -562,097 
Rolling Stock Investment -318,885 4.7 -434,782 -318,885 
Rolling Stock Operation and 
Maintenance -1,796,242 
 
26.4 
 
-3,006,700 -1,796,242 
TOTAL COST -6,792,895 100 -8,786,697 -6,792,895 
Time savings 1,580,567 34.9 2,710,696 1,975,709 
 -Conventional train 1,235,903 27.3 2,120,121 1,544,879 
 -Car 138,848 3.1 237,971 173,560 
 -Bus 49,421 1.1 84,676 61,776 
 -Air transport 156,395 3.5 267,928 195,494 
Generated demand 780,681 17.2 1,302,319 861,224 
Cost savings in other modes 1,934,446 42.7 3,166,381 1,934,446 
 -Conventional train 785,714 17.4 1,287,343 785,714 
 -Car 391,093 8.6 640,900 391,093 
 -Bus 12,619 0.3 20,631 12,619 
 -Air transport 745,020 16.5 1,217,507 745,020 
Accidents 225,813 5.0 346,791 225,813 
Congestion 6,323 0.1 11,623 7,903 
TOTAL BENEFITS 4,527,830 100 7,537,810 5,005,096 
NPV (1987) -2,265,066  -1,248,887 -1,787,800 
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Figure 5.7 Probability distribution of the NPV Madrid-Seville 
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demand, clearly shows that the line needs a much higher volume of total demand to be 
socially profitable. 
 
The two columns on the right in Figure 26 are the result of the sensitivity analysis carried 
out. The analysis consists of, in first place reducing the social discount rate to 3 , and in 
second place, increasing values of time 25%, with respect to the initial evaluation (first 
column). In both cases one would expect to obtain a better NPV value, which is in fact 
what happens, but the NPV’s are still way away of being a positive figure. This highlights 
that the social profitability of the Madrid-Seville HSR line is nowhere near of being a high 
value, even when favourable conditions for that to happen have been studied. 
 
Lastly, the risk analysis showed in Figure 27, shows that the probability of the NPV to be 
positive during the evaluation period is zero. It has to be noted that not all the exact 
demand values were used for this CBA, instead many were estimated, therefore this 
probability distribution may vary slightly using the unavailable real annual demand 
numbers. Anyway, the maximum result shown in the density function is -1.700M!. This 
analysis clearly shows the negative social value of this investment. 
 
Figure 27 Probability distribution of NPV in the Madrid-Seville line [12] 
13.7  Remarks on the CBA of the Madrid-Seville line exposed. 
 
My own remarks on this CBA are the following: 
• The analysis has not accounted for any type of environmental benefits 
derived from the loss of road traffic. This is estimating the amount of 
pollutants that will be saved from being released to the atmosphere. 
Instead, they contend that during construction, CO2 emissions are greater 
than the amount of CO2 saved due to the operation of the line during 30 
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years. In fact, authors say that, from a climate point of view, it would be 
better to upgrade existing conventional rail lines rather than constructing 
a new HSR line. Also, no reduction in noise has been evaluated.  
 
• The CBA has not accounted for any impacts on either regional 
economies or national economies. This means it has not taken into 
account the job creation during construction and operation of the line and 
the derived wider economic impacts for the country. 
 
• The IRR has not been calculated although it implies no extra difficulty. 
Using the same software as for calculating the NPV, the IRR is easy to 
calculate, as it is the discount rate for which the NPV is zero. The IRR 
indicates the efficiency or yield of a project in contrast with the NPV, 
which shows its magnitude or value. In my opinion, both indicators should 
be calculated in order to have a better global result from the CBA. 
 
14  Conclusions 
The conclusions will respond to the issues raised at the beginning of the document, which 
are the aims of this thesis. The goals of this thesis can be rated as fulfilled. The 
conclusions will be separated in relation to the aims stated at the beginning of the 
document and will only reflect the authors deductions from the research that has been 
carried out. 
 
14.1  Effects of the separation of management and operations in railway 
companies. 
• Although compulsory according to European Directives, proper separation of 
operation and management in the railway sector has not yet been done in the 
studied countries. Separation has occurred only to comply with the mentioned 
Directive; therefore minimum effort has been done for a complete separation in 
independent companies. All that has happened is separation of accounts of the 
same undertaking under different commercial names, although both “new” 
companies still belong to the same global enterprise. This global enterprise is still 
owned by the public sector, specifically the Ministry of Transport of the studied 
countries. The basic intention of this separation processes is to achieve 
liberalisation of the infrastructure i.e. to allow new companies to enter the market 
and break with the prevailing monopoly conditions until now.  
 
• The direct consequence of this unfulfilled separation of functions in the railway 
sector is that little liberalisation has occurred. Mainly, State companies operate 
the railway services. The exception in the studied countries is Germany, where 
more companies are operating other than Deutsche Bahn, mainly because of new 
entrants in the freight transport sector, which is not subsidized by the State and 
therefore easier for the newcomer to compete. The rest of the countries have only 
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opened the railway market for freight companies, not for the passenger services. 
This shows that further liberalisation should take place in order to warrantee full 
competition in the passenger services market. 
 
14.2  Reasons for the growing trend of HSR construction in Europe 
• The main reason that governments give for justifying HSR construction is the 
capacity constraints that actually appear in the conventional railway networks. 
In France the Paris-Lyon corridor was suffering from important congestion 
problems before 1981 when the new HSR between both cities was opened, and 
only 11 years later it achieved 19 million passengers, therefore asserting the 
justification of capacity. 
 
• In Germany, the main reason for HSR construction or even better, the upgrade of 
conventional lines to faster lines (not necessarily HSR), was the need for the 
country to transport freight from the ports in the north to the industrial areas in the 
south after reunification. Some capacity problems were also used as pretext for 
the first lines to be constructed (Hannover-Würzburg). 
 
• In Italy, the Alta Velocittà/Alta Capacità (upgraded conventional lines up to 
230km/h for freight and passengers) was constructed so that a better integration 
with the conventional lines would expand the railway transport capacity in 
passenger services. Also, it was thought that the AV/AC would favour the 
maintenance of conventional lines between cities that were connected by AV/AC. 
 
• In Spain, the main motivation for HSR is the reduction of travel times between 
Madrid and the rest of province capital cities within less than 4 hours. Therefore, 
this criterion does not respond to technical transportation issues such as 
optimization, capacity or integration between transport modes. Also, in Spain, 
achieving a very extensive HSR network is synonym of technological forefront. 
 
14.3  Costs and benefits of HSR 
• There are different costs for HSR construction between the studied countries. The 
highest average cost per km of line are found in Italy and Germany with 30M!/km 
and 25M!/km respectively. The lowest average costs are observed in France and 
Spain with 15M!/km and 14M!/km respectively. 
 
• These big construction costs differences are mainly because of the harsh 
mountainous terrain in the north of Italy, which implies a lot of tunnelling and 
viaducts. Also topographical issues make the German costs higher. Political and 
bureaucratic discrepancies have also induced high cost overruns in Germany, as 
well as higher land expropriation costs due to densely populated areas. Another 
reason for these higher costs is the restrictive environmental policies in Germany, 
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which force to take strict environmental protection measures and therefore an 
increase in the project’s cost. 
 
• Regarding infrastructure maintenance costs, France and Spain present higher 
values than Italy mainly because Italy’s technology is not that of the other two 
countries. AV/AC infrastructure is not as sophisticated (as lower speed is 
achieved) as the Spanish or French, leading to lower costs. 
 
• Benefits of HSR are similar in all countries in terms of time savings, comfort and 
more capacity in congested corridors but it has been proved by experience that 
HSR does not favour the economies of poorer and smaller areas, but it favours 
the activity suction towards bigger nodes. 
 
14.4  Most suitable conditions for HSR deployment. 
The most suitable conditions for HSR deployment are summarized in the following lines: 
• HSR is most suitable for medium haul journeys (200-500km) due to lower door-to-
door times compared with the plane. Above 550km, the plane achieves 
advantage over HSR in term of door-to-door time. 
 
• In many important medium distance corridors, since HSR was deployed, air 
market shares have dropped dramatically in favour of the train. Usually when the 
journey is 3 hours or less, the HSR takes larger proportion of the market share. 
Although this does not mean that demand rates are acceptable for HSR, 
especially in Spain, where high market shares does not mean high demand. With 
respect to road traffic, the introduction of HSR has reduced the amount of traffic 
but not as much as in the air transport. 
 
• HSR must be introduced in highly demanded corridors for the project to be 
socially profitable. Before operations start, the capacity of the corridor must be 
adjusted to its real demand in order to optimize costs.  
 
Regarding population distribution, it has been proved that HSR works better when 
the population is congregated in few high-density nodes, together with the fact 
that urban areas near the main corridor have intermediate sized population. This 
way, the main corridor can be fed by branches to and from these medium sized 
cities. Where this applies best is in France, especially in the Paris-Lyon corridor.  
 
• If demand is lower than 10 million passengers during the first year of operation, 
an average 500km HSR line with average costs in Europe and assuming 
conservative conditions of other parameters (operator’s annual revenue growth, 
generated demand and time savings), the NPV will be negative and the IRR will 
be rather low (lower than the social discount rate), therefore the investment is not 
socially profitable. 
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14.5  Decision-making processes and criteria differences within the study countries 
• In all countries, France, Germany, Spain and Italy, the three types of appraisal 
techniques are used for HSR projects. These are, cost-benefit analysis, multi-
criteria analysis and the financial analysis. Although the focus and the criteria 
included in the evaluations vary significantly. 
 
• In Germany, the environmental criteria a largely evaluated and influence the 
decision-making process to a large extent. Germany is unique since it carries out 
SIA and ERA in the MCA (qualitative results outputs) for evaluating landscape 
and biodiversity issues during the project’s construction and operation. 
 
• France and Spain’s evaluations are more focused to economic impact and 
regional development. In the case of France, a minimum IRR in the CBA must be 
obtained in order to put the project forward. 
 
• In Italy, not much information regarding HSR project appraisal criteria has been 
gathered; therefore the author deducts that is not an extended practice in that 
country. Research has confirmed that the little appraisal done is erroneous and 
not accurate. However, financial analysis (cash flows analysis during the life of 
the project) is somewhat important, just like in Spain. 
 
• Despite of the project appraisals, the final decision is always taken in the 
Transport Ministry of each country, so it is always a political decision, that may be 
or may be not influenced by the technical support provided by the appraisals. 
 
• The variables (value of time, value of life, value of a CO2 tonne etc) used in the 
appraisals vary across the countries, mainly influenced by economic parameters 
such Gross Domestic Product or income. 
 
14.6  Financing sources for HSR 
• France is the country that has developed the PPP contracts the most out of the 
four studied countries. As explained, about 55% of the funding for the new 
projected lines in the TGV-Atlantique comes from private sources. Although the 
already existing lines have been mainly financed by State funds (about 60%) and 
regional and local funds. EU contribution to the development of HSR has been 
substantially low (8-10%). 
 
• Spain is the country that, due to its inclusion in the Euro Regional Development 
Funds and Cohesion Funds development plan, has had the largest EU finance for 
its HSR lines (between 10-40%). The rest come from Public Budgets, which many 
times have to depend on bank loans, therefore increasing Public Debt. Recently a 
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PPP concession contract has been signed to build and operate the HSR link 
between France and Spain, which is the first of this type for Spain. 
 
• In Germany, State funds come from loans with interest rates and also from 
interest free loans. A large proportion of the German funding for HSR comes from 
the Federal government, with very little proportion of EU funding (about 3%). 
 
• Italy’s HSR network (or AV/AC) has also been broadly financed by State funds, 
which are either State equity or loans (Public Debt). Very small private 
participation has taken place in Italy and also has received very small proportion 
of EU funds. 
 
14.7  Ex-post evaluation of the HSR line between Madrid and Seville in Spain. 
• The ex-post evaluation of this project is an example of how a project has been 
undertaken without the necessary ex-ante appraisal, especially regarding demand 
forecast. Demand rates have to be accurately estimated, because demand is 
what determines the social profitability of a transport project. Even more when 
dealing with HSR project where investment costs are extraordinary high. 
 
• A NPV of -2.200M ! means that cash flows in terms of costs and benefits to 
society are totally on the side of the economic loss, therefore being the costs 
much higher than the benefits that were expected from the project.  
 
• An ex-post appraisal of the Paris-Lyon line has not been presented but with more 
than 20 million passenger per year, it is clear that social profitability should be 
high. 
 
• Ex-post evaluations are good to see how a project has performed during a certain 
period of time and to prove whether initial objectives have been achieved. 
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